

Carlisle Barracks, PA

STRENGTH—WISDOM

PREVENTING AND MANAGING CONFLICT IN AN UNSTABLE WORLD

Karen Finkenbinder and Paul M. Sangrey



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**Preventing and Managing Conflict
in an Unstable World**

**Edited by
Paul M. Sangrey and Karen J. Finkenbinder**

**An Anthology of United States Army Peacekeeping
& Stability Operations Institute Intern Papers**

May 2014

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INTRODUCTION

Paul Sangrey and Karen Finkenbinder

The genesis for this anthology occurred almost two years ago. As the internship program grew, we realized that many of their projects were too good to be used only by us. We thought their ideas deserved a forum where others might also benefit from their observations. This anthology is not exhaustive. In fact, there were many more papers we would have liked to include but, alas, we had to make the cut somewhere. These papers were written between 2010 and 2012.

As we noted in our recently published monograph, *Smart Research: Leveraging Interns and Fellows to Enhance Your Research Program*, most often, interns are brought into organizations and given basic tasks. That is not the *modus operandi* at PKSOL. The number one rule here is that each intern must be given a *real* assignment, not “make work” and, most often, that project comes from our or a collaborator’s research list. These are research projects that would not otherwise be completed.

In addition to research projects, some interns are assigned to operational projects. These vary each semester though there are five fairly long-term projects that are currently in progress. They are: The Peace, Stability, Irregular Warfare Research Project; The International Forum for the Challenges of Peace Operations Research Project; Army Training related to Peace and Stability Activities; Protection of Civilians, and the United Nations Case Studies Project. Dozens of interns have assisted, and in some cases managed intern teams, to support these projects.

The Peace, Stability, Irregular Warfare Research Project (PSI): The purpose of the PSI is to provide educators, students and those in leadership positions with a bibliography of the major works outlining events, thoughts, and doctrine in stability operations, counterinsurgency, and peace operations. Of particular interest are works that caused a substantive change in the overview of key issues. Numerous interns have contributed to this project.

The International Forum for the Challenges of Peace Operations Research Project: The International Forum for the Challenges of Peace Operations is currently comprised of 19 partner nations and seeks to promote and broaden the international dialogue between key stakeholders addressing peace operations issues in a timely, effective and inclusive manner. PKSOI has been the U.S. partner in the Challenges Forum since 1997 and, since 2011, has co-partnered with the Department of State's Bureau for International Organizations. Interns have contributed to a variety of different projects for Challenges which have provided opportunities to work with several international organizations.

Army Training for Peace and Stability Activities: PKSOI is tasked by the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) to review collective tasks, Combined Arms Training Strategy, Mission Essential Task List (METL) Development and Training Support, as they relate to peace and stability activities. Interns have become integral to the development of tasks and training strategies than can be used by any type of unit or echelon required to engage in peace or stability activities.

Protection of Civilians: PKSOI has been designated as the Army's proponent for Protection of Civilians and has developed, and continues to develop, several

references related to the Protection of Civilians (PoC). Interns have contributed as research assistants to: The Mass Atrocity Response Operations (MARO): A Military Planning Handbook; Mass Atrocity Prevention and Response Options (MAPRO): A Policy Planning Handbook; Protection of the Civilians Reference Guide; and several doctrinal publications.

United Nations Case Studies: PKSOI keeps a library of binders related to every, historical and current, UN mission. These binders are repositories of articles and reference materials and are used by students, researchers and others. Though originally completed in 2008, since that time, interns have been reformatting, updating, and enhancing them. They are working towards digitizing them so they can be readily available on the Web.

As you can see, interns make lasting contributions. We have always embraced a whole-of-government, interagency, and comprehensive approach and our interns' contributions are a natural outgrowth of our organizational philosophy. They make a profound impact upon our organization. We hope you will enjoy their work as much as we do.

**SECTION I:
MANAGING ONGOING CONFLICT IN HOST
COUNTRIES**

CHAPTER 1

HOW MUCH IS ENOUGH? ANALYZING SOLDIER-TO-CIVILIAN RATIOS IN OCCUPATION Jeremy Wallace

INTRODUCTION

History is littered with examples where the inability to stabilize a nation at the conclusion of military operations has led to even more complex problems. In accordance with Western tradition, the invading nation achieves proper stabilization by providing security and basic services to the civilian population while working towards a peaceful transfer of power back to the subdued country's home government. If done correctly, the foreign nation can avoid a costly insurgency and gain a valuable diplomatic partner. While the United States' military is aware of this premise, its performance in Iraq, during the early occupation, leads one to question why the United States was unable to achieve this desired outcome. If the Surge of 2007 proved anything, it is that the size of an occupying force is one of the most important, if not the most important, factor in providing the security and services necessary in a successful occupation. How many soldiers are enough, however? By analyzing the examples of United States' military occupations of sovereign nations: Mexico, the Confederate States of America, the Philippines and Germany; and taking into account the circumstances unique to each case, it is possible to discern the optimal ratio of occupying force per occupied population in a future conflict.

MEXICAN-AMERICAN WAR

Winfield Scott's Occupation of Vera Cruz and Mexico City

The Mexican-American War, fought from 1846 to 1848, is most remembered for fulfilling Manifest Destiny and providing the training ground for the future leaders of the Civil War. Militarily, however, the Mexican-American War provides the first example of a successful occupation by American forces. The policies employed by Major General Winfield Scott in Vera Cruz and Mexico City set the pattern for future policies employed by the United States' military.¹ Meanwhile, analyzing Scott's fellow officer and professional rival Major General Zachary Taylor and his experiences in northern Mexico provides counter-examples to Scott's successful occupation.

Scott, even after a string of military successes, was in a precarious situation in early 1847.² His army of several thousand men, small even by the standards of the day, could not hope to subjugate a nation of 7 million without gaining the acceptance of the Mexican people. With this knowledge, Scott proceeded carefully after the surrender of Vera Cruz on 27 March 1847.³ The general declared martial law in the city – a precaution to protect the Mexican citizens as well as his own men. While there was robbing and looting before the formal surrender of Vera Cruz, Scott stamped out unruly behavior. He heavily punished cases of murder, rape, assaults, robbery and destruction of property. Both Mexicans and Americans were subject to these provisions, but Scott wisely allowed a Mexican commission to try the civilian population and an American commission to weigh the crimes of

soldiers. Punishments included fines, imprisonment, forced labor, lashes and even hanging in the case of an American soldier convicted of rape.⁴ When American transgressions continued, he made a personal plea to his officers and “good soldiers” to curb the illegal behavior of their comrades. A week later, Isaac Stevens, an American engineer, informed his wife that “scarcely and outrage has been committed in the city.”⁵

The General did more than just prevent crime, however. He also “regulated food prices, issued 10,000 rations to the poor and paid idle citizens to clean debris out of the streets.”⁶ Furthermore, American soldiers loaned money and shared their food with needy residents. As a show of respect to the clergy of a deeply religious population, Scott ordered his men to salute priests and personally requested permission to use two local churches. Despite his Protestant upbringing, Scott and his staff donned dress uniforms and were active participants in religious services at the Vera Cruz cathedral.⁷ Scott’s strict discipline and show of respect to the native population paid dividends. Guerrilla bands that could have otherwise posed a serious threat to his army never gained the support necessary to be more than an annoyance.

Scott’s policies of “strict discipline, respect for property, reverence to religion, purchase of supplies, and like measures” helped maintain security and prevent uprisings in every city he occupied. In perhaps his most impressive feat, the General captured and held Mexico City, a metropolis of 200,000, with only 7,000 soldiers, a soldier-to-civilian ratio of 3.5 percent.⁸ While Scott acted in accordance with the principles that lead to a successful occupation, his success was also a product of the times and circumstances. First, the vast majority of the Mexican population was indif-

ferent or accepting of the American presence. The aristocracy had fled from the Americans' advance, and the extremely poor did not notice a change in their livelihood. Meanwhile, the industrious middle class, which comprised much of the population, benefited financially from an American presence flush with cash.⁹ Further, by driving out the military and aristocracy, two organizations about which the common citizens always complained, the American military engendered at least some good will.¹⁰ Of further help, General Santa Anna, the Mexican military commander and head of state, was not beloved by his people. He had been the "on again, off again" dictator of Mexico for nearly 20 years, revoking democratic privileges and indulging his own appetites at the expense of the state. In his last failed presidency, he faced a rebellion and two states declared themselves independent republics. Unsurprisingly, Santa Anna's return to politics was not greeted with enthusiasm in many circles.¹¹

Militarily, Scott's army benefitted from only needing to occupy one city at a time, and consequently did not have to spread his forces thinly over a wide area. Furthermore, Scott was not required to subdue the surrounding countryside so he could concentrate his forces in the city he occupied. The ability to mount a successful insurgency was also curtailed by the times. Operating on the assumption that it takes one to two bullets to kill a soldier, an ambush with manually reloading firearms, taking 20-30 seconds to load, would not be nearly as effective as the same ambush with automatic weapons.¹² To combat sniping, Scott stated that his army would raze the block of any house caught firing upon his soldiers, a move of dubious legality in today's world. In a similar manner, American soldiers did not have many of the same restraints,

such as needing permission to fire their weapons that today's soldiers face under the scrutiny of the international press. Finally, the mainstay of modern insurgencies and bane of conventional forces, the improvised explosive device, had not yet been invented. Still, what Scott managed to accomplish was impressive. What can one take away from the study of Scott's occupation of Mexico City? Strict discipline enforced at all levels of the army, observance of local customs, meeting the economic and physiological needs of the local inhabitants and a population disillusioned with its current leadership can all aid in the successful occupation of a population.

Zachary Taylor's Occupation in Northern Mexico

Where Scott employed a blueprint for success, Major General Zachary Taylor's initial struggles in occupation were the equal of Scott's accomplishments. Having no plan for pacification, Taylor did nothing to instill discipline in his ranks. Suffering from increased boredom due to the conclusion of conventional military operations and taking full advantage of the lackadaisical environment, the men began a pattern of farm raiding, plundering, assaults, rape and even murder. In addition to their crimes, the soldiers' rampant racism and anti-Catholicism inflamed the local population. Consequently, the tide of public opinion shifted against the Americans, and Mexicans of multiple backgrounds began conducting guerilla operations. With time, these irregular forces began serious harassment of the U.S. supply lines and isolated garrisons. While the U.S. Army managed to mitigate these threats with active patrols and increasing convoy security at first, eventually "American commanders finally supple-

mented tactical measures with more enlightened policies to reduce violence against civilians."¹³

Among these policies, military governors "instituted strict curfews, moved garrisons out of city centers, set up road blocks to keep soldiers away from populated areas, and threatened to discharge any unit whose members indiscriminately slaughtered Mexican livestock or plundered from locals."¹⁴ When this did not stem the violence, Taylor also held local governments responsible for U.S. materiel destroyed in their jurisdiction and organized lightly armed police forces comprised of Mexican citizens to root out guerrillas and their supporters although this idea was largely ineffective. In the harshest of measures, the Army began holding entire towns responsible for the failure to turn over guerrillas. Further, any Mexican found supporting guerrillas with material would pay fines and forfeit all personal possessions. Fortunately for the Americans, the combined institution of these measures curtailed attacks considerably in northern Mexico.¹⁵

Taylor's military governor in Saltillo, Brevet Major General John E. Wool, attributed the success in combating guerrilla operations to three basic principles. First, holding local leaders personally responsible for the infractions committed under their jurisdiction. Second, the financial contributions the United States demanded for destroyed property from the local area made citizens reluctant to harbor guerrillas. Finally, the use of a local police force greatly increased the amount of intelligence the American forces received. Not everyone agrees with Wool's opinion, however. Other reasons for success include "the large number of troops on security duty, their offensive operations against partisans, and the measures taken to at least

separate the volunteer troops from the civilian operations.”¹⁶ Given the lack of Mexican records, it is difficult to find Taylor’s soldier-to-civilian ratio, but logic dictates a larger force would have been required before his reforms.

AMERICAN CIVIL WAR—OCCUPATION OF NEW ORLEANS

Less than 20 years later, many of the combatants of the Mexican War found themselves taking up arms again, this time against their fellow countrymen. During the course of the American Civil War, the Union captured and occupied several Confederate cities, mostly located on the Gulf Coast or on the banks of the Mississippi River. The city of New Orleans provides a case study into the occupation methods of the Federal army during the Civil War. According to the 1860 census, New Orleans had 168,675 citizens making it the largest city in the Confederacy. Given its location as both a large population center and hub of commerce at the mouth of the Mississippi, the city posed an attractive target to Union forces. Admiral Farragut captured New Orleans on April 29, 1862, and Major General Benjamin Butler moved in with a force of 5000 troop to occupy the city.¹⁷

Not all of these soldiers were destined to stay in New Orleans, however. Butler needed to hold eastern Louisiana as well. The general later states that “We were 2500 men in a city of...150,000 inhabitants.”¹⁸ This puts the soldier-to-civilian ratio at 1.6 percent, a little less than half the ratio enjoyed by General Scott in Mexico City. Butler began his occupation by declaring martial law for the New Orleans’ inhabitants. He distributed captured Confederate food supplies to the

city's starving citizens, employed many in support of the Union army and to clean up the city, reduced stagnant water to combat disease, reestablished international trade by acquiring cotton from the Northeast and heavily taxed the wealthy to establish social programs for the city's poor. While Butler's policies tended to make him popular with the lower class, not all his actions were well received. He executed William Mumford for taking down an American flag hung by Farragut at the New Orleans Mint, passed a law mandating that any woman insulting a Union soldier be treated as a prostitute and armed three regiments of African-Americans to serve as militia. Overall, however, by gaining the support of the poorest classes, Butler managed to keep control of the city, and even received large amounts of informal intelligence and counterespionage services from people he aided. Proof of Butler's success came during the Confederate counterattack on August 5, 1862. New Orleans not only did not engage in an uprising to support the assault, but also helped to drive off the attacking force. Butler described the New Orleans' citizens as "all hostile, bitter, defiant, explosive, standing literally in a magazine, a spark only needed for destruction."¹⁹ How did the general manage to keep the peace with essentially half the manpower available to Scott? Like Scott, Butler was quick to establish martial law. Although he operated under controversial practices and did not earn the respect of the population as Scott managed to, Butler mitigated this problem by providing economic relief, food and sanitation for the city. Reviled by part of the city's inhabitants, Butler still maintained the support of the majority of citizens, and turned them into a useful military asset to protect against the possible recapture of the New Orleans. These occupi-

ers also had an advantage over those commanded by Scott in that they had the same language and culture as the city they occupied. Further, with the majority of male residents off fighting in the conventional Confederate forces, the chances of an armed insurrection were severely reduced. For military thinkers, Butler's tale reaffirms the importance of reconstructing an occupied city's economy and demonstrates how the local population can be used as an asset during an occupation.

PHILIPPINE-AMERICAN WAR – OCCUPATION OF MANILA

The nation became embroiled in another one of the small brush-fire wars that plagued the United States in the early twentieth century starting in 1899 after annexing the Philippines following the Spanish-American War. As with Scott in Mexico City, the capital of the Philippines, Manila, proves to be an interesting case study of occupation. Containing 250,000 residents, the city provided an obstacle of similar size to what Scott encountered in 1847. On August 13, 1898, the United States' 8th Army received the surrender of the city from the Spanish, fought off Philippine rebels intent on the country's independence, and took control of the capital. The 8th Army had 10,900 men under its command putting the ratio of soldiers-to-civilians at 4.4 percent. Sensing hostility from the Filipinos, General Arthur MacArthur instituted mounted police patrols of 3,000 strong, disbanded and disarmed the local Filipino police force, established a court system for both civilians and soldiers and formed a police division named Provost Guard Separate Brigade comprised of 3,200 troops from three regiments. With the

exodus of the talented and experienced Spanish administrative officials, it was necessary for the Army to assume the functions of city government until appropriate civil officials could be developed. The military government reformed the antiquated Spanish system by relying on Spanish companies and infrastructure already in place to provide water and electricity to the city and established a bureau to monitor food quality and inspect street vendors. In time, the military reopened the Spanish primary school system and slowly introduced English language instruction for its 5,000 students.²⁰

Despite this detailed and efficient plan for pacification, insurgent activity, which had been originally organized to overthrow the Spanish colonial authorities, was slowly building momentum in the city. The insurgent movement gained unexpected energy with President McKinley's proclamation of peaceful annexation of the Philippines. In the following weeks, General Emilio Aguinaldo managed to organize close to 6,000 rebels in and around the city to attack the American government. Before he could execute his plans, however, U.S. forces launched an attack that devastated Aguinaldo's forces and prevented the mass uprising he sought to create. Despite the victory, the experience shook U.S. forces. The new military governor, General Elwell Otis, responded with liberal reforms and harsh repressions.²¹ Otis instituted a strict military curfew beginning at 7 p.m. and reopened local courts to aid the Provost Courts in prosecuting those who disobeyed the new ordinance. Otis also established a Bureau of Information which employed a small number of American and Filipino agents charged with breaking up subversive groups in the capital. Finally, Otis augmented his military police with 246 native officers,

giving the Americans much needed intelligence about the city's inhabitants.²² These measures proved very effective in combating insurrection, and the Army returned nominal control of the government in July 1900.

The Manila occupation was an incredibly unique experience compared with other occupations of foreign cities. The Americans took control of a city already being attacked by a fully formed insurgency but managed to defeat the insurgents and diminish their offensive capabilities while the Americans occupied the city. As was the case in Mexico City and New Orleans, the American military governors moved quickly to provide security and services to the population after the initial occupation and the subsequent rebellion. The Army's integration of local citizens into the security system of military police significantly aided its ability to gather intelligence and arrest insurgents. Although brutal atrocities on both sides of the conflict provide a sad legacy for the war, the lack of bloodshed in Manila is a testament to American officer's competence in administering military government.²³

WORLD WAR II - OCCUPATION OF GERMANY

The next conflict that required the United States to occupy enemy territory during an active conflict was World War II. Fortunately for the U.S. military, specifically the Army, strategists were busy before and during the early portion of the war considering the possibility of occupying Germany. During World War I, occupation was explored by the U.S. Army, which concluded that a successful occupation force would contain .1 percent of the total invading strength.²⁴ While this is a positive step in occupational thinking,

for Scott, Butler and MacArthur had no formal training in the matter, it did not take into account the population of the occupied area. Unfortunately, heavy analysis of occupational governments was not conducted again until the JAG composed FM 27-5, *Military Government* in 1940.²⁵ The U.S. military went one step further in 1942 with the establishment of the School of Military Government, which based its number of students from the percentage established in World War I. This represented the first time the United States thoroughly planned and trained for occupation rather than detailing military commanders to install governments as territory fell into U.S. possession. The Joint Chiefs of Staff also provided formal national guidance from Washington by issuing a directive to General Dwight D. Eisenhower on principles of the occupation. The directive, JCS 1607, included its provisions that "that Germany would be treated as a defeated enemy and that occupation forces would exert limited control of the economy and distribution of goods and food to prevent disease and unrest. Fraternization was strictly forbidden between soldiers and the German people while the troops oversaw the extirpation of Nazism and militarism."²⁶

The occupation of Germany during combat operations continued for only a brief period. Coercing the surrender of the Nazi government resisting in Berlin from the time of the amphibious landing at Normandy the previous June took less than a year. During this period, however, the Rhineland Campaign shows the progression of U.S. occupational policy. Fortunately for the Americans, the Nazi government ordered the evacuation of its cities and towns as the Allied forces advanced freeing the Americans from administering government to even more people. For those left be-

hind, the Americans would first post a "Notice Occupation of to the Population" announcing the occupation. Second, the Americans appointed a sympathetic mayor to establish a link to the population. Third, the population was disarmed and forced to turn in communication devices. Finally, the rules of martial law, such as curfews, circulation limitations, gathering restrictions and registering adults were instituted.²⁷

Gathering specific numbers on the soldier-to-civilian ratio in Germany before Victory in Europe Day is a difficult task. While some prewar city populations are known, it is difficult to estimate how many civilians fled or were killed in the conflict. Further, the occupation happened in such a short time that it reduced the number of viable examples. However, a few cases exist where it is possible to examine the percentage of occupying soldiers to occupied population. In the German city of Aachen, 35 officers and 48 enlisted personnel (83 soldiers total) presided over a population of 14,000.²⁸ This force was augmented, at least for a time, by the 690th Field Artillery Battalion acting as military police, putting the overall strength of the occupying force at around 700. As the front shifted, however, the battalion moved with it leaving only the original occupation detachment. However, this provided enough time for the artillery battalion to aid the detachment in the personnel intensive activities such as registering adults and confiscating weapons. Overall, the soldier-to-civilian ratio in Aachen fluctuated anywhere between .59 percent and 5.0 percent. In the German town of Monschau, a quiet town of 1,100 residents, an average detachment of two officers, a warrant officer and six enlisted men (9 soldiers total) controlled the city.²⁹ Consequently, the soldier-to-civilian ratio was a paltry .82 percent.

Of the U.S. Army's occupation of cities surveyed thus far, this is by far the smallest ratio. The American forces enjoyed many more inherent advantages than previously seen, however. With the Nazi order to evacuate, actual Nazis who were more likely to actively resist the occupation moved further into the interior of the country. This had the fortunate side effect of removing the local government making it necessary for the Army to appoint its own local leaders sympathetic to the Americans. Further, the Germans had been brought up in a society that naturally obeyed authority and so the occupiers found their jobs unhampered by the expected sabotage, ambush and sniping.³⁰ In addition to the cultural reasons for German submissiveness, the country's people were understandably war-weary after five years of conflict. With the Nazi regime retreating on two fronts, people began worrying about reconstructing their own lives, which required them to not cause trouble.³¹ Also of use, Germany's status as an industrialized nation meant the citizens understood much about sanitation and infrastructure freeing the U.S. military from having to provide it. On the American side, the soldiers engaged in occupation were far different than their predecessors. The officers had been educated at the School for Military Government or equivalent civilian university. They had the benefit of a concrete plan laid out in the *Military Government* handbook, which was further tempered by experiences in North Africa and Sicily. Likewise, the enlisted personnel were trained as military police and were not regular soldiers merely assigned to the duty. While the American occupational experience in Germany was undoubtedly a success, the planning and training prior to entering the country laid the foundation for achievement.

The lessons learned in World War II Germany were largely ignored in the decades that followed, however. Military thinkers were too busy devising war plans to counter the Soviet threat to consider the prospect of nation-building. The manual distributed to World War II officers instructing proper governance in occupied territories was replaced by superseding manuals that failed to address this problem. The February 2001 manual Joint Publication 3-57, *Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Operations*, contained only a single reference to occupation in hostile territory.³² This almost 60 year gap in U.S. military strategy would prove to be costly in Iraq.³³

IRAQ WAR

Iraq Overview

The conventional operations in Iraq were undeniably planned well. U.S. forces defeated their Iraqi adversaries with relative ease, and major combat operations ceased within months of the invasion. However, eight years later the United States still remains embroiled in conflict—a situation largely attributed to a lack of planning for Phase IV Post-Hostility Operations. Commanding General Tommy Frank's main priorities in the occupation: humanitarian assistance, reconstruction and security were not flawed. However, the poor execution of Phase IV led to a myriad of problems.

Much of the problems with instituting Phase IV had stemmed from the way Phase III, brilliant in the conventional style of warfare as it was, and the transitional period between the two segments were conducted. Phase III called for a quick drive to capture the

Iraqi capital summed up with Frank's alleged favorite term "Speed Kills." Unfortunately, this style of warfare did not defeat future insurgents; it only served to bypass them. In addition, the military did not destroy conventional weaponry in fear that they were biologically hazardous or nuclear in nature. Further, once cities fell to American forces, they lacked a coherent plan to deal with the anarchy that ensued, causing many Iraqis to think that either the United States lacked compassion for their plight or were incapable of preventing it.³⁴

Perhaps the biggest problem of all, however, was the lack of available forces to complete the necessary tasks. Franks desired 250,000 troops for the occupation of the country—a figure that was in agreement with several other forecasts about the necessary number of troops. Washington was incredulous, however. Paul Wolfowitz stated in a meeting "I don't see why it would take more troops to occupy a country than to take down a regime."³⁵ When the invasion commenced on 20 March 2003, the entire invasion force was 145,000 soldiers including the British contribution, a big enough contingent to defeat Iraq's conventional forces, but not nearly large enough to pacify the country.³⁶ A number of problems results from an insufficient amount of troops. First, the American military was incapable of stopping the looting that tainted their image and destroyed valuable infrastructure. Second, the border with Syria was relatively unguarded allowing the free flow of insurgents and supplies between the two countries. Finally, there were not nearly enough soldiers to manage detainees and provide security. Commanders were forced to make a decision between guarding supply routes and enemy prisoners of war or preventing the population from

looting and other lawless activities. Unfortunately, this pick your poison scenario created problems regardless of which decision was made.³⁷

Baghdad

While the whole country lacked sufficient troops, the occupation of Baghdad exemplifies the problems associated with occupying an urban area with an inadequate force. The capital of Iraq was home to some 5 million people at the time of the invasion, but a mere 20,000 soldiers were available to control the city.³⁸ This put the soldier-to-civilian ratio at .40 percent, the smallest ratio witnessed thus far, and far smaller than the 3.5 percent and the 4.4 percent the United States employed during its prior occupations of capitals Mexico City and Manila. Surprisingly, the number is even smaller than the entire country's ratio of .58 percent, an unfortunate reality considering the importance of the city. Due to this shortage of soldiers and the continued hostilities with Fedayeen fighters, the U.S. lacked the numbers necessary to enforce a martial law and disarm the population.

This lack of force was also just one of the things that went wrong in Baghdad, however. On the operational level, some units who had planned for only combat operations could not be withdrawn in accordance with the original timetable, and consequently lacked the sufficient training to handle post-Saddam Baghdad. On policy scale, the United States hesitated to call itself an occupier but instead considered its military a liberating force. This distinction legally prevented the United States from ensuring the standards of order put forth by the Geneva Convention for an occupying power, which would have obligated the U.S. to pre-

vent looting. The United States eventually conceded its status as an occupying power in May 2003, but the damage caused to the infrastructure of Baghdad and squandering of good-will engendered by the removal of Saddam was done.³⁹

CONCLUSION

Baghdad is the first city the United States has occupied where one can question success. There were a number of factors that hindered the military from pacifying the Iraqi capital. The government foolishly refused to take the responsibilities of an occupation, Franks' strategy left large pockets of insurgents, the Iraqis had unrealistic expectations of American capability, the Americans lacked sufficient occupational training and Baghdad was a veritable arsenal of weapons and explosives, but the proper amount of soldiers would have done much to deal with these issues. With such a troop concentration, the U.S. could have enforced a martial law to stop looting, provided security, and maintained authority in the city. Furthermore, the military could have disarmed the population in accordance with the practices developed in Germany. The lack of force was assuredly not United State's only issue in Baghdad and Iraq at large, but it was the most constricting factor in solving problems as they arose.

With an eye towards strategic planning, how many soldiers would it take to occupy a city like Tripoli assuming Colonel Muammar Gaddafi leaves the city but does not surrender his forces? First, it is necessary to consider Tripoli's population, which stands at 1,065,405 people according to the 2006 census. Given the current civil war against Gaddafi's regime, it is safe to assume he lacks universal support even in his

own capital. That makes situation somewhat similar to what Scott encountered in Mexico City where the lowest ratio was used to successfully occupy a foreign capital. To garner that same 3.5 percent soldier-to-civilian ratio, it would require just under 37,200 troops. However, given the training and experience of the current military due to Iraq and Afghanistan that number could be reduced significantly as was done by the U.S. in Germany. Further, the Libyan civil war has created an organized native rebel force capable of considerably aiding U.S. forces in the case of occupation. On the negative side, possible insurgents have been battling for less than six months, which diminishes their chances of war fatigue. Further, the proliferation of firearms would be a serious obstacle to overcome. Assuming a sound initial plan to provide security, however, the U.S. could occupy Tripoli with 32,000-35,000 troops.

History is most useful when it aids humanity in its current endeavors. Fortunately for the United States military, the organization has tried its hand at occupation several times over the past two centuries. These experiences provide a bank of examples from which one can draw conclusions about successful and unsuccessful occupation practices. If circumstance dictates the U.S. military must invade and occupy a nation, it must stress physical and economic security, respect for the civilian population, disarmament, training and education for its soldiers. Most importantly, however, it must provide a sufficient force to facilitate these other lessons. Without a proper soldier-to-civilian ratio, even the most efficient occupation plan is destined to fail.

ENDNOTES

1. Timothy D. Johnson, *Gallant Army* (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2007), 58.

2. John Eisenhower, *So Far from God: The U.S. War with Mexico 1846-1848* (New York: Random House, 1990), 266.

3. *Ibid.*, 265.

4. *Ibid.*, 266.

5. Johnson, *Gallant Army*, 57.

6. *Ibid.*, 55.

7. Eisenhower, *So Far from God: The U.S. War with Mexico 1846-1848*, 267.

8. Johnson, *Gallant Army*, 242.

9. *Ibid.*, 109.

10. *Ibid.*,

11. *Ibid.*, 34.

12. While this is a logical conclusion, modern marksmanship is generally poorer than that of the past, meaning the advantage enjoyed by modern guerrillas in this scenario may not be as high as one might perceive.

13. Stephen A. Carney, *The Occupation of Mexico* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 2006), 19-23.

14. *Ibid.*, 23.

15. *Ibid.*, 24.

16. *Ibid.*, 25.

17. Mark Grimsely, *The Hard Hand of War: Union Military Policy toward Southern Civilians, 1861-1865* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 53.

18. Stephanie McCurry, *Confederate Reckoning, Power and Politics in the Civil War South* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010), 7.

19. *Ibid.*, 10.

20. Alfred W. McCoy, *Policing America's Empire: The United States, the Philippines, and the Rise of the Surveillance State* (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 2009), 66.

21. *Ibid.*, 68.

22. *Ibid.*, 69.

23. *Ibid.*, 64.

24. Allen W. Kiefer, *Lessons Forgotten: Comparing the Occupation of Germany with Iraq* (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2009), 5.

25. *Ibid.*,

26. *Ibid.*, 13.

27. F. Earl Ziemke, *The U.S. Army in the Occupation of Germany* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1976), 136.

28. *Ibid.*, 145.

29. *Ibid.*, 149.

30. *Ibid.*, 146.

31. *Ibid.*, 139.

32. Kiefer, *Lessons Forgotten: Comparing the Occupation of Germany with Iraq*, 19.

33. In this analysis, Afghanistan is not discussed due its reality as a “failed state” at the time of invasion. Although the Taliban had nominal control of the country, that conflict was as much about instituting a government as replacing one.

34. Thomas E. Ricks, *Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq* (New York: Penguin Press, 2006), 88.

35. *Ibid.*, 121.

36. *Ibid.*, 177.

37. *Ibid.*, 148.

38. Lyle W. Cayce, *Liberation or Occupation? How Failure to Apply Occupation Law During Operation Iraqi Freedom Threatened U.S. Strategic Interest* (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2004), 9.

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CHAPTER 2

RED AND WHITE STRIPES UNDER BLUE HELMETS: WHEN WILL THE UNITED STATES DEPLOY TROOPS TO UN PEACEKEEPING MISSIONS?

Sarah Cassel

The United States frequently deploys troops to United Nations peacekeeping missions in distinct capacities, most commonly as direct support forces, but occasionally under blue helmets. United States (U.S.) involvement in Somalia in the early to mid 1990s, for example, is a good illustration of several of the forms of U.S. military involvement overseas. After the United Nations Operation in Somalia I (UNOSOM I) faced difficulties, the U.S. led a UN-sanctioned multinational Unified Task Force (UNITAF) in Somalia from December 1992 until May 1993 to create a stable environment in the country for the delivery of humanitarian aid in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 794. In March 1993, once the UN deemed UNITAF's mission successful, it created the United Nations Operation in Somalia II (UNOSOM II), to which the United States contributed troops under blue helmets to maintain stability in the country and begin reconstructing economic, social and political life.¹ While U.S. troops were operating under UN control in UNOSOM II, the United States also deployed U.S.-commanded direct support forces to the UN mission such as the U.S. Task Force Ranger.

To limit the scope of the discussion on U.S. military presence in UN missions, this paper will focus exclusively on U.S. contribution of troops to UN peace-

keeping missions in which the troops serve under UN command in blue helmets.

In determining appropriate action when confronted with a conflict situation, the United States considers its options with regard to UN mandates and its own military capabilities. The United States assesses the risks and potential benefits involved in choosing a particular course of action (or inaction) to achieve its desired end when weighing its choices. When the United Nations calls for a peacekeeping mission, the United States (having approved the mission in the Security Council) must decide whether to deploy its own troops under blue helmets.

If the U.S. decides to contribute to a UN mission, it does so because it has determined that its end is compatible with and not opposed to the end of the UN (though the ends do not have to be the same). The United States will therefore consider its national interests: security concerns (for example the recent need to manage the spread of violent anti-U.S. insurgencies); economic concerns (stabilizing regions for trade purposes); or the accumulation of political power (either for the country as a whole or for a certain political party). Once the United States determines that the UN peacekeeping mission is in line with its national interests, it assesses the means of the mission— i.e. the options it can use to support the mission within the mandate and the specifications of the mandate itself. The U.S. has capacity to assist UN missions financially, politically and/or militarily, recognizing that contributing troops is the highest risk option. The U.S. will therefore only decide to deploy U.S. troops under UN command if the potential benefit from the military contribution will most likely outweigh the high cost of deployment. As the United States takes many precau-

tions to avoid U.S. military deaths, history shows that the United States will only deploy U.S. troops under blue helmets to UN peacekeeping missions when the tasks involved will not put the troops' lives in great danger.

This article will reflect on the United Nations Operation in Somalia II (UNOSOM II), the United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH), the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) and the United Nations Preventive Deployment Force (UNPREDEP), for they are the only instances in which the United States deployed U.S. troops to UN missions under blue helmets.

In the cases of Haiti and the Balkans, it is possible to claim that the United States had an economic-related interest in visibly involving itself in the regions through the United Nations. After a Haitian military coup overthrew the democratically-elected President Jean Bertrand Aristide, the Clinton administration decided to categorically support his reinstatement to stabilize the country. Due to the proximity of Haiti to the United States, the chaos in the country resulting from the coup prompted thousands of Haitian refugees to migrate to the United States. President Clinton therefore contributed significant U.S. resources including funding, administrative capabilities and troops to quiet the state of internal affairs in Haiti so that Haitians would no longer migrate in such large numbers.² In the Balkans, President Clinton decided to involve the United States in the region because he saw the territory as a linchpin of European stability, which would dictate economic cooperation between the continents.³ Conversely, the United States became involved in Somalia not for national interests but because it aimed to portray itself as the "leader of the free

world" that could successfully address crises abroad by directing multilateral humanitarian missions.⁴ The Bush Administration's 1993 *National Security Strategy*, for example, asserts, "Through a strategy of engagement and leadership, we seek... an enduring global faith in America—that it can and will lead in a collective response to the world's crises."⁵ President Bush's deployment of U.S. troops in Somalia in the U.S.-led multilateral UNITAF mission just weeks before handing the White House over to President Clinton was largely in reaction to overwhelming international pressure to intervene in the "nature induced, man multiplied"⁶ famine that was causing the deaths of thousands of Somalis. In every case of eventual U.S. military involvement in UN peacekeeping missions under UN command, the United States was pursuing its national interests or the perpetuation of a national image on the world stage.

Once the United States determines its vested national interest or special purpose in a region, it must consider the contemporaneous general "conditions" that create the necessary setting to allow for U.S. involvement. The most significant condition that typically determines U.S. political action, including the decision to deploy troops abroad, is the state of U.S. public opinion. In the case of Haiti, President Clinton aimed to differentiate himself from President Bush in the 1993 presidential election by promising to immediately stop the repatriation of Haitian refugees. Upon assuming office, the Clinton administration found that it could not easily reverse the policy, which prompted it to look for alternatives, and it ultimately decided to back the democratically-elected President Aristide. Additionally, the Congressional Black Caucus continually reminded President Clinton of his ini-

tial commitment to address the instability in Haiti,⁷ as did the Cuban-American community in Florida who were witnessing a continual flow of thousands of Haitian refugees.⁸ According to a 1994 poll conducted by the Program on International Policy Attitudes, 54% of Americans "would support U.S. intervention in Haiti as part of a UN-sponsored intervention to forcibly reinstall President Jean Bertrand Aristide in the event sanctions fail."⁹ Furthermore, the poll found that "if the Haitian military agrees to reinstate Aristide, a solid majority (60%) of Americans would support sending a UN peacekeeping force, including U.S. troops."¹⁰ Despite certain prominent calls for involvement, President Clinton's successful intervention in Haiti evoked only a little response from the U.S. public once he committed to engaging in the country, perhaps because it was not a visible security threat. This apathy ultimately allowed him to invest in operations in Haiti without worrying about appeasing his electorate.¹¹

Similarly, U.S. and European public opinion, which reacted to report of civilian deaths perpetrated by the Bosnian Serb Army during the Markale marketplace massacres largely, motivated U.S. involvement in the Balkans. The horrors of the massacres impelled the international community to consider intervention into the ethnic conflict, which it ultimately undertook using UN-sanctioned NATO forces for a bombing campaign in Bosnia to pressure the opposing parties to come to terms. Furthermore, since there were few U.S. casualties in the NATO and UN operations, the U.S. public was comfortable supporting the intervention since it came at little personal cost.¹² Bearing in mind U.S. aversion to committing troops to potentially dangerous missions, President Clinton's strategy in the Balkans was to wage "a pragmatic and moral

style of warfare that pushe[d] military action as far as it [could] go, in view of the hard limits of American public opinion, Congressional dissent and alliance discord."¹³

Before the United States initially decided to intervene in Somalia through UNITAF in December 1992, public support was generally strong for U.S. involvement abroad. The U.S. had recently "successfully" completed Operation Just Cause in Panama¹⁴ and Operation Desert Storm in Kuwait,¹⁵ which had garnered significant domestic backing and had cultivated an international perception of the United States as an effective world leader. Thus, when fighting between violent warlords exacerbated the drought in Somalia, causing widespread famine and thousands of deaths, the international community looked to the United States to play a decisive role in stabilizing the region.¹⁶ As early as January 1992, U.S. senators began pushing for intervention in Somalia after having heard about, and in some cases having seen firsthand, the horrible conditions in Somali refugee camps.¹⁷ The U.S. public, however, paid little attention to the region until Operation Restore Hope began.¹⁸ After another lull in news coverage of Somalia, the gruesome deaths of 18 U.S. soldiers from a reserve force who were attempting to assist a downed Black Hawk helicopter caused intense public outcry and pressured the Clinton administration to withdraw all U.S. forces from the country.¹⁹ Although the U.S. soldiers who were killed were serving in a U.S.-led special operation as opposed to being under UN command, public opinion was strong enough to call for removal of all U.S. troops, regardless of their mission. As Professor Matthew A. Baum asserts, "unless a president is highly confident of success, an attentive public can, when the strategic stakes

are relatively modest, inhibit him from undertaking risky foreign policy initiatives, including using military force.”²⁰

Another condition that establishes the foundation for the deployment of U.S. troops under blue helmets in UN peacekeeping missions is whether the United States is already committed in other wars or large-scale military operations. Although the U.S. was involved in numerous small-scale operations throughout the world during the time of the four cases under review, it was not decisively engaged in any large-scale military assignments. In fact, the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1990 and the reunification of Germany signified the end of a previously tense period in which the United States had played an active role in international diplomacy. Thus, throughout the early and mid 1990s, the United States was free to direct attention to other regional issues.²¹

The final significant condition, which was common among the four cases, is the stability of the U.S. economy. Notably, all of the instances in which the United States contributed troops to UN peacekeeping missions occurred between 1992 and 1999. After a mild recession in 1990-1991, the United States entered a period of sustained growth so that from 1993 until 2000, “the United States exhibited the best economic performance of the past three decades” with real economic growth averaging 4.5% annually and with only 4% unemployment.²² Therefore, since the United States was enjoying a phase of economic security, it felt comfortable extending its reach to militarily influence to volatile regions of the world.

The mission specifications are also one of the circumstances that affects when the United States decides to deploy its troops under UN command. The

type of operations involved in a peacekeeping mission, for example, is fundamental to the decision. Since the United States can conduct military operations in conjunction with multinational forces such as NATO or in U.S.-led forces, such as in the case of UNITAF, the U.S. will likely only contribute troops to UN missions under blue helmets when the mission is within the capabilities of the UN and a different force could not do better. Considering the nature of the instances in which the U.S. deployed troops to UN-commanded missions, it seems that for the U.S. to participate, operations must only include monitoring, observation and supervision functions, as opposed to engagement in active combat. In all of the cases under review, the United States participated in UN-sanctioned (though not UN-commanded) multinational forces either prior to or concurrent with the UN mission to stabilize the region so that the UN mission could effectively proceed.

In Haiti, UNMIH began in September 1993 to modernize the Haitian military and create a Haitian police force as part of an agreement with Haitian General Cédras. Due to escalating violence and non-cooperation by the Haitian military, however, UNMIH left Haiti a month later and the United States prepared for U.S.-led Operation Uphold Democracy to deploy in the country if the Haitian military continued to refuse democratically-elected President Aristide's repatriation. Three hours before the multinational operation was set to touch ground in Haiti, the Governor's Island Accord was signed and the military forces were pulled back. A smaller U.S.-led multinational force was then deployed to create a stable environment in Haiti so that President Aristide could assume his position. Its mission was to "secure the country quickly,

establish a Quick Reaction Force to deal with any threats, provide protection for coalition military forces, and restore the legitimate government of Haiti.”²³ In March 1995, the operation in Haiti was transferred to UN command (UNMIH), though the commander of U.S. forces, Major General Joseph Kinzer, became the Force Commander of the UN forces as well, which helped assuage some U.S. concerns.²⁴ The new mission of UNMIH was then mandated to “assist the Government to maintain the secure and stable environment established by the [U.S.-led multinational] force,”²⁵ as well as to create a national civil police force and oversee elections. The United States was therefore willing to contribute troops to the UN-commanded peace-keeping mission because the forces were tasked with operations that were within UN capacity. UNMIH withdrew from Haiti completely by June 1996, after having guaranteed stability following the December 1995 presidential election, though U.S. forces had already withdrawn from the mission by March 1996.²⁶

United States involvement in Somalia in the 1990s began when President Bush authorized the multinational U.S.-led UNITAF force in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 794 to stabilize Somalia for the delivery of humanitarian aid from December 1992 until May 1993. This mission was launched after UNOSOM I, which was meant to “monitor the ceasefire in Mogadishu and escort deliveries of humanitarian supplies to distribution centers in the city,”²⁷ had failed due to escalating violence in the region.²⁸ The operation conducted by UNITAF was beyond UN capacity due to technological, administrative and resource limitations in the United Nations (among other issues), and therefore required a well-trained, integrated multinational force to successfully complete

it. Only after UNITAF accomplished its mission did the United Nations take over command by creating UNOSOM II, which took on a peacekeeping function through the implementation of disarmament and reconciliation programs. Since U.S. troops were already stationed in Somalia through UNITAF, some were integrated into UNOSOM II under blue helmets when the mission changed hands to UN control. The dual-command relationship between the United States and UNOSOM II complicated the mission, for a U.S. general served as both the UN Deputy Forces Commander and Commander of U.S. forces,²⁹ though the UN Force Commander, Lieutenant-General Çevik Bir, was from Turkey.

In the Balkans, the United States contributed troops under UN command to the UN peacekeeping mission UNPROFOR, which was originally charged with demilitarizing the three United Nations Protected Areas (UNPAs) in Croatia, but was soon expanded to include monitoring other “pink zones” in Croatia and supervising immigration at UNPA borders. In June 1992, escalating violence in Bosnia-Herzegovina caused UNPROFOR’s mandate to include securing the Sarajevo airport and delivering humanitarian assistance to the city. Its mission was later enlarged further to include protecting released civilian detainees, monitoring “safe areas” in five Bosnian towns and the city of Sarajevo, and supervising the implementation of various cease-fire agreements and negotiations.³⁰ In December 1992, UNPROFOR was also deployed in Macedonia to oversee the border and prevent violent spillover into the region.³¹ Although UNPROFOR began in February 1992, the United States only began contributing troops to the mission in November of that year and did so solely in operations in Croatia

and Macedonia.³² To contribute to the struggle in the Balkans, the United States participated in a UN-mandated NATO mission, Operation Deny Flight, from April 1993 until December 1995 to enforce the UN no-fly-zone over Bosnia-Herzegovina and to provide air support to UN forces since the UN did not have sufficient capabilities for that mission. After the first Markale marketplace massacre in February 1994, UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali requested that NATO commence air strikes and shoot down violators of the no-fly zone. Later, as a reaction to increased violence and the second Markale massacres, NATO initiated Operation Deliberate Force in August 1995 to conduct heavy airstrikes in Bosnia and Herzegovina to pressure Slobodan Milošević to negotiate. In March 1995, UNPROFOR was replaced by three separate peacekeeping operations: UNPREDEP in Macedonia, United Nations Confidence Restoration Operation in Croatia (UNCRO), and United Nations Peace Forces (UNPF) headquartered in Bosnia-Herzegovina. After the split, the United States contributed troops under blue helmets solely to UNPREDEP because participating demonstrated support for the UN effort at a low risk since the operation was observation-based, which the United States determined was within UN capacity.³³

Another significant mission specification that the United States weighs when contemplating deploying U.S. troops under blue helmets is the length of time for which the mission is projected to last. Long peacekeeping missions tend to be politically costly to the sitting presidential administration or political party, especially if the missions are interpreted as the U.S. being bogged down by UN bureaucracy. Thus, the timeframe of the mission must be acceptable not

only to the military, but also to the civilian politicians overseeing it in order to deploy U.S. troops. This issue was demonstrated by the UN missions in Somalia and Haiti and by the two missions in the Balkans, which each lasted only three to five years, despite the intended stabilizing nature of the missions that normally requires a longer-term commitment.

The final mission specification that should exist is the feasibility of the mission itself, though that is not a primary determinant of U.S. involvement. Thought is given to the terrain and the presence of existing infrastructure in the conflict region, such as roads, airports, communication infrastructure and hospitals, as well as to the capability to build apparatuses from scratch. Military missions must also ascertain whether reinforcements are easily deployable and whether military supplies can be delivered effectively in order to determine whether an operation has a likelihood of success.

The existence of conditions and mission specifications serves as a baseline foundation upon which the United States may decide to deploy U.S. troops under blue helmets to UN peacekeeping missions. Depending on the situation and the sitting presidential administration, these circumstances will carry varying degrees of importance, but they must all exist to some extent for the United States to see the high-risk option of deploying troops as worth the potential benefit of the operation.

Furthermore, since the United States maintains the capacity to deploy troops to non-UN forces, it will decide to contribute troops under UN command primarily when it desires to influence international political affairs by generating a visible demonstration of support to troop contributing countries and/or to the

host nation. U.S. troop presence under blue helmets in Haiti exhibited President Clinton's commitment to the region and his determination to implement the Governor's Island Agreement and reinstate President Aristide in the Haitian government.³⁴ United States troop contributions in Somalia legitimized the mission to other countries involved in UNOSOM II by demonstrating its dedication to the success of the humanitarian mission. Once the United States resolved to withdraw completely from Somalia in early 1994 following the deaths of the 18 U.S. soldiers, Belgium, France and Sweden decided to withdraw their forces as well.³⁵ Similarly, the visible presence of U.S. troops under blue helmets in the Balkans added legitimacy to the missions so that other countries sustained their participation. In the debate over keeping U.S. troops in UNPREDEP past the Clinton administration's deadline for withdrawal in 1996, Lieutenant General Patrick Hughes, then director of the Defense Intelligence Service, asserted that the persistent presence of U.S. troops was necessary to convince other nations to contribute to the mission. Speaking before the Senate Intelligence Committee, he claimed, "I would say that in general terms, the continued participation of the United States in some fashion is a precondition by many countries for their continued involvement."³⁶ Furthermore, the U.S. troops operating under UN command along Macedonia's northern border with Serbia and Kosovo served as a visible demonstration of support to the Macedonian government by functioning as a deterrent force so that the conflict would not spill over into the country. Danish UN Force Commander, General Thomsen explained, "When I use [U.S. troops] as a reserve, then Serbians will see Americans along the whole border. It's not in my mandate, but indirectly

we are in fact a deterrent force. We are placed between two armies."³⁷

Since the United States possesses extensive military and diplomatic capabilities, it maintains a great responsibility to use its armed forces and political sway effectively. Thus, when considering the situations in which the United States should deploy U.S. troops under blue helmets to UN peacekeeping missions, political leaders should weigh the risk of using U.S. troops under foreign command against the potential benefit of militarily supporting the UN mission. After determining that the necessary circumstances exist in varying degrees, it should ultimately decide to use U.S. troops under blue helmets when a visible U.S. presence is essential to the success of the mission; otherwise, it may be more advisable to contribute to a different type of multinational force.

Given the current environment within the United States, it is highly unlikely that the U.S. will decide to deploy troops to UN peacekeeping missions under UN command for the next few years at least. The U.S. economy is not presently stable enough to generate a public desire to involve the country in foreign affairs at the expense of U.S. financial security. According to a poll conducted by the Pew Research Center for the People and the Press in June 2011, "Six-in-ten (60%) say the cost of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan has contributed a great deal to the size of the debt. About four-in-ten (42%) say the same about the condition of the national economy."³⁸ Keeping in mind that economic predictions are notoriously limited, economists have forecasted extremely slow growth for the next few years³⁹ with eventual substantial improvement by 2020.⁴⁰ Americans will therefore be unwilling to consider military commitments abroad until they

feel completely secure with the state of the domestic economy, which will likely take some years even after significant economic recovery.

Furthermore, the continual instability in South Sudan and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), where the United Nations currently has peacekeeping missions, creates a popular sentiment within the United States of wariness concerning the efficacy of UN missions.⁴¹ Reports have shown that although a UN presence in Syria and the DRC is preferable to having no presence at all,⁴² the increased violence in Syria has recently caused the United States, Britain, and France to call for the termination of the UN Supervision Mission in Syria (UNSMIS).⁴³ However, despite the unfavorable image of UN peacekeeping missions in the United States at the moment, 83% of American voters “say it is important that the United States maintain an active role within the United Nations, with a substantial majority (63%) saying it is ‘very important’ that the United States do so.”⁴⁴ Therefore, it is possible that the American people will support U.S. military involvement in UN peacekeeping missions if the operations gain a reputation of being highly necessary and successful.

Another factor contributing to the current U.S. aversion to deploying troops to UN missions is the widespread war fatigue in the United States. The recent wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have left Americans tired of hearing news of constant bloodshed and uneasy about deploying U.S. troops to missions that seem to last longer than originally anticipated. According to Pew Research Center polls concerning U.S. intervention in Libya⁴⁵ and Syria⁴⁶ conducted in 2011 and 2012 respectively, there is little public support for U.S. military involvement in the region, and policy-

makers are uninterested in risking their positions to champion U.S. military action abroad. Thus, without a significant push from either the public or from policymakers, the United States will likely choose to keep its soldiers at home for the foreseeable future.

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CHAPTER 3

SECURITY REFORM AND U.S.-AFGHAN RELATIONS POST-WITHDRAWAL

Nasim Fekrat

INTRODUCTION

The United States invaded Afghanistan in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 attack by Al Qaeda. The initial mission of the U.S. was to destroy the Al Qaeda terrorist organization and end terrorists' use of Afghanistan as a safe haven. The United States also said that it would remove from power the Taliban regime, which gave sanctuary to Al Qaeda, and create a viable democratic government. The United States has been successful in its stated missions, and the Taliban regime was ousted from power in 2001 by a unified effort of the United States and the Afghan Northern Alliance. In December 2001, the United States and the United Nations brought some well-known Afghan leaders together in Bonn, Germany to reach an agreement for the establishment of a roadmap known as the Bonn Agreement for creating peace and security, reconstructing the country and reestablishing some key institutions

Since 2001, Afghanistan has achieved significant changes in every field. However, these changes were not done in a way that sufficiently and efficiently produced long-term stability. Ten years have passed with an international presence in Afghanistan. During this period, billions of dollars have been spent on the coun-

try's security, government and institutions, but, unfortunately, Afghanistan has a dysfunctional and corrupt central government to this day. This includes security institutions such as the Afghan National Army (ANA) and the Afghan National Police (ANP). The U.S and its allies plan to reduce their presence in Afghanistan by 2013 and withdraw completely a year later, and the drawdown of troops may also bring a drastic decline in international funding. The Afghan government has until now been heavily reliant on foreign donations. After the U.S. withdrawal, it might not be able sustain itself or maintain its expensive security institutions (ANA and ANP).

This paper will suggest some reforms in post-withdrawal Afghanistan that the United States should consider in its relationship with Afghanistan. These reforms will include some fundamental structural changes at the national level, shifting from a large, national army and police force to a small army and a predominantly local police.

GENERAL STRATEGY

For the United States to maintain a good relationship with Afghanistan beyond 2014, the first and most important step is to continue reforming Afghanistan's security organizations in conformity with changes in the security environment. Until now, a key to the U.S. exit strategy from Afghanistan has been to build capable Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), consisting of the ANA and the ANP. In January 2011, the U.S, and its international allies promised the Afghan government to expand the ANSF to 378,000 personnel by October 2012.¹ The current number of ANA personnel is estimated around 171,600 and of ANP per-

sonnel around 134,000. This large of a security force requires a fixed cost that Afghanistan is incapable of paying for by itself. As the U.S. drawdown occurs, the funding will likely diminish in Afghanistan. The ANSF is estimated to cost eight billion dollars annually and U.S. officials have said that Washington is only prepared to provide three billion after 2014.² Given the country's economic problems and its reliance on foreign donations, the United States needs to come up with a thoughtful and sustainable solution for Afghanistan's security beyond 2014. The obvious solution is to reduce the number of ANSF to the highest number that Afghanistan will be able to efficiently afford. This reduction should start during the transition period while the United States and the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) can ensure that the security situation will not deteriorate and hinder the process. Considering the current situation of Afghanistan, having a large national army is not in its long-term interests. Afghanistan does not have any imminent conventional threat from its neighbors nor is a large army the proper instrument against insurgents. Ultimately, Afghan national security rests on a vibrant market economy, not an expansive military.

AFGHAN NATIONAL ARMY

Constructive U.S. engagement should focus on building a small, professional security institution that work efficiently without relying on foreign donations. The current number of ANA troops should be reduced drastically into a small number that the Afghan government can afford. Of course, Afghanistan needs to secure its borders, mainly in three zones: south, east and west. The maximum soldiers that Afghanistan

would need would be four brigades—around 20,000 soldiers. These soldiers should be selected from the ANA's top units and from other experienced personnel. More importantly, considering the current negotiations with the Taliban through reconciliation initiatives, the ANA counterinsurgency mission will end, but the danger is the Afghan military will resist demobilization citing the need to maintain high readiness as a hedge against potential enemies. The U.S. should provide assistance and training and should equip a smaller Afghan army with the advanced technology and skills in order to operate efficiently and effectively. A smaller, modern army will meet Afghanistan's security interests without being a financial drain. The army should be paid well in order to mitigate corruption especially the selling of key positions for profit. Likewise, having a small, well-paid and well-educated army would reduce the attrition rates, which are currently quite high. The current rate of desertion is estimated above 20 percent annually, which means that billions of dollars have been spent for training and equipment for soldiers who leave military service.

³ If half of what has been spent on the ANA is spent on creating a small army, it would be much stronger and more effective. A long term solution to the current dilemma is to create a small army that can be maintained and supported by Afghanistan and also can be cost efficient for the donor countries in the long-term.

Creating a small army needs to be thoughtfully planned and ethnic distributions should be considered. The United States and its international partners built the Afghan National Army from scratch. At the beginning, most of the ANA soldiers came from the Northern Alliance especially from Tajik ethnic groups. This caused an imbalance within the ANA because of

the absence of some other ethnic groups especially the Pashtu's, who are the majority of the population. This is one of the main causes of the high desertion rate. Furthermore, one must remember that the national army represents Afghanistan as a nation and thus ethnic diversity in the army is vital.

A successful army requires extensive training and skills, which is not possible without U.S. support. The United States should continue assisting the Afghan army with training to improve its ability to face challenges. In addition to training, the United States should continue providing military technology, including vehicles, facilities and communication systems for use in combat and other missions such as disaster relief. Under current security assistance programs, a small ANA will have sufficient equipment to meet Afghan security needs. This asset will allow the United States to spend less on Afghanistan. Moreover, the army needs to have broader skills sets especially when it encounters smugglers or drug traffickers. A well-trained, proficient Afghan army and police will be able to stop the infiltration of terrorist groups inside Afghanistan and prevent the country from falling into the hands of terrorist groups that pose a danger to the United States.

Admittedly, a substantial reduction in the army will create higher unemployment so the transition must be well planned. Demobilized soldiers should undergo intensive training in literacy, and vocational courses, in order to be ready for a second-stage security recruitment, for a mechanized and well-trained army require a certain level of literacy. Furthermore, greater attention to educating soldiers will reap long term benefits to society as well. The Afghan government might consider adopting the American GI Bill

system in which the government pays for college. These soldiers could also return to their local communities and villages to integrate into local police to help maintain local security or serve as army reserves.

AFGHAN NATIONAL POLICE

Over the last 10 years, the U.S. and international community's efforts were significant in creating the Afghan national police. However, this emphasis on national police conflicts with Afghanistan's traditional reliance on local community elders, chieftains and family. Unfortunately, the Afghan people do not look at themselves as a united nation; they do not count themselves as an Afghan, rather they are Pashtun, Tajik, Hazara, Uzbek and so on. In order to optimize Afghan domestic security, responsibility for security should be given to local communities and villages. Afghanistan is a country in which the traditional systems of governing and hierarchy have centered on the villages for ages. Thus for the restoration and recovery of the traditional form of government, the United States and Afghan government should respect these traditions by giving back the security authority to locals.

Like the Afghan National Army, the Afghan National Police needs to be reformed. The current number of ANP personnel is estimated around 130,000. This number should be reduced to a size that permits an ANP presence in Kabul and provincial capitals. The local police would have jurisdiction below that level. Thus, the majority of national police could be integrated into local police smoothly. With a well-trained and national professional police, the Afghan government will be able to target problems endemic to the country like corruption and human rights abuse. Like the

Afghan army, the national police should have an equitable ethnic distribution. The remaining police should be localized and modeled after the United States' successful experiences in Iraq. A mechanism should be designed so that local police function under the local government. Part of these initiatives was already started by the former ISAF commander, General David Petraeus, so the concept is not an abrupt change.

The ANP should be well-paid, highly-trained and professional. The national police should be capable of handling any local and provincial situations beyond the capabilities of the local police. For instance, if the local police are not able to stop violence or arrest a power broker, the ANP should respond immediately to assist them. The police should consist of several highly-structured units and be paid good salaries to reduce the level of corruption. In addition, family benefits should be provided as an incentive for the police to remain loyal to the government and to their job. The average policeman in the ANP is currently paid less than \$200 monthly, which places financial hardship on the family. Living in Kabul or other big cities, this salary does not sustain one person, let alone a policeman with a wife and children. In addition to having increased salaries, the ANP should be highly trained. It should be modeled after a successful police organization like the one in Burkina Faso, which is itself modeled after the French police.⁴ The most recent successful example is the Iraqi security forces, which are entirely structured after Italy's *Carabinieri* – a paramilitary police force.⁵ One of the reasons that the Iraqi forces are successful is because of their *Carabinieri* training that the United States had sub-contracted to Italy. Essentially, professionalization of the ANP requires intensive training that the United States can

continue to provide to Afghanistan post-withdrawal. For the last ten years, one of the reasons that Afghan officials have made so many excuses about problems with the police was the shortage of American trainers, which was caused by the rapid expansion of the ANP. However, with the reduction of the ANP, the United States and its partner nations should be able to provide enough trainers and assistance even with reduced budgets.

Creating a small national police force will reduce the level of corruption. The current Afghan police are dysfunctional and heavily corrupt—a situation that has destroyed the people’s trust in the government. The lack of trust and predatory police practices were two of the factors that strengthened the position of the Taliban in many villages in Southern Afghanistan. The Afghan police have been heavily involved in drug trafficking, with senior officials at the Ministry of Interior having been bribed to protect the drug traffickers. In addition, senior provincial and district police positions were sold to persons involved in drug trafficking.⁶ Border police positions have been among the worst offenders because of bribes from smugglers. In many villages and communities, the ANP is viewed as predatory and as a greater threat to security than the Taliban. They are well-known for demanding bribes and for harassing and abusing people. The trust should be brought back to the people, and people should trust police. The establishment of a small national police force will go far to rectify these problems.

NON-NATIONAL POLICE INITIATIVES

For several years, the United States has been working on Afghan police reform. The local police initiative has already been established as part of the military

strategy for security transition. This program was formally launched in 2010 after President Karzai authorized the establishment of Afghan local police.⁷ Currently there are four types of local community police initiatives: The Afghan Local Police (ALP) is aimed at defending their communities. The Local Defense Initiatives (also known as Village Stability Operations) are assisted by the U.S. Special Forces to protect their villages. The Afghan Provincial Protection Program (APPP) is built and funded by Department of Defense. Finally, the Afghan Public Protection Force (APPF) is developed by the Ministry of Interior in partnership with ISAF and the U.S. Embassy in Kabul. The APPF was designed to replace the private security companies in the protection of people, infrastructure, facilities, construction projects and convoys.⁸ The APPF is an important milestone in the ongoing transition from private security companies to government security. In view of all these programs, the United States might need to prioritize or ask allies to provide assistance, such as advisors, trainers and technology, which are the most basic needs for the maintenance and operation of Afghan localized police. In practical terms, these initiatives are sustainable with little security force assistance.

Local community police are practical and effective because locally recruited police officers are connected to the community and feel responsible to their duty. A local police officer understands the terrain and does not need to spend time learning the environment and adapting to the situation. Furthermore, trust is an important factor for police officers, and a police officer who grows up in the community will already be well known. Most importantly, the local police officer will wholeheartedly be committed to his duty for pro-

tecting his community, which consists of his family, friends, relatives and other clan members. If a local policeman does something wrong he will be chastised by the community and family. Because of the fear of isolation from community and fear for the prestige of his family, he will be committed to his job and provide the best security to the locals.

Afghanistan struggles with its diverse terrain and ethnic groups, which is another reason for having a local community police. It is impracticable to install a police officer in a village where the spoken language is not his native language. A police officer who comes from another tribe might be dedicated to his job but lacks certain vital advantages. For example, he lacks the awareness and understanding of the community as compared to locally recruited police. For example, an officer who comes from southern Afghanistan to serve in a village in the central part of Afghanistan, the area that is mostly populated by Hazaras, would need to learn the language, traditions, local culture and otherwise adapt to the particular community, while a local police officer already possesses all these advantages

Police are the first line of defense and the most visible face of the government to the population. Therefore, the recruitment for a local police should be done carefully. The most challenging part of creating local community police is the process of recruitment. The requirements should not be affected by nepotism, bribery, or local chiefs' or warlords' influence. To avoid turbulence, the person who is being recruited must be evaluated on criteria that would include both a background check and a mental, physical and health check. Unfortunately, for the past two years these criteria have not been measured, so local power brokers

have gained influence over the local police programs. Recently, Human Rights Watch reported that the ALP members in several provinces have committed human rights abuses, including looting, illegal detention, beatings, killings, sexual assault and extortion.⁹ Incidents like this undermine the legitimacy of the ALP and distance the populace from the government. In order to prevent such unpleasant incidents, the national police should be trained to watch over the ALP. If a member of the ALP breaches the law and his responsibilities, it should be the ANP's job to investigate the case, and the perpetrator should be punished. Effective security forces require checks and balances. In this case, the ANP should always gear up to restore the public trust by providing better security forces to locals. Since the United States has begun the initiative and has been involved with developing this program for the security transition to Afghan forces, it has a responsibility to engage with the Afghan government on developing this program post-withdrawal.

CONCLUSION

The sociopolitical and economic realities of Afghanistan indicate that it is not feasible to have a large security force in Afghanistan. The fragile security and peace, which has been achieved since 2001, obligate the United States to remain engaged in Afghanistan after 2014. As a matter of prudence, U.S. achievements in Afghanistan will be at risk if the withdrawal is too abrupt because Afghanistan will not be capable of handling its security by itself. The future stability of Afghanistan after 2014 requires constructive U.S. engagement. A comprehensive, long-term framework is essential for ensuring the proper functioning of se-

curity forces in the country. With the end of the insurgency, the Afghan government and its American advisers should begin transforming the Afghan police from a counterinsurgency force to a law enforcement organization. This transition requires police training, procurement and advisory support. The police should be mentally and physically ready to provide protection to citizens and prevent any harassment or insurgent activities that threaten the citizens. Of course, it is not easy to resolve all problems just by reforming security forces, but the current situation requires prioritizing the assets that help to bring stability to the country. The Afghan security challenges cannot be solved by national police alone. There are many other areas that need improving, such as the criminal justice system. If security reform successfully takes place and the government is able to deliver good security and protection to the people, this will affect the need for reform in other systems as well.

The effectiveness and professionalism of the Afghan police and army depends on the performance of the United States as a partner. Advisors provided by the United States may help the country to revive its pre-Soviet era security reputation. This will require U.S. help and Afghan responsibility in building an effective police force that provides security and justice to the Afghan people. The reform of the ANA and ANP is more likely to succeed if the U.S. continues its strong support for the Afghan government. Big reforms are sometimes expensive, but in this case, they require less logistical support and expense on the part of the international community if the burden rests on the Afghans. Such reform will definitely improve the lives of the Afghan people and will strengthen the effectiveness of other reform efforts as well. Further-

more, the United States will benefit from security and stability in Afghanistan.

When it is secure, the United States and Afghanistan can mutually profit from the trillions of dollars of untapped natural resources. More importantly, the country will stand on its own two feet and not become a safe haven for terrorists once again. Other benefits would include reduction of threats to the United States and a reduction in the number of refugees who attempt to enter to United States and other countries. Security will bring peace and prosperity to the country. Afghanistan and America could become partners in trade and investment. A secure and prosperous Afghanistan will also stop growing poppies for opium and will allow children who labor in the poppy fields will go to school instead. Finally, a secure and prosperous Afghanistan will be a place where democracy will flourish, which is the main goal of the United States.

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**SECTION II:
HELPING POST-CONFLICT COUNTRIES
DEVELOP ECONOMICALLY TO PREVENT
RECURRENT CONFLICT**

CHAPTER 4

THE HIGH COST OF GOOD INTENTIONS: 17 YEARS OF FOREIGN AID AND STATEBUILDING IN RWANDA

Sara Masciola

The merits of foreign aid to Third World and post-conflict nations have been debated vigorously over the past decade. Popular books like William Easterly's *The White Man's Burden* regret that only a fraction of the money spent on such nations reaches the people whom it is meant to help. Others argue that funding would be better utilized for domestic purposes rather than gambled away to nations with little oversight through development programs. More recently, high debt in developed countries has inspired deliberation on excessive spending with foreign aid potentially placed on the chopping block.

Foreign aid, however, makes up a small fraction of American gross domestic product (GDP) and can potentially reap large dividends as a tool of foreign policy. Before policymakers argue about the better uses of limited funds, the benefits of foreign aid – its effect on the development and stabilization of the recipient nation – should be closely examined, as the cost-benefit ratio is potentially favorable. This study is an attempt to do so, using Rwanda as a case study to scrutinize the utilization of foreign funding overseas.

In the post-genocide era, Rwanda has endeavored to secure itself politically and economically. As a major player in the Great Lakes region of Africa, Rwanda's stabilization could anchor an otherwise volatile area. As a geographically small country, however, its suc-

cess has not always been a priority for the developed world, especially as they focus on the Middle East. So a substantial amount of foreign aid has been given to Rwanda, while it maintains a moderate freedom in the administration of such funds. For this reason, the nation presents an interesting case study as its state-building efforts are somewhat clear-cut and portray a relatively unambiguous example of the foreign aid process.

For the purposes of this paper, state-building will inherently refer to an end goal—it is a process meant to empower the government to protect citizens from threats, including extreme poverty, national epidemics, political oppression and military attack. Though the term human security varies in meaning, state-building in Rwanda might be perceived as aligning with Edward Newman's explanation, "Traditional security sees state legitimacy looking outward to the international system for power, recognition, and independence. Human security forces the state to look inward to the 'people from where it draws its legitimacy.'"¹ Therefore, as the security of the Rwandan people increases, the state is strengthened, and state-building might be perceived as successful. How foreign aid contributes to such security is the topic at hand.

This report first explores aid flows in post-genocide Rwanda and the correlation between international funding and Rwandans' standard of living. After determining that progress in poverty reduction, disease control, and education is not consistently connected to increases in foreign aid, political stability and military competence are gauged. Next, case studies of foreign aid to Cambodia, Haiti and Bosnia are compared with Rwandan development over time. Similarities

between cases are examined, and the implications of such parallels are used to make suggestions for the donor community regarding future allotments of foreign aid.

HISTORY: 1994-PRESENT

For one hundred days in 1994, Rwanda's Hutu government led the majority-Hutu population in massacring Tutsis and moderate Hutus. The plane of Hutu president Habyarimana had been shot down, and the government blamed Tutsis and the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF)—a group of exiled Rwandans fighting the government from Uganda—for his death. An estimated 800,000 were killed. In the first days of the campaign, disfigured bodies clogged the river systems and floated into neighboring countries. *Genocidaires* raped Tutsi women on a massive scale, and those who survived were commonly infected with HIV/AIDS.²

The absence of outside rescue continues to plague the global community so determined to prevent post-Holocaust genocides. Belgian troops withdrew from Rwanda in early spring as a reaction to the murder of nine of its soldiers—a calculated tactic by the government to prevent foreign interference in the coming genocide. Meanwhile, the international community knew the extent of the killing but was hesitant to send peacekeepers into harm's way. Therefore, the small contingent of United Nations (UN) soldiers led by Romeo Dallaire did not have the forces or mandate to effectively stop the killing.

When the RPF defeated the Rwandan government and ended the massacres in July 1994, the group's leader, Paul Kagame, became vice-president of Rwanda. After nine years of transitional government led by

the RPF, Kagame was elected president in 2003 with 95% of the vote, amidst criticism of fraud.³

In the aftermath of the RPF's victory in 1994, Hutus fled across the border into present-day Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Exiled Tutsis began to return to Rwanda. International humanitarian workers responded to the resultant refugee crisis, and nations donated generously to help rebuild the war-torn country. The process of state-building began almost immediately. Foreign aid flowed through Rwanda even during the massacres of the early nineties, but after Rwanda lost a sizeable portion of its citizens in 1994, contributions from other nations became even more significant. Economically, the deaths and subsequent refugee crisis distorted the country's tax-base, GDP, labor force and system of property rights. Politically, a new government was transitioning into power and needed the support of its remaining citizens and the armed forces. Intervention from the global community may have been late, but it was still necessary for Rwanda's survival.

FOREIGN AID AND ITS IMPACT ON RWANDA'S PROGRESS

U.S. policymakers must consider whether millions of dollars in official development assistance (ODA) are having a valuable impact on Rwandan economic and political development and stability. ODA includes aid given by governments and multilateral organizations.⁴

⁵ For example, in Fiscal Year (FY) 2009/2010, Rwanda received \$945,342,794 in assistance (\$172,857,313 (18%) of which came from the U.S.).⁶ All of American contributions were assigned for project support, a form of aid that other donors are gradually replacing with

general budget support at the insistence of the Rwandan government.⁷

To assess the effects of foreign aid on state-building, ODA was measured from the pre- and post-genocide years. Though most charitable income is generated by transnational and international agencies,⁸ using ODA data alone does not present a full representation of foreign aid in Rwanda as it does not include funding from non-governmental organizations (NGOs) financed by private sources. However, even the IMF has bemoaned the inadequate data available to track NGO spending so only the trajectory of ODA is followed to ensure the data used is accurate.




FIGURE 1: ODA FOR RWANDA

As Figure 1 demonstrates, international financing continued through the 1994 genocide, only to plummet between 1996 and 2000. The immediate post-genocide period (1994-1995) was accompanied by large amounts of ODA particularly emergency humanitarian assistance to help with the massive flow of refugees.⁹ The 1996 Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda reported that only 35.3% of aid given in 1994 was used within Rwanda with the rest

spent on refugees outside of its borders.¹⁰ Gradually, Rwanda's intervention in the DRC and a switch away from emergency relief caused foreign aid to slow. In the early 2000s, though, assistance again began to surge reaching \$934,380,000 in 2009. This was partially due to reduced military operations in the DRC, and the new president's commitments to poverty reduction, anti-corruption and long-term independence from aid and debt. If Rwanda's state-building – measured first through human development – positively correlates with foreign aid, there may be foundation for a later argument of causation.




FIGURE 2: HUMAN DEVELOPMENT INDEX FOR RWANDA

UN Human Development Index (HDI) values for corresponding years demonstrate that this is not the case. The index measures standards of living using education wealth and health indicators. Assuming that foreign aid is at least partially devoted to improvement in these three categories, one might expect a plunge in HDI between 1995 and 2000, followed by a spike. In fact, the five years following the war were paralleled by a jump in the HDI rankings, only to level

off—even decrease—in the midst of massive budget swells (Figure 2).¹¹




FIGURE 2: HUMAN DEVELOPMENT INDEX FOR RWANDA

It is also interesting that the drop in human development between 2005 and 2010 corresponds with a renewed emphasis on general budget support for the Rwandan government rather than project-based funding. As more money bypasses the structure of planned tasks, the effectiveness of the funds seems to dissipate.

ODA, however, is hardly the sole decisive factor in HDI shifts. For example, inclusion of life expectancy in the overall index value means that an HDI increase does not have to be the result of proactive spending. The early 1990s saw massacres and the loss of 800,000 Rwandans. Therefore, the late-90s increase in life expectancy was not only a result of better medical treatment but also because genocide had ended.¹² In addition, survivors and returning refugees overtook abandoned property, which increased their wealth. Subsequent HDI stagnation suggests either that earlier values were thus inflated or that population growth reduced overall per capita benefits because Rwanda consistently remains in the lowest HDI despite a sub-

stantial NGO and donor presence. Therefore, higher levels of ODA do not directly correspond with better HDI scores, but depend on a variety of factors related to the recipient nation's management of funds and capacity for reform as well as responsible distribution by donors.

CORRELATION VERSUS CAUSATION AND THE PROBLEM OF DEVELOPMENT STATISTICS

The correlative evidence presented still leaves room for misdiagnosis unless international funding can be directly connected to Rwanda's progress in state-building. Otherwise, it is impractical to determine the true source of stability and development. National groups independent of foreign financing may have caused change in sectors that international funding barely reached.

Furthermore, interpretation of current data does not explain reasons for success, nor is it always useful to predict future progress. First, reverse causality is a possibility when considering donor motivations. Funds could be provided because of developments on the ground, rather than progress depending upon aid. Second, a common argument is that aid is given to countries precisely because they are having problems. To indicate that ODA is failing because these problems are not instantly reversed is to misunderstand the depth of societal decay. Third, it is necessary to understand who initiated each project. If foreigners were the instigators, plans may not be continued by the Rwandan government. So the correlation of high ODA and low HDI scores says little about causality. If foreign aid is rampant but not reaching the sectors that need it most, it would be difficult to accuse inter-

national donors of being useless – they are experiencing an allocation problem. For Rwanda, though, this does not seem to be the case. There are indications that funds are being funneled into the poverty, health and education sectors (the HDI categories), and the next section will address in more detail the extent to which the expenditures produce results. In some cases, monetary contributions are not enough to reverse the problems affecting Rwanda's future stability.

THE IMPACT OF AID: WEALTH, HEALTH AND EDUCATION

Wealth and Poverty

GDP in Rwanda has made a remarkable recovery since 1994, but the effects of development efforts on poverty reduction are less apparent. Statistics from 2006 show that because of population growth 600,000 more Rwandans were living in poverty than five years earlier despite a poverty rate that decreased from 60.2% to 56.9%.¹³ In 2007, Kagame launched a second plan (one had been launched in 2000 as well) that includes increased investment in business, public works, credit packages, as well as promotion of Rwanda's reputation for clean government.¹⁴ Despite the efforts, by the end of 2010, almost two-thirds of the population was still living below the poverty line.¹⁵

A 2007 UN development report claimed that the Rwandan government does not spend international aid efficiently enough to reduce poverty. The UNDP for Rwanda lamented that, "...the aid that reaches Rwanda is not currently aligned with the MDGs [Millennial Development Goals], is not adequately targeted towards the poor and is not efficiently coordinated or

monitored. Increasing aid flows to Rwanda under these conditions is likely to increase the waste and distortions created by large inflows..."¹⁶

The UN's concern, however, is mostly with foreign donors, whose aid is unpredictable and project-driven—a combination that makes it difficult for the Rwandan government to create long-term development programs based on the country's needs.¹⁷ The organization advises donors to provide more money to sector-budget-support to prevent its use on defense, while asking them to ensure quality control.¹⁸ In other words, the UN recognized that foreign aid was not adequately addressing poverty and put the burden of fixing the problem on donors. Then, plans were laid for an increase in ODA anyway.

Additionally, World Bank data paints a discouraging picture of wealth distribution. The gap between rich and poor is not only expanding, but is also revealing an economic division along ethnic lines. Before the genocide, 39% of national income went to the wealthiest 20% of Rwandans, and 10% went to the bottom 20%; both groups were mostly Hutu.¹⁹ By 2006, 51% of national income went to the wealthiest 20% — a group now largely made up of Tutsis—and 5% of income was distributed to the poorest 20% (still Hutu).²⁰ Even after the mass exodus of Hutus and the influx of Tutsi refugees following the genocide, Hutus remain the majority in Rwanda. If aid does not target the lower income strata, ethnic tensions may continue to fester, pitting wealth against numbers.

Observers have already noted the potential for violence stemming from an income gap. Peter Uvin once described Rwanda as possessing positive macro-economic indicators, government and donor approval of Rwanda's development progress, free-market ori-

entation and great inequality in assets and income.²¹ Though one could easily perceive this as a modern description, the Rwanda under discussion in the article was from the 1980s and early 1990s—right before the genocide. According to Uvin, the aid community during this time helped create conditions for violence by allowing development projects to be located chiefly in politically-connected regions, employing only the well-connected.²² Development spending tended to favor the wealthier income strata and state-led exclusion was ignored at best.²³ Government-encouraged tribalism in the early 1990s then provided poor Hutus an explanation for their under-development—the Tutsis.²⁴

Therefore without better monitoring of funds and a greater concern for societal equality, the aid community once again risks contributing to authoritarianism. In the early 1990s, development aid in Rwanda was mostly project-oriented, but with the recent preference for general budget support, donor control over the use of their funds has dissipated even further. To increase prosperity, Kagame also launched a campaign to attract foreign direct investment (FDI). Figure 3 demonstrates the success of the effort.²⁵ Rwanda has not traditionally drawn large amounts of FDI, but Kagame's active pursuit and the country's reputation for fighting corruption recently gained dividends. For example, USAID and the government of Rwanda (GOR) connected Rwandan coffee farmers to international retailers and trained them to grow specialty varieties. Between 2001 and 2006, coffee exports grew to \$8 million, and farmers' per capita income more than quadrupled.²⁶ Even this success, however, relied heavily on USAID, and one-crop dependence is hardly a development panacea. Instead of replacing

foreign aid with corporatism, this model suggests that poverty could be reduced with the contributions of private sector innovation.




FIGURE 3: FDI TRENDS IN RWANDA

To maintain perspective, note that Rwanda still remains dependent on ODA and that FDI is relatively small. During stints of violence—1992, 1994, 1997 and 1999—foreign investment dropped because FDI hinges upon the stability of a nation. In a rather circular fashion, foreign investment strengthens the economic security of the state, but it only arrives once a certain threshold of stability is already in place. The role of foreign aid, then, is to help the government of Rwanda reach that threshold.

Healthcare: Donor Activity versus Local Needs

The health sector has traditionally received a large proportion of Rwanda’s foreign aid. Between 2000 and 2006, health expenditures rose from \$73 million to \$301.6 million.²⁷ In 2004, 16% of total funds were

set aside for health, a figure only smaller than that for economic infrastructure (17%) and general budget support (36%).²⁸ As ODA increased, the health sector received the highest proportion of aid money.²⁹ Nevertheless, the Rwandan Ministry of Health (MOH) estimated in 2006 that the government would need to spend an additional \$20 per capita on the health sector in order to reach their Millennium Development Goal (MDG) in child mortality by 2015.³⁰ The prospects of a spending increase seemed grim by government accounts:

A combination of optimistic assumptions (doubling of aid...double digit economic growth, and health receiving...15%...of all additional resources) would yield just \$8 per head extra for health by 2015. A lower-case scenario (5% per annum growth of the economy, a 50% increase in aid, and a 10% health share of additional resources) results in only an extra \$2 per capita.³¹

Even sharp increases in donor funding cannot alleviate the problem as indicated by USAID's 2008 Corruption Assessment of the Rwandan Health Sector. This report noted that foreign-led campaigns against major diseases "have made it more difficult for the MOH to control and coordinate donor health activities to ensure that their programs are compatible with [government of Rwanda] priorities."³² Therefore, foreign aid to the health sector—though a main and increasing priority for donors—remains inadequately low and complicates the distribution of services for local officials.

Concerns about disease in refugee camps—along with the malaria, tuberculosis and HIV/AIDS pandemics raging today—are most likely to attract the attention of humanitarians who are provided with a

tangible problem to solve. Vaccinating a population and offering mosquito nets is relatively simpler than establishing a nationwide healthcare system from scratch. To the dismay of the Rwandan leadership, the focus on disease eradication can ignore local needs. Donors often earmark funds to combat specific illnesses. So while HIV/AIDS received \$47 million in 2006, malaria (the leading cause of mortality) and childhood illnesses were only granted \$18 million and \$1 million, respectively.³³ The national government also regrets the donor community's decision to give funds directly to local governments or projects; the MOH blames this direct allocation for unequal resourcing throughout the country—\$1.86 per capita in some provinces and \$11.84 in others.³⁴

Though it views aid for health as being “outside government control, and not reliable,”³⁵ the government of Rwanda still depends on grants. In June 2011, the Dean of the National University of Rwanda visited Duke University to recruit partners to “create a high-quality national health care system that can be sustained without requiring substantial foreign aid.”³⁶ Foreign aid and advice, however, are necessary for the transition to occur. For example, Global Funds organized a summit to raise money from private sector companies in 2010. The event succeeded in raising \$3 million, but less than half of that amount originated from the Rwandan private sector, the rest coming from other African countries.³⁷

Nonetheless, attempts at self-sufficiency are well-precedented. Much like the program to eradicate poverty, the Rwandan leadership initiated phased healthcare reforms beginning after the genocide with supply-side concerns like infrastructure and personnel. The plan was modeled after that of the World

Health Organization (WHO), with national programs run through the Ministry of Health in Kigali and health districts accountable to the MOH established in the rest of the country.³⁸ This international system, however, did not consult with healthcare beneficiaries, and, at the time, Rwanda lacked the human and financial capital to meet WHO standards of service.³⁹

When the transitional government expired in 2003, the leadership instituted healthcare reforms with much more success. The new approach aligned health districts with local government districts, made those health facilities accountable to local government, increased the resources of district-level clinics, prioritized community involvement and prioritized public demand for care.⁴⁰ When local contexts and needs replaced the WHO blueprint, healthcare reforms began to thrive. By 2005, under-5 mortality rates had recovered to pre-war levels and continued to fall, reaching 110.8 deaths per 1000 children in 2009 (compared to 240.8 in 1995, 180 in 2000, and 138.4 in 2005).⁴¹ Note, however, that these rates still do not align with the 2015 goals. In addition, increased use of modern family planning methods could be credited for the success, rather than institutional structure.⁴²

Additionally, a program called Paying for Performance (P4P) was piloted in 2002 and applied nationwide in 2006.⁴³ Under this system, medical staff are paid for results rather than time spent working. Theoretically, this should improve the quality of healthcare provided. In practice, though, only one third of medical positions in Rwanda are filled so 72% of interviewed staff reported having to work extra hours to finish their workload.⁴⁴ Furthermore, several employees described the ethical dilemma created by the program, “overworked staff invest all their en-

ergy into the remunerated activities and their proper documentation, and tend to neglect other core tasks for the sake of the incentives.”⁴⁵ Furthermore, the staff see often see the remunerated activities as imposed by outsiders without knowledge of local needs.⁴⁶

Therefore, the results of foreign aid are not symmetrical with the amount of ODA donated. Many foreign-based programs do not take into account local needs or the state of Rwandan healthcare personnel and infrastructure. Even the commendable efforts of P4P, which is largely funded by multilateral organizations, cannot be optimally applied due to staffing limits in healthcare facilities.

However, as of 2008, foreign donors provide 80% of health sector funding.⁴⁷ The many successes that do occur in the field could be reasonably attributed to international involvement. There may not be a one-to-one ratio between dollars spent and health coverage provided, but compared to other sectors of Rwandan society, the transformation of the health system has been considered praiseworthy by domestic and international observers. A more pressing problem, cited by Kalk, et al. may be the potential drop in healthcare performance once foreign aid is reduced.⁴⁸

Education and Ethnic Violence

Successful state-building depends on a country's ability to prevent further violence and to return society to normalized relations. The Rwandan government uses its educational system to ease this transition and to prevent ethnic divisions from returning the nation to war. Education-based economic opportunity for future generations theoretically curbs resentment and societal divisions between ethnic groups. Considering the asymmetrical income distribution emerging in

Rwanda, government efforts seem to be appropriately focused.

The genocide shattered Rwanda's educational system, and foreign aid became necessary to restore its foundations. According to Obura, "schools were ransacked and destroyed, as was the Ministry of Education. Few teachers were left. Little documentation or school supplies remained."⁴⁹ The psychological impact of the genocide further affected the students, 95% of whom had witnessed acts of violence.⁵⁰ Not only were teachers and students among the victims, but afterwards children returned to school with counterparts who had worked as *genocidaires*. Guilty teachers, moreover, were reluctant to teach an unbiased version of the genocide, lest they accuse themselves or appear hypocritical.⁵¹ Under such circumstances, the Rwandan government needed global intervention to overcome its societal barriers.

Receiving the necessary financial aid, the Rwandan government now spends more than twice as much on education as on health, with some funding provided by the Education for All Fast Track Initiative.⁵² Efforts seem to be paying off. The 2010 Least Developed Countries Report labels Rwanda as on track to meet its MDG in primary education enrollment.⁵³ Additionally, the UNDP education index for Rwanda – measuring gross enrollment ratio and adult literacy rates – has risen sharply over the past decade.

Still, several agencies have voiced concerns over secondary education, and the problem may be directly connected to donor activity. The 2011 national budget sets aside more than nine times more funding for primary education than for upper secondary.⁵⁴ Despite the disparity, the government still spends more on secondary education than is advised by donors.⁵⁵ This

reflects foreign donors' preference for the UN MDGs, which focuses on universal primary education. For example, the United Kingdom's Department for International Development is one of the largest education sector donors, and in the recent past, the MDGs have been called the "cornerstone of its development policy."⁵⁶

Disagreements over priorities also include the government's insistence on a trilingual education. The administration's penchant toward the policy is politically-based – it is a peacebuilding attempt to establish equality between the three languages preferred by different Rwandan groups.⁵⁷ The donor community, however, resists the idea because students already struggle to properly handle one language.⁵⁸ Perhaps initiatives would be even more successful if the Rwandan government were given the leeway to respond to local problems with local solutions. On the other hand, subsectors of education run mostly by government mandate have had their own share of problems so collaboration with the international community is not the cut-and-dry source of setbacks.

Genocide education, for instance, still lacks the unbiased quality necessary to prevent future violence, and an increase in foreign funding would do little to address this problem. Since 1994, the formal teaching of history has either been banned or responsibility given to the government so funding directed toward schools is given little chance to directly influence the genocide narrative. Instead, the government established education camps for both released genocide prisoners and a large segment of the rest of society in order to stress national unity and to discuss Rwanda's historical, economic and social issues.⁵⁹ Their oversimplified version of history rejects ethnic labels and

teaches that Tutsi, Hutu, and Twa categories were traditionally economically-driven and provided room for social mobility. While such an account is based partially on historical fact, it ignores the complexities of prior Hutu-Tutsi relations. Given the sensitivity of the subject matter, however, it would be difficult to find Rwandan teachers neutral toward the events of 1994. National education programs do not prevent personal genocide narratives from disseminating throughout the country. Tutsis and moderate Hutus still remember which group plotted their extermination regardless of that group's pre-colonial origins. Some Hutus deny the label of genocide while some Tutsis doubt the victimization of moderate Hutus. Even the *gacaca* trials, which left room for local truth-telling, sometimes contributed to local vengeance unrelated to the genocide. Those on trial lacked adequate defense councils so accusations were sometimes a result of personal animosities or suspicions.⁶⁰ Therefore, the involvement of the global community could be a necessary component of Rwandan nation-building if it provides a neutral platform through which citizens can illuminate the past and prevent future violence. On the other hand, the positive effects of monetary aid on this specific sector of education are still uncertain.

So, while the educational capacity of the nation has increased, the end goal of building a peaceful state may not be reached. Erasing tribal identities with a national narrative is meant to prevent future ethnic cleansing, but the government cannot expunge the memory of genocide with doctrine alone. Existing divisions between Rwandans are ignored. It is simply assumed that they are willing to replace the memory of a recent, violent past with a distant myth.

Rising literacy rates and more years of schooling

are a positive development in recent years, but the quality of genocide education makes the difference between an educated society that lives in peace and an educated society that resorts to massacre. In fact, research done in 2008 reveals that tribal hatreds are still alive in Rwandan schools. Hutu classmates continue to harass their Tutsi counterparts, and some teachers were found using publications from the National Revolutionary Movement for Development—the group responsible for planning the genocide.⁶¹ While school enrollment is a viable funding target, it has little to do with what happens once the children begin classes. In this sense, state-building efforts may be straying from future stability.

ODA AND POLITICAL PROGRESS

To account for changes in political stability, the Failed States Indices from 2005 (the first available) to 2011 are examined. Since 2000, ODA has been increasing, so these values demonstrate Rwanda's state of political development in the midst of funding inflation. Figure 4 shows the results.⁶²




FIGURE 4: FAILED STATES INDEX: RWANDA

The Failed States Index operates on a scale from 1-10, with higher values indicating a greater threat of instability. Rwanda has consistently been on the list of top 50 countries most likely to become a failed state going from 12 in 2005 and falling to 34 in 2011.⁶³ The rankings, however, only show that other countries have done worse than Rwanda in the past 7 years. When compared to itself, Rwanda's index score in 2005 (8.3) and its score in 2011 (8.2) illustrate a lack of permanent progress over time. Pumping more aid into Rwandan may correlate with limited improvement from 2006 to 2009, but progress made on human rights and rule-of-law eventually stagnates and then reverses. The figures also deteriorate in the years following presidential elections (2003 and 2010), which suggests that domestic political opportunities hold more sway over government actions than the apparently futile threat of reduced international funding.

Again, if foreign donations are not specifically earmarked, funding increases might not be expected to address political stability, but this is not the case with Rwanda. Just as aid money was provided for the sectors that contributed to Rwanda's HDI values, grants have been given to the Kagame government to conduct democracy promotion. In 2008, USAID provided \$665,000 to Rwanda to address civic participation, political rights and judicial independence.⁶⁴ That number jumped to \$2,580,000 in 2009 and nearly doubled a year later.⁶⁵

ODA AND RWANDAN POLITICS

Since Kagame and the RPF took power in 1994, they have attempted to establish the legitimacy of the government. This task was easier in the aftermath of

civil war because the RPF is universally credited for stopping the genocide. When Prudence Bushnell, the U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Africa, instructed Kagame in 1994 to stop his advance and negotiate with the *interahamwe*, his response—“*Madam, they’re killing my people.*”⁶⁶—later gave him a humanitarian credibility that the global community had been lacking.

After the genocide, international guilt provided leeway for the RPF that otherwise would have been replaced with condemnation over its human rights abuses. To be fair, the controversial operations in the DRC did stem from a legitimate security threat. *Genocidaires* who had fled across the border continued their atrocities often using the safety of refugee camps as bases for operations. RPF soldiers, however, did not clearly demarcate the line between war-fighting and retribution. The operational necessity of certain brutalities is still in question.

Nor were the human rights abuses reserved for the DRC. The immediate post-genocide period was accompanied by revenge killings of many Hutu leaders still in the country, including judges, local government officials, clerics and teachers. The RPA is a well-documented source of the killings.⁶⁷ In 2004, judges, mayors, teachers and other government officials considered opponents of the state were purged.⁶⁸ A 2005 Frontline report revealed that, “for stating their beliefs about the government, Rwandans can now be imprisoned, disappear, be forced into exile, or killed.”⁶⁹

When donors finally began to notice the abuses of the Rwandan government, Kagame became increasingly defiant, unwilling to have Rwanda’s political options hampered by financial pressures. In 2000, the Bush administration threatened to rescind support

for IMF aid to Rwanda if the country did not retreat from the DRC.⁷⁰ Two years later, Kagame had yet to remove his troops so the U.S. blocked a disbursement of Rwanda's Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility.⁷¹ Afterward, Kagame announced that "Rwandans must stop being dependent on the international community, whose attitude that compounds our problems emerge[s] from indifference, ignorance, and malice."⁷² The president's irritation continued for years, notably in May 2006, when he ignored an assessment by the World Food Programme that suggested that almost 300,000 Rwandans needed emergency famine response.⁷³ He referred to the estimation as "mere fabrication, opportunistic and serving selfish interests,"⁷⁴ despite USAID's support for the assessment with their Famine Early Warning System.⁷⁵

Still, donors have shown sympathy, often owing to the Rwandan government's technocratic abilities.⁷⁶ Because of their unquestioning support for Kagame's regime, some accuse Rwanda's patrons of "re-creating the preconditions for catastrophe."⁷⁷ Just as aid agencies believed—up until the genocide—that the Habyarimana government was isolated from early acts of Hutu violence and continued to provide funding, donors today separate political and economic spheres. Countries only occasionally threaten to withdraw their funding, and they act on their threats even more rarely.

Instead, the global community has given Kagame awards highlighting his social achievements. These include the African National Achievement Award, Andrew Young Medal for Capitalism and Social Progress, Global Leadership Award, the ICT Africa Award and honorary degrees from American educational institutions.⁷⁸

Nonetheless, not all U.S. agencies have ignored Rwanda's political reality. While USAID remains cautiously optimistic about Rwanda's security and health achievements, it does recognize the country's shortcomings in governance. The agency's *Integrated Strategic Plan* for Rwanda between 2004 and 2009 added a new political objective for the Rwandan government: "Improved governance through increased citizen participation."⁷⁹ In 2008, Rwanda joined the U.S. Millennium Challenge Corporation threshold assistance program to "strengthen the capacity and independence of the judiciary, expand opportunities for civic participation, and promote civil rights and liberties."⁸⁰ Again, ODA earmarked for such democratic activities has been on the rise for the past decade.

Real democracy, however, remains elusive. The first democratization process began in 2001, as the government's transition period ended. Local elections were held, but RPF appointees controlled the voting system, the use of finger printing circumvented efforts at a secret ballot, and Human Rights Watch found the election to be "flawed from the beginning."⁸¹ After the 2003 presidential election, grassroots political activity continued to be banned, and pluralism was reduced with further restrictions on political parties.⁸² In 2010 — after the five-year USAID program and over a decade of democracy assistance from the U.S.⁸³ — Kagame won the presidential elections with 93% of the vote amidst widespread concerns about pre-election coercion such as arrests and assassinations plagued opposition leaders and independent journalists.⁸⁴ Meanwhile, two opposition parties were banned, and, as usual, the government considered criticism of the Kagame regime to be an act of criminal "divisionism."⁸⁵ The three candidates who did run against Kagame were nominated by RPF cartel parties.⁸⁶

NGOs in Rwanda have also been targets of political oppression. Human rights groups are particularly vulnerable if they denounce government actions. By 1996, 38 NGOs were expelled from Rwanda, and the operations of 18 others were suspended.⁸⁷ The government mandates that NGOs register with the Ministry of Local Government and submit regular reports on progress and finances. While this regulates potentially disruptive behavior and allows the government to track development, the annual records are not always publically accessible, and the consequences of government intervention can be severe. Notably, the League for the Promotion and Defense of Human Rights in Rwanda had to flee in 2004 after its assets were frozen, and it was accused of divisionism.⁸⁸

ODA AND THE RWANDAN MILITARY

If there is one sector that has received high international praise for its ability to promote Rwanda's national goals, it is the Rwanda Defence Force (RDF), formerly the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA). A few months after the genocide, Kagame and his officers began to integrate increased numbers of Hutus and ex-FAR soldiers into the RPA. An education program encouraged open dialogue about Hutu-Tutsi relations and promoted joint-resolution of inter-ethnic conflicts.⁸⁹ RPF leaders disseminated a common military doctrine to all soldiers, advancing a unified strategic purpose for the entire army. Since 1994, the combined force has proven remarkably effective. In 1996, the army defeated Hutu extremists in northern Rwanda and later completed an efficient invasion and campaign against former *genocidaires* in the DRC.

More recently, Rwandan troops have been engaged in peacekeeping operations, impressing the international community with its professionalism. Darfur and Haiti are the primary locations for Rwandan peacekeepers with almost 3500 soldiers in UNAMID in 2008.⁹⁰ After announcing the deployment of 140 peacekeepers to Haiti in 2010, police spokesman Kayiranga insisted that Rwanda was willing to expand its forces further.⁹¹ The former Commander of AFRICOM, General Ward, hailed the RDF as “a very professional force,” pledging a closer partnership with the U.S. military.⁹² Likewise UK Chief of Defense Staff General Richards paid his respects to the RDF and offered future collaborations.⁹³

Successful military integration and ground force proficiency give the impression that Rwandan state-building, in general, should be based on the success story of the armed forces. On the surface, it is a technical triumph, with the army often hailed as the most well-organized and well-operated military force in Africa. However, to prevent a return to violence, the state must have more than strength. After all, President Habyarimana’s regime exercised great control over its forces, but his policy directives determined the army’s impact on Rwandans.

In the late 1990s, policy directives from the RPF-led government included deep penetration into the DRC to fight members of the *interahamwe*, a group largely responsible for carrying out the genocide. As mentioned earlier, Kigali’s interest in vanquishing the group was not entirely motivated by blood-thirst. The RPF campaign consisted of two separate goals—toppling Habyarimana and then stopping the genocide by overthrowing the Hutu interim regime—and the DRC operations could be viewed as a completion of

the second. Despite the Congolese military's alliance with ex-FAR in the late 1990s,⁹⁴ Rwanda's current operations in the DRC could be utilized for peace: Congolese military forces are too weak to expel the rebels on their own so recent cooperation with Rwandan troops provides neighborly assistance against destabilizing forces. Yet, problems associated with the Congo wars persist. Though efficient, the Rwandan army is accused of natural resource looting and crimes against humanity. For example, during Rwanda's years in the DRC, data collected from the Economist Intelligence Unit and National Bank of Rwanda revealed a 706.7 ton discrepancy between domestic production of coltan and the amount that Rwanda exported.⁹⁵ As for the crimes against humanity, Amnesty International accused the RPA of massacring tens of thousands of civilians during the second Congo war.⁹⁶ In October 2010, a UN report asserted that Rwandan actions through 2003 "may [have been] genocide."⁹⁷

Modern military policies, though more secretive, do not indicate that much has changed since the Rwandans officially pulled out of their neighboring country. International pressure played a large role in Rwanda's original departure, but the government's sentiments about DRC rebels altered very little. In 2007, RDF Spokesperson Jill Rutaremara announced that her government was "not happy with the rate at which [the DRC] is flushing out rebels fighting us from their side."⁹⁸ However, Rwanda is not relying solely on the Congolese government, as it persists with smaller, non-continuous operations against ex-FAR groups. *New York Times* writer Jeffrey Gettleman interviewed demobilized soldiers at the end of 2008 about several instances of hushed military involvement.⁹⁹

A Rwandan government administrator said a military hospital in Kigali was treating many Rwandan soldiers who were recently wounded while fighting in Congo, but the administrator said he could be jailed for talking about it...

"We usually get a promotion," said one fighter who was recently a corporal in the Rwandan Army and served as a sergeant in the rebel forces last month. He said that he could be severely punished if identified and that Rwandan officials and rebel commanders told the fighters not to say anything about the cooperation.

The underlying issue apparent in this testimony is the military threat to Rwandan citizens unwilling to follow the government line. Rwanda may unnerve its neighbors, but that is the nature of power politics. When the army is seen as a threat internally, it may be a sign that state-building has started to skirt the line of authoritarianism. As recent as February 2011, Jane's Military and Security Assessment for Rwanda warned that, "the RDF remains tightly controlled by politicized elements of the old Rwandan Patriotic Front."¹⁰⁰ Furthermore, in language usually reserved for countries like Pakistan, Rwanda-expert Filip Reyntjens described the African nation as "an army with a state rather than a state with an army."¹⁰¹

Still, foreign donors have supported the Rwandan military indirectly and directly. Indirectly, aid money funneled into the national budget can be used for military expenditures without donor oversight. In 2007, almost ten percent of Rwanda's annual aid goes to the security sector, more than the amount budgeted for agriculture and social protection combined.¹⁰² In 2007, the UN advised the Rwandan government to decrease its military spending in order to concentrate on the economy and poverty reduction.¹⁰³ The government

rejected the idea, however, claiming that the UN misinterpreted its data, that military spending was below the regional average and that the percentage of spending on the RDF had actually decreased since 2000.¹⁰⁴

Alternative sources of finance may also conceal the true amount of money being spent on the military. During Rwanda's official years of involvement in the DRC, the military budget never exceeded US\$100 million.¹⁰⁵ Actual defense expenditures, though, were estimated by the UN to be US\$400 million—financed mostly by wealth garnered from DRC operations.¹⁰⁶ Other sources of income for the military included “unofficial ‘taxes’ and ‘voluntary’ contributions to the war effort, theft and extortion, and payments by public enterprises like Rwandex, Sonarwa and Rwandatel.”¹⁰⁷

Foreign government agencies also fund Rwanda's military directly. In the late 1990s, U.S. Special Forces provided basic training to the Rwandan army, and later military cooperation agreements provided military aid (\$0.6 million in 2005).¹⁰⁸

Foreign expenditures on the Rwandan military have shown remarkable dividends, but the political directives guiding the RDF continue to threaten the country's neighbors and potentially its own people. If Rwanda's future peace is dependent upon a strong, integrated army, donors may not be wrong in praising the RDF's stabilizing potential. However, as evidence reveals the army's destabilizing effects on the Great Lakes region as a whole, their funding can hardly be perceived as harmless.

RWANDA AND CAMBODIA: A COMPARISON IN AID AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

Much like Rwanda, Cambodia suffered a genocide that destroyed the country's social and material infrastructure. From 1975-1979, the Khmer Rouge under the leadership of Pol Pot murdered roughly 1.7 million of its own people. Many of the victims were urbanites and those who appeared educated. When the Vietnamese invaded Cambodia, ending the genocide, the result was a nation without a qualified workforce to run the state. The current Prime Minister, Hun Sen, has been in a leadership role since the early 1980s.

Though elected today, Sen's rise parallels that of Kagame. First, both came to power after the militant overthrow of genocidal regimes. In such cases, legitimacy of rule is strong by comparison, and policies are easily justified as methods to prevent a return to violence. Second, elections in both countries are suspected of foul play. Ahead of Cambodia's 2013 parliamentary elections, the only remaining opposition party has been the victim of a campaign to isolate it from all local organization.¹⁰⁹ The government used the court system to exile its leader and to sentence him to 12 years in prison under charges that banned him from running for Parliament.¹¹⁰

The Cambodian government also approaches civil society like the Rwandan leadership. Authorities passed a draft law allowing the government to ban organizations accused of supporting political parties or "acting somehow to 'damage' national security, peace, or safety."¹¹¹ A 2011 bill would also require NGOs to register with the government or be disbanded. Like Rwanda's post-genocide crackdown on critical aid agencies, Cambodia has also jailed 38 human rights

workers who were defending victims of the political system.¹¹²

The political similarities between Rwanda and Cambodia would, nevertheless, be meaningless for the purposes of this paper were it not for the trans-border consistency of foreign aid donors and their unquestioning support for the regimes of both countries. At first, such support helped both nations transition to peace after genocide. In Rwanda, emergency aid prevented mass starvation in refugee camps, and in Cambodia, the government used donated rice to pay state officials and create an administration.¹¹³ Furthermore, was it not for the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), the first free and fair elections might not have taken place in 1993.¹¹⁴ Later commune elections in 2002 also “require[d] international funding, [and] they were scheduled only after international donors and NGOs pushed for them...”¹¹⁵ That year saw pre-election violence, but foreign donors pledged \$615 million—\$75 million more than requested.¹¹⁶

Pressure from aid agencies in the late 1990s also led the Cambodian government to accept a program of limited governmental decentralization. Much like Rwanda, the Cambodian leadership concentrated solely on the centralization of state power in the years following the genocide. The state already had a difficult time extending its control over the entire country and population, so decentralization would have made an unstable situation worse.¹¹⁷ As its control strengthened and caution diminished, however, the government allowed the provinces and communes to participate in local development projects.¹¹⁸ Donors contributed \$75 million in the first phase (1996-2000) and \$95.2 million for a second phase (2001-2005) to transfer resources toward local governments.¹¹⁹

Still, little significant change in resource distribution seemed to occur. The donor community supported several reforms, but when projects ended, local actors were not motivated to continue them. State workers' salaries were no longer subsidized by foreign contributions, and Cambodia lacked the institutional structure to cope with radical decentralization initiatives.¹²⁰

Political shortcomings amid substantial foreign aid have also become common because of government corruption and manipulation of funding. As the state requests additional resources each year, it is accused of being unable or unwilling to collect revenue on its own.¹²¹ Correspondingly, rumors spread that the government accumulates hundreds of millions of dollars from corruption, drug trafficking and illegal logging.¹²² Meanwhile, the Cambodian Institute for Development complained that donors "virtually take over the funding of education, healthcare, social welfare, rural development, etc. while government spends most of its funds on defense and security."¹²³

Donors recognize the obstacles presented by the Cambodian government but have done little to counter it. Instead, some agencies simply plan for expected losses. For example, an officer with a donor umbrella group told a *Washington Post* journalist, "Some money goes this way or that. But it's useful if some of it reaches the poor... That's better than nothing."¹²⁴

Regarding military support, the U.S. continues to arrange joint exercises with the Cambodian army, using Cambodian land to train Asian troops for peace-keeping operations.¹²⁵ Yet, Human Rights Watch warned that, "[s]ince 2006, the U.S. has provided more than \$4.5 million worth of military equipment and training to Cambodia. Some of that aid has gone to units and individuals within the Cambodian military

with records of serious human rights violations.”¹²⁶ The State Department has recorded the Cambodian military’s illegal land seizures near training sites, but it continues to approve bilateral cooperation and funding for construction on this land.¹²⁷

For two reasons, foreign aid in neither Rwanda nor Cambodia contributes directly to democracy promotion or donor-encouraged military behavior. First, after the genocides, both countries were ruled by strongmen who may have been influenced by calls for reduced foreign aid but were rarely threatened with it. In Rwanda for example, Kagame’s quest to wean his country of foreign aid also suggests that global donors possess the power to curb leaders’ authority. Even if Sen and Kagame have not democratized in reality, foreign pressure at least forces them to fain an interest in forming a liberalized society.

Yet, in neither country has the international community’s power been fully exercised – aid for Rwanda and Cambodia is climbing. Human Rights Watch reported a 2009 incident in which Cambodia committed a serious breach of the 1951 Refugee Convention, and the U.S. responded by only withholding a shipment of 200 surplus military trucks and trailers.¹²⁸ Brinkley summarized the situation: “Each year...Sen promises to reform. The donors nod and make their pledges – \$1.1 billion last year [2010]. Then everyone goes home and nothing changes.”¹²⁹

Rwanda is exceptional in one sense. Unlike Sen, Kagame’s regime has dedicated itself to fighting corruption, persuading donors that investments will not be siphoned away from their original projects. Without the stability of government accountability, however, the switch toward general budget support widens opportunities for misappropriation. Once Rwanda’s

principled reputation and financial partnerships have been fully established, what legal mechanisms are in place to prevent a slide toward corruption, especially as the country continues to prosper?

RWANDA AND HAITI: A COMPARISON IN AID AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

Like Rwanda, Haiti has been the recipient of a growing amount of ODA in the past decade. In fact, Rwanda and Haiti received a roughly equivalent amount of assistance in 2008,¹³⁰ and the OECD often categorizes Haiti as economically comparable to East Africa.

Spikes in Haitian aid are mostly due to natural disasters and the ensuing crisis response. For example, tropical storms in 1994, hurricanes and food riots in 2008, and a 7.0-magnitude earthquake in January 2010 boosted the foreign presence in the Caribbean nation.¹³¹ U.S. troops were sent to Haiti in 2010 to help distribute an original pledge of over \$100 million in aid, as peacekeepers worldwide descended upon the country.¹³² Partly for this reason, funds flowing into the country are actually higher than data suggests because the increasing amount of money designated for United Nations or North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) peacekeeping operations is not considered ODA.¹³³ Also distorting is the large number of private donations given to Haiti in response to natural disasters—an estimated \$1,245,000,000 from private contributors one year after the 2010 earthquake, none of which is counted as ODA.¹³⁴ Figure 5 shows ODA data through 2009 to avoid distortions in the comparison between Haiti's and Rwanda's trajectories caused by the unusually destructive earthquake of 2010¹³⁵.




FIGURE 5: ODA FOR HAITI AND RWANDA

The earthquake killed as many as several hundred thousand people and decimated the infrastructure of the capital, Port-au-Prince. Despite generous financial help from the global community, it was necessary to rebuild the nation, already the poorest in the Western Hemisphere. Schools, hospitals, businesses and government buildings were destroyed and a large fraction of the population dead or homeless. In this way, the environment mirrors post-genocide Rwanda.

Even controlling for 2010, observers almost universally consider Haiti to be a foreign aid failure. Billions have been funneled into the Haitian economy, yet its development has been limited, if not non-existent. In 2002, the Director of World Bank's Operations Evaluation Department wrote, "...the outcome of World Bank assistance programs [in Haiti from 1986 to 2002] is rated unsatisfactory..., the institutional development impact, negligible, and the sustainability of the few benefits that have accrued, unlikely."¹³⁶ U.S. contributions alone totaled nearly \$1.5 billion between 1990 and 2005




FIGURE 6: HUMAN DEVELOPMENT INDEX FOR HAITI AND RWANDA

Haiti's situation is analogous to the situation facing Rwanda. Both face high poverty rates, unequal income distribution, health epidemics and a need for greater concentration on higher education for its citizens. Rwanda's and Haiti's HDI values parallel each other as closely as their ODA levels (Figure 6).¹³⁷ Whether or not this similarity brands Rwanda a foreign aid failure as well is dependent on the reasons for such shortcomings.

The National Academy of Public Administration blamed Haiti's poor utilization of aid on several factors also relating to Rwanda's experience.¹³⁸ First, the government did not initiate development programs or take ownership of those funded by donors. For example, after spending almost \$100 million on rule-of-law programs between 1995 and 2000, the U.S. General Accounting Office complained that "The Haitian government's lack of a clear commitment to addressing the major problems of its police and judicial institutions has been the key factor affecting the success of the U.S. assistance provided to these institutions. U.S. assistance has been impeded because the Haitian Government has not acted..." The Rwandan govern-

ment has been responsive to donor programs as the international community funds them, but differing priorities cause the government to drop its support for some projects once aid is withdrawn. Therefore, the ownership problem could reflect poorly-designed donor projects, which the government does not believe conform to its needs.

Second, like Rwanda and Cambodia, Haiti has been highly dependent on aid to meet its needs. Unlike Rwanda, however, the former Aristide government made little effort to move away from its reliance on international financing and showed scant interest in governance or national reconstruction. Dependence on global donors transforms aid from a long-term to a short-term solution. Instead of using the funds as a transition tool toward stability, aid money becomes a crutch that allows for continued misappropriation. Donors' reluctance to carry out threats regarding misallocated aid, however, enables this behavior in small forms in both Rwanda and Cambodia.

Finally, disputes between the Haitian President and Parliament impede donors from coordinating their actions with either group. Rules on aid expenditure are rarely agreed upon and even less frequently passed making the international-national partnership a shaky affair. On this point, the benefits of one-party leadership in Rwanda are understandable. Though it has altered HDI very little—and sometimes for the worse—Kagame's style of governance, much like his army, can be credited for efficiency. Disagreements with global donors are presented by one governmental voice and even if hostile could be viewed as a mechanism to clarify the donor-recipient relationship.

RWANDA AND BOSNIA: A COMPARISON IN AID AND POST-ETHNIC CONFLICT

The perils of ethnic conflict also surfaced in the mid-90s Balkans. In May 1991, Slovenia and Croatia declared independence from the Serbian government in Belgrade, initiating the breakup of Yugoslavia. Following the secession, Bosnia-Herzegovina held a referendum (boycotted by Bosnian Serbs) and voted overwhelmingly for its own republic. An armed struggle between the resistant Bosnian Serbs (supported by Serbia), Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats broke out, which included an ethnic cleansing campaign by the Bosnian Serbs against the Muslims. NATO intervention eventually resulted in the 1995 Dayton Peace Accords and an agreement on a multiethnic government. The first elections took place in September 1996 under international supervision.¹³⁹

Bosnia's proximity to Europe strengthened Western resolve to rebuild its war-torn infrastructure and political system. Immediately following war's end, emergency funding for state-building projects began to flow eastward, but problems arose just as quickly. Within a year, donors threatened to partially withhold funds because the Bosnian government was not complying with main components of the peace agreement – i.e. hindering the return of refugees, declining to turn over war criminals for prosecution and evading arms-control reductions.¹⁴⁰ At an aid conference in London, then-British Prime Minister John Major asserted, "This international help will be conditional on the willingness in Bosnia and Herzegovina to implement all aspects of the peace agreement."¹⁴¹

By the late 1990s, disturbing reports of continued disregard for Dayton compelled donors to carry out

their threats. For example, the U.S. withheld some military aid for the Train and Equip program in 1998 because Bosnian Muslims and Croats refused to unify their armed forces, even symbolically.¹⁴² Then, in August 1999, an American-run anti-fraud unit informed the international Office of the High Representative (OHR) that an estimated \$1 billion in Bosnian funding was missing.¹⁴³ This truthfulness of this figure was questioned, however.¹⁴⁴

In the latter case, the denial of a problem preempted the need to withdraw aid as a punishment. Therein lays the ambiguity of conditionality: whether or not a nation is abiding by the conditions set forth by the donors is left to the donors to decide. When multiple donor countries disagree on an evaluation, each financier either acts on his own limiting the penalty for the shirking, or collective action mires actors in discussions of definition, obstructing timely response.

Yet, early accusations of financial mismanagement did not detract in any resolute manner the amount of foreign aid contributed to Bosnia. Between 1996 and 2007, \$14 billion and 60,000 troops from 36 NATO-backed countries were sent to the country, amounting to roughly \$300 per person per year.¹⁴⁵ In fact, the Centre for European Studies puts the number higher in the immediate post-war era, at \$1400 per head in the first two years of humanitarian and reconstruction funding.¹⁴⁶ Yet, according to a 2011 report by an independent Balkans analyst group,

For the average citizen of Bosnia & Herzegovina, the billions of euros of foreign aid, various reconstruction and development strategies and 15 years of peace have not brought much progress...The average Bosnian has not seen any of the \$1,400 per capita of international assistance that has for years been given

to their country. However, their average political representative receives more than this as a monthly salary.¹⁴⁷

Given its location in Europe, a high degree of funding and above-average results would be expected. Peace, funding and amicably concerned, albeit self-interested, neighbors make an ideal environment for aid to flourish. Though aid is gradually decreasing, potential EU candidacy and current trade partnerships incentivize Bosnia to reform politically and economically.¹⁴⁸ Indeed, Bosnia-Herzegovina is classified as a highly developed country in the UN Human Development Reports.

HDI values, however, are too sporadic to use as a measure of development progress. For instance, the earliest data available is from 2001, and numbers are only recorded from 2003-2005 and from 2010 after that. The trajectory during this time is domed, starting with a .777 score in 2001, peaking at .803 in 2005, and dropping back down to .710 in 2010.¹⁴⁹ While Bosnia's numbers show a significant amount of development when compared to Rwanda, Haiti or Cambodia, overall progress has varied little in the last decade, despite consistent foreign donations.

Political progress is even less apparent. Independent observers often cite corruption as the reason for misappropriation of aid and continued ethnic divisions as the reason for flawed democracy. On a scale from 0 to 10 (0 being highly corrupt, 10 being very clean), Bosnia rated a 3.2 in Transparency International's 2010 Corruption Perceptions Index.¹⁵⁰ Granted, this is an improvement from a score of 3 in 2009 and 2.9 in 2005, but it still sits on par with countries like Liberia, Mexico, Albania and Guatemala.¹⁵¹

As for flawed democracy, ethnic divisions are still challenging the existence of the state. Bosnian Serbs and Croats recently demanded more autonomy, and some leaders suggest the secession of the more prosperous Republika Srpska.¹⁵² Meanwhile, the power-sharing system allows ethnic groups to maintain their own government, police force and education system because ethnic sectors of the population are also concentrated geographically (though not exclusively).¹⁵³ Moreover, ethnic quotas for almost every public office allow for patronage systems and political deadlock.¹⁵⁴

Seeing such little progress, foreigners are now suffering from donor fatigue and are eager to concentrate on the recent Middle Eastern wars.¹⁵⁵ With corruption scaring off FDI and weak rule-of-law reducing incentives for privatization, it is uncertain from whom replacement funding will hail. Instead, donors pressure the Bosnian government to absorb the situation. McMahon and Western lament the choice: "Rather than expend more effort, which might have generated backlash for nationalist parties, the international community delegated much of its power in a misguided effort to let the Bosnians rule themselves..." A problematic strategy given the perverse institutions that the foreigners helped create.¹⁵⁶ Nationalism, then, hinders the actions of a neutral donor community.

Bosnia's foreign aid debacle sheds greater light on Rwanda's situation in four ways. First, Bosnian's corruption issue shows that Kagame's strategy to attract FDI is well-founded. Rwanda's reputation for transparency makes future investors more confident that their ventures will succeed uninterrupted. In May 2010, the IMF predicted that the expected increase in FDI (2.4% of GDP "over the long term"), along with an increase in private-public partnerships, would

gradually decrease the current account deficit and reduce Rwanda's high debt (14.4% of GDP at the end of 2009).¹⁵⁷ For the purposes of sustainability, a lack of corruption has more benefits than political accountability alone.

Second, Bosnia's government structure requiring equal representation of each ethnic group illustrates the problems that Rwanda has avoided with a Tutu-led government. Discounting the obvious qualms with authoritarianism, keeping Hutus from ruling status in the immediate aftermath of the genocide provided a symbolic break from the past, encouraging victims that their "new" country was more secure. The political setup of Rwanda is a response the RPF winning the civil war and securing its gains, rather than a healing tactic. Nevertheless, political deadlock is circumvented because groups that formerly massacred each other are not forced to make unanimous decisions for the future of their country. On this point, however, there is a warning for Kagame. Even if ethnic labels are banned, ethnic identity and its genocidal history are not easily erased. The Bosnian system sets ethnic quotas in recognition of this fact, but if the Rwandan government acknowledges ethnicity only in genocide-related trials and ignores its role in Rwandans' everyday lives, it risks something worse than stalemate—inter-group tension without a political outlet. For this reason, gradual political integration amongst ethnic groups might be beneficial for future stability, just as military integration bolstered the armed forces. On the other hand, a delay risks one group consolidating power early and refusing entrance to others later.

Third, Bosnia shows that foreign donors can be finicky with their investments even when the target country is in Europe. International donors have hier-

archies to whom they must answer about their success, and a lost cause hardly convinces financiers to continue their patronage. A small, African country with few strategic advantages for the West will be treated with even less patience. As mentioned, the UN recently slated foreign donors for their vacillating approach toward Rwanda. Because Rwanda's budget is largely based on outside funding, an unpredictable source of income makes planning future state projects a difficult task.

Finally, the Bosnian case exemplifies the potential failures of conditionality. Even when threats were carried out against the Bosnian government, aid was not significantly reduced, and the problems about which donors complained persisted. At the time that donor threats were carried through in Bosnia, the country was at its peak of dependence on the international community. The effectiveness of conditionality on Rwanda—as it is weaning itself away from donor influences—is even less certain. In the face of Rwanda's resurgent military, political authoritarianism and fluctuating development funding, constraints are more likely to be placed on the international community than by them.

COLLECTIVE LESSONS LEARNED: IMPLICATIONS OF FOREIGN AID POLICY ON UNSTABLE NATIONS

The relationship between foreign aid allocation and the four countries under discussion demonstrate similar patterns. Rwanda, Cambodia, Haiti and Bosnia benefitted from the emergency aid bestowed upon them in the immediate aftermath of their crises. Afterward, all four nations experienced stunted recov-

ery. Each lacked the infrastructure and human capital to maintain foreign-induced changes. Motivation to continue global projects waned as funding decreased, and three out of four underwent stagnating, and then decreasing, HDI values. Cambodia's HDI had been rising but dropped between 2005 and 2010; Bosnia's values were inconclusive. Yet, ODA consistently increased for all four nations, regardless of political resistance to donors and inefficient use of funds.

Why donors do not withhold their aid is an open debate. The plethora of information available on governments shirking on their promises makes it almost certain that global ignorance is not the reason. Instead, multilateral organizations frequently cite their concern that the people of a recipient nation will suffer if aid stops. Even if the government uses funds in unscrupulous ways, it is not worth punishing innocent civilians. An example is the UNDP's 2007 assessment that noted Rwanda's inefficient use of funds to reduce poverty but called for an increase in ODA anyway.

Second, the façade of real change in unstable countries may be enough for donors. Even superficial reforms can be reported to domestic audiences as progress. In other words, artificial transformations provide an illusion of donor power while political realities demonstrate the limits of that power. To publicize shortcomings beyond mere statements of disappointment threatens to reveal the extent of the donor-recipient imbalance and would require donors to right alleged wrongs. As a matter of pride and rationality, it is easier for donors to make their pledges and then monitor from a distance keeping deeper intervention at bay while stabilizing governments through appeasement.

Finally, placing conditions on aid rarely succeeds. Though monitoring the use of funding is often necessary in the political sector to prevent abuse of power and corruption, this is not always the case with regard to economic and health reforms. The conditions set by global donors may be an inappropriate response. For example, successes in Rwanda's health sector did not begin to emerge until the international WHO model was replaced with a system that responded to local needs. In other situations, conditions could be reasonable, but a lack of repercussions for renegeing provides little incentive for recipient nations to listen to donors. For Bosnia, the only requirement for funding was conformity with Dayton, and the country received over \$14 billion despite non-compliance.

Another reason that foreign aid might receive lackluster results relates to national security. Global donors' strategic concerns dictate aid policy more than a concern for human rights in recipient countries. Nor is this much of a secret. A recent piece in *The Washington Post* reiterates the standard argument: "[F]oreign aid is not designed to make countries like us. The United States wants stable democratic partners that are reliable allies in the long run. Aid builds these relationships, even when the countries we help don't support U.S. in the short run."¹⁵⁸

Irresponsible distribution of aid, however, could lead to instability. Differences in resource distribution amongst provinces can exasperate ethnic cleavages when national groups are separated geographically (Bosnia) or politically (Rwanda).

Beyond strict conditionality, however, donors do have the ability to dictate the marginal utilization of their aid. Rwanda concentrating funding on primary education and HIV/AIDS eradication instead of fo-

cusing on the leadership's deeper interests in secondary education and the provision of basic healthcare demonstrates this effect. When Rwandan civil society organizations bemoan Western imposition of arbitrary rules, yet accept them in order to retain funding, donor power is revealed. At the same time, donors cannot fix every problem afflicting a post-conflict nation. For example, outsiders rarely convince ethnic groups to unify; the homegrown desire for peace or the outright chaos of political divisionism are more persuasive tools of reconciliation.

Therefore, if a long-term global strategy is the principal concern for donor countries, it is inadequate to measure the effects of foreign aid by technical results such as voter registration, election turnout or the number of troops trained. Genuinely democratic politics and an accountable leadership determine the use of those technical results. For example, international military support trains troops and provides them with equipment, but political decisions determine whether that support is dedicated to peacekeeping, war or political militarism. International politics determine how much aid is donated, and domestic politics determine how that money is utilized, but donors rarely use the former to influence the latter, despite domestic politics being the lynchpin in the overall success of resource allocation. Instead, ODA increases as a result of donor sympathy, guilt, or self-interest, none of which—despite good intentions—guarantee recipients' stability.

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CHAPTER 5

MICROFINANCE AND SMALL BUSINESS: THE POTENTIAL EMPOWERING EFFECTS FOR WOMEN IN AFGHANISTAN AND IRAQ AND THE ROLE OF THE US MILITARY

James Pagano

INTRODUCTION

The practice of microfinance has been widely hailed as a potential solution to global poverty. Proponents of microfinance are particularly excited by the potential of these loans to empower impoverished women. This investment strategy is significant to the study of global stability because it has the potential to reduce violence, increase economic growth and alleviate poverty.

Currently, the U.S. military focuses primarily on the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. While by no means the same, both countries share similar issues that make them logical sites for microfinance practices. Based on the theories that drive the microfinance movement, both of these war-torn nations stand to make significant gains from the increased availability of financial services for their respective impoverished populations. Furthermore, both nations provide a significant opportunity to test the capacity of microfinance to empower women who enjoy relatively few rights in both nations.

MICROFINANCE 101

In most wealthy countries, the majority of the population enjoys widespread access to capital and financial services at reasonable levels of interest. However, the banks that exist in developing countries only offer their services to the nation's wealthy.¹ Only pawnshops or local moneylenders who charge exorbitant interest rates offer the poor credit. In addition, nations with large poor populations often suffer from low quality of governance. These issues cause higher transaction costs, a lack of confidence in institutions and a reluctance of legitimate banks and NGOs to participate.²³ This opportunity gap perpetuates the vicious cycle, but microfinance seeks to address this problem.

Microfinance is the practice of offering financial services to very small businesses, groups or individuals who have very little wealth and generally limited collateral. The most common and widely celebrated subset of microfinance is microloaning—the practice of providing a small loan to a disadvantaged individual so he or she can invest in capital to create or expand an income-generating activity.⁴ These small businesses, or microenterprises, serve as engines for growth in regions that face high unemployment, endemic poverty and general underdevelopment.⁵ The loans then serve two purposes. First, the loans provide seed money to small-scale businesses that can spur economic growth. Second, they provide an opportunity for income generation.⁶

In 1976, Nobel laureate Muhammad Yunus, an economics professor from Bangladesh, made his first microloan in the amount of only \$27 and later that year founded the Grameen Bank (Village Bank).⁷ His

objectives for providing credit to the poor on suitable terms and teaching them sound financial practices proved highly effective. Today, microfinance institutions (MFIs) exist in over 100 countries worldwide. As of 2006, an estimated one hundred million people had received microfinance in some form.⁸ A staggering 98% of the planet's poorest individuals repay their loans in full. Yunus and the Grameen Bank received the Nobel Peace Prize in 2006 for their effort to reduce global poverty, improve human rights and strengthen the prospects for world peace. According to Yunus, poverty results in the unintentional denial of many basic human rights and is incompatible with long-term, stable peace.

How the Loans Work and the Structure of Microfinance Institutions

As previously stated, microloans are small sums of money provided to poor individuals to expand or create income generating activities. In the beginning of the microfinance revolution, all MFIs were non-profit. Typically, these loans last for a period of between six months and a year with set repayments dates that generally vary between bi-weekly and weekly. Such frequent repayments encourage borrowers not to default and allow MFI staff to provide frequent and regular assistance.⁹ Microloans often go to women as they have proven themselves more responsible, more likely to pay back the loans and more likely to recycle their gains into the welfare of their family and children.¹⁰

Grameen bank is also famous for implementing a group lending strategy. Though loans are granted on an individual basis, the group provides both support

and pressure. Each member of the group is a borrower working with the bank, but in order for an individual to receive a loan, the entire group must maintain a good credit rating. This method of ensuring repayment has proven very effective in tight-knit rural communities.¹¹ Nevertheless, many MFIs simply use more traditional individual loans.

Microloans typically charge interest rates higher than those charged on commercial bank loans. However, these rates still are dwarfed by the rates charged by local moneylenders. The very high transaction costs associated with microlending necessitate these higher rates. For instance, Grameen Bank's average loan charges 20% interest. In addition to the group requirement and frequent interest payments, loans often require a certain amount of money to be put into savings to ensure the poor borrowers have access to funds in times of unforeseen expenses.¹²

Since the start of microfinance in 1976, the practice has expanded and changed in many ways. Grameen Bank has always been a non-profit institution and this model dominated microfinance until the early 1990s. The non-profit model often depends on the high repayment rates of borrowers and the donations of philanthropists and host governments. This dependence has prompted many to label it as unsustainable. Today, MFIs are split between non-profit and conventional banks. There is much about which is more appropriate for an industry that began purely as a means to help the poor.¹³ Those who favor the for-profit model claim that non-profit's reliance on donor funds and sole focus on positive welfare benefits makes these organizations inefficient in the allocation of their funds.¹⁴

Each of the divergent perspectives addresses three main qualities: self-sufficiency, achievement of social

good and permanence. Multiple scholars believe MFIs should focus primarily on financial self-sufficiency, supporting the permanence of the institution and independence from state subsidies or private donations.¹⁵ The opposing view proposes that positive social benefits must trump all other interests. If an institution has made laudable progress in poverty reduction, its financiers ought to continue to invest in the institution. However, even an institution that relies on subsidies should not run steep losses. This would imply the organization is not doing its job correctly, as microloans are not meant to be charity.

Developing nations have always been the focus, and MFIs have had the most significant results there despite efforts to extend microfinance into transitional and developed economies. Microfinance has worked in both rural and urban settings, though the higher population density of urban areas reduces the transaction cost of the loans and sometimes allows lower rates of interest to be charged.

Microfinance holds much promise for poverty reduction, and so, the method has become very popular among private donors, and efforts to raise seed money for new microfinance institutions have become easier since the early 1980s. However, perhaps even more exciting to proponents is the potential of microfinance to empower poor women in male-dominated societies.

THE EFFECTS OF ECONOMIC EMPOWERMENT

Many proponents argue that in addition to reducing poverty and promoting growth, microfinance has the potential to change the social status of poor women in the world. These advocates believe that this is

the primary reason it should continue as a preferred method of providing economic assistance.

Over the past forty years, it has become clear that poor women borrow money more efficiently than men do. This is true both statistically (women have a higher repayment rate than men) and anecdotally (women are more likely to recycle the wealth they generate back into the household). Women borrowers will spend the proceeds generated from a loan on the education and nutrition of their children more frequently than men do, as well as distribute food and education in a more egalitarian way with respect to gender.¹⁶

The Virtuous Spirals of Economic Empowerment

The effects of increased empowerment are theoretically very powerful. Sometimes the effects are referred to as the virtuous spirals, as they enhance and build on one another.¹⁷ In fact, one scholar went so far as to refer to economic empowerment as the magic potion of development and the solution to inequitable gender roles. The same author also suggests that empowering women should have a hugely beneficial effect on a nation's wealth.¹⁸ In this context, economic power refers to "control of income and other key economic resources (e.g., land, animals...)." The distinction between "control of" and "earning" income also forms an important part of the underlying arguments supporting women's economic empowerment.¹⁹ Control implies the women have some say as to how money is spent, where simple earning means that women generate income but do not necessarily decide how it is allocated. Control helps women gain increased equality and a higher degree of influence over their own lives. This higher degree of autonomy leads to direct investment

in the human capital of children, direct increases in a nation's wealth and well-being and indirect improvements in a nation's income growth by corresponding reductions in fertility rates. Some evidence also suggests that improvements in female influence may lead to reduced violence, conflict and corruption.²⁰

Given such bright prospects for positive change, it is no surprise many scholars express such tremendous, though at times unrealistic, optimism for the effects of microfinance. Such promise bears further exploration to adequately understand the potential power of microfinance.

Measureable Impacts of Microfinance and Female Empowerment

The prospects for female empowerment because of microfinance are promising, but many of the proposed benefits are largely theoretical. Conflicting reports regarding the capacity of microfinance to empower women exist and come to very different conclusions on the future utility of microfinance and microloans.

Often the results differ from country to country and region to region suggesting culture has a strong influence on microfinance's overall impact. Nonetheless, the majority of cases reviewed show that microfinance has a positive impact on poverty, but the effects on women's empowerment are less clear. A comprehensive analysis of MFIs throughout Africa shows the impact on women's rights to be very mixed. The author of this analysis attributes the mixed results to a number of cultural factors and the shorter history of microfinance in the region.²¹ The study found that demand for microloans was high in Africa. However, women who accepted loans did not always use them

for projects that contributed to the empowerment of women and on occasion actually used the loans to reinforce gender roles and stereotypes.²² For example, a mother might use the unpaid labor of a daughter to assist her enterprise as opposed to using her revenue to educate the daughter.

Additionally, the author recognizes that polygamy in parts of Africa complicates female empowerment. For example, income contribution by one wife might lead to withdrawal of the male's contribution as he invests his money in a different wife's household.²³ The author also notes that increases in a woman's income can increase household tensions, in some cases leading to an increased incidence of violence against women. Despite the negatives found in this assessment, the author also noted that in Sudan, specifically, borrowers felt that having an independent resource base from their husbands was important and that as a result they now felt more respected and confident.²⁴ While the results of this assessment showed MFIs in these countries to have a mixed record with regard to female empowerment, empowering changes did occur though in lower numbers and at a slower rate than more optimistic studies had predicted.

The numerous case studies of Bangladesh paint a different picture and show more evidence of female empowerment. Bangladesh, as the home of microfinance, tends to be the flagship example for all supporters of microfinance. As theorists postulated, higher female income resulted in marked child health benefits. This study also indicates that female borrowing helped reduce poverty and had a positive growth impact on the surrounding communities.²⁵ Unlike other studies, increases in household tensions in Bangladesh did not give rise to any significant increase in violence against

women. The improved confidence of Bengali women is evident as well.²⁶ That said no evidence for the claim of reduced corruption has occurred.

As is clear from these two case studies, microfinance's empowering effects, while real, are not a foregone conclusion. Effective, efficient, thorough and targeted microfinance can have positive impacts on female social standing; however, inefficient and unmonitored programs can have the reverse effect. Cultural norms, laws and practices must be considered when designing a microfinancing strategy and forming reasonable expectations. To a certain extent, a degree of experimentation and failure will have to occur in a specific society to see how a culture will adjust to increased female income. As such, the idea that microfinance is a magic bullet to nonegalitarian treatment of women is overstated. Thus, the MFIs should understand gender relations in a society, form reasonable expectations for female empowerment and remain flexible in the design of its programs so it can maximize the empowering effects of microfinance.

BEST PRACTICES AND IMPORTANT CONSIDERATIONS

As mentioned above, there are disputes within the academic community concerning the most effective way to run a microfinance operation. Some debate exists as to whether sustainability or social impact and outreach should be the barometer by which to measure success. For the purpose of creating a comprehensive list of best practices, both considerations shall be taken into account. Most explorations of best practices emphasize sustainability. However, in order to most effectively empower women and reduce poverty

results and outreach must also be assessed especially if a specific microfinance institution has a limited operation time. Special consideration of the precarious situations that exist in both Iraq and Afghanistan will also shape this brief study of best practices.

Best Practices

In both Iraq and Afghanistan, microfinance is a growth industry. Furthermore, both countries have weak, fledgling democracies confronting constant threats of violence. Such commonalities suggest that similar best practices can apply in each. A bulleted list of some important best practices in these environments follows:

- Include impact assessment and measurement. This practice often does not receive enough emphasis or attention. Many MFIs rely on anecdotal evidence as opposed to comprehensive statistical analysis for a variety of reasons, most often the cost and difficulty associated with such analysis.²⁷ Lack of analysis makes impact attribution to microfinance programs equally challenging. Assessment on the household level is most highly recommended because they are easier to evaluate for a number of reasons and provide breadth to the impact assessment.²⁸ The type of impact measured is also an important area of assessment. Social as well as economic measurements must be considered in order to prove the efficacy of a specific program. For example, changes in household consumption as well as household income can be measured definitively. Measureable changes such as number of immunizations, amount

of children attending school and other medical measures are not as clear-cut but play an important role in providing quantitative data regarding female empowerment.²⁹ Lastly, qualitative surveys regarding perception can be important for providing anecdotal evidence about female empowerment. Surveys asking borrowers about how they perceive their family role to have changed can provide important feedback to an MFI about the impacts of their loans. All three of these variables must be taken into account to design an effective impact assessment framework.

- Strive for transparency and provide structure. Microfinance programs should constantly look for ways to reduce costs and streamline the structure of their institutions. Enforce regular loan rules. Debts must be paid, for debt forgiveness can undermine the success of a program.
- Separate aid deliveries and microfinance deliveries. In the likely occurrence that microfinance partners or staff are involved in aid activities, ensure the two are not mixed.³⁰
- Prepare for emergencies. They are likely to arise in poor countries, and a successful microfinance institution must be prepared. Such responses may include temporary repayment extensions and programs to get clients back to work. Across the board concessions should be avoided. Instead, to the greatest degree possible, emergency responses should be evaluated on a case-by-case basis.³¹
- Include human capital programs that reduce existing human capital deficits using received grants and donations. Training locals to work

with MFIs will increase community outreach, provide jobs and reduce the cost of microfinance in the long-run.³²

- Coordinate with the government and other grant-giving organizations. Microfinance should not compete with grants. Furthermore, when organizations have not coordinated their specific efforts, their programs can run counter to one another and reduce the efficacy of both operations.
- Ensure that lessons from past failures are learned quickly. Paying careful attention to clients who default or drop out of microfinance programs will make the programs more effective in the future.
- Promote long-term focus. Microfinance is not a temporary development program. Programs ideally last until the impoverished have complete access to normal banking tools. Such a goal implies that the program will need to remain sustainable and viable for many decades.³³
- Avoid using hard currency. Phone banking reduces the likelihood that microfinance employees or clients will be the target of robberies.³⁴
- Develop a revenue stream. Many microfinance institutions receive significant amounts of assistance from donors. Successful microfinance institutions in the long-run must not become dependent on these donations and must have their own revenue stream after the initial start up period.³⁵
- Lobby for a supportive legal and financial framework in the host country.
- Hold frequent and regular meetings between MFIs. Various MFIs operate within Iraq and

Afghanistan, and each one uses slightly different methods. Frequent and regular meetings between MFIs will help increase the efficacy of microfinance programs by sharing the most effective practices and will allow MFIs to be more responsive to changing situations on the ground.

- Target women.

The Poorest of the Poor: Expanding Outreach

Widespread research shows that microfinance often fails to reach the very poorest individuals. Indeed, this issue has become a serious point of contention amongst microfinance scholars. Unfortunately, these extremely impoverished individuals often lack the skills and abilities to absorb any level of debt and require highly-involved, specialized programs to succeed in microfinance. Such specific programs often have very high overhead costs, as more staff is needed to track and assist them.³⁶ Results show that such individuals benefit more from nonfinancial services such as food, nutrition and health assistance.

Microfinance institutions should prioritize outreach to these individuals but not through highly specialized programs. Instead, microfinance programs should work with either the host government or NGOs to create safety net services tied to skill development and microfinance graduation. These safety net programs must require that recipients take-part in skills training that will enable them to benefit from financial assistance in the future. Once the recipient has finished with the safety net program, they should graduate into a microfinance program.³⁷

IRAQ

Women's Rights

In order to determine the prospects for female empowerment in Iraq, the current status of women must first be explored. According to a special report by Freedom House and a number of other sources, the status of women in Iraq remains woefully low. However, the U.S.-led invasion of 2003 and the subsequent end of the Ba'athist rule opened Iraq to some improvements in gender rights and relations. Furthermore, the growth of the microfinance industry in Iraq holds additional promise for the promotion and expansion of women's rights.

Under the rule of Saddam Hussein, Iraqi women possessed relatively few rights despite the Ba'athist party's secularism, and so women's rights stood to make significant gains following the U.S. invasion but progress remains modest at best. The increased violence during the first year of the invasion and in the years following the U.S. troop surge caused a spike in violence against women. Although violence remains a daily reality, the lack of a strong institutional framework protecting women's rights remains the most significant barrier to female empowerment. The Iraqi constitution evolved in such a way that it guaranteed far more rights than women enjoy far fewer rights today. Women now legally have a minimum quota of 25% of the seats in parliament, but these women act as mere puppets for their male counterparts. The right to vote legally extends to women, but they tend to act as little more than an extension of their spouse's opinion. The constitution also guarantees the right to work to all women. However, although women make up 55%

of the population, they make up only 17% take part in the labor force and of that, only 23% are unemployed.³⁸

Education is inequitable in Iraq as well. In fact, lack of education largely explains why women do not take advantage of the rights legally afforded to them. Women are ignorant of their rights. Many NGOs entered Iraq with the intention of educating women but faced violent opposition and thus chose not to operate within Iraq.

The many injustices facing women in Iraq earned Iraq an overall score of 2.4 on a scale of 5 in Freedom House's special report on Women's Rights in the Middle East and North Africa. This score places Iraq near the bottom of the list and behind several other regional neighbors. Fortunately for women in Iraq and for proponents of microfinance, Iraqi women have the legal right to own land and manage their own money. Therefore, the practice of microfinance may hold some promise.³⁹

Microfinance in Iraq

Prior to the invasion in 2003, no formal microfinance institutions existed in Iraq. Like in many poor countries, the poor population could not access commercial bank loans and moneylenders charged exorbitant interest rates. Since the invasion, fourteen microfinance institutions operate in all eighteen provinces of Iraq and have loaned over \$453.5 million.⁴⁰ Furthermore, the industry continues to expand rapidly.⁴¹

Despite the tremendous growth in the Iraqi microfinance industry, the war-torn country presents microfinanciers many difficulties. First and foremost is the precarious security situation. Though violence has declined since its height, the uncertainty surround-

ing the country dissuades potential investors who see Iraq as too risky. Security concerns also raise the cost of each loan, as MFIs must provide security for their loan officers. Iraqis also demonstrate a high level of dependency on the state, which creates an aversion to self-employment.⁴² A skill deficit has also emerged. Highly trained workers who can serve as loan officers and financial advisors are scarce, making expansion of already existing MFIs expensive. Such skill deficits necessitate expansive and costly employee training programs.

Despite continued barriers to successful microfinance, USAID and the government of Iraq view it as an important part of the country's rebuilding process. The government, with the help of USAID, has set the goal of reducing poverty in Iraq from its current level of 23% to 16% by 2014.⁴³ Jointly these governments have identified how they would like to continue expanding microfinance and increasing its impact on Iraqi poverty and unemployment. These methods include increasing awareness of MFIs and how they work, building human capacity through training and education, creating a friendlier regulatory environment and improving existing networks between MFIs. The strategy seeks to improve outreach to the poorest of the poor while simultaneously extending credit to existing medium and small businesses as a means of employment generation

While microfinance may have a bright future concerning poverty reduction and employment generation, its effect on women's rights appears much more modest. Between 2007 and 2010, outreach to women as a percentage of total active clients climbed from 13% to 18%. While the growth is positive, an 18% share lags woefully far behind programs in other parts of

world.⁴⁴ The average outreach to women as a percentage of total active clients in programs in Bangladesh and Bolivia hovers around 90%. Even other countries in the region with similar religious histories have rates that average slightly over 30%.⁴⁵ Much of this disparity results from the structural restrictions facing women in Iraq. For example, women have unequal access to the justice system and are not allowed to obtain passports without spousal approval.⁴⁶

Structural barriers, like the ones that exist in Iraq, are difficult for women to overcome through increased employment or reductions in poverty. However, increased economic participation could eventually reduce female suppression in Iraq. More income under women's control will likely lead to further human capital investment in children and should also add to a female's self-confidence, just as in other regions.

However, how much control a woman would gain from working remains unclear for significant empowerment only results from control over spending. Tight controls initiated by the male head of household greatly nullify the potential for female empowerment. Nonetheless, greater contribution to household income would increase a woman's influence within the home. As a result, traditional aid measures such as school construction may have a more significant impact on women than microfinance. Any empowerment that would occur because of microfinance would likely be so modest that perceptible improvements in women's rights would likely only occur on a generational scale.

AFGHANISTAN

A History of Women's Rights in Afghanistan

The history of women's rights in Afghanistan may surprise many. Despite the widespread knowledge of women's rights atrocities under the Taliban in the 1990s and the Mujahideen before them, several earlier governments attempted women's rights reforms. The new government's policies simply represent the most recent attempt. The first attempt to improve women's rights occurred in the 1920s under the Afghan king Amanullah. Starting in 1923, Amanullah allowed women to go unveiled in public and eventually to dress in contemporary western attire. He also outlawed marriage practices that he deemed detrimental to women and to society as a whole. The government supported female education and opened female schools across the country.⁴⁷

Kabul, largely considered the cultural center of Afghanistan, embraced these changes; however, the various religious and ethnic groups populating rural Afghanistan found these reforms offensive and perceived them as a challenge to their patriarchal form of life. Rural populations also viewed these changes as western and imperialist. Ultimately, Afghanistan proved too decentralized to enforce the new laws regarding female equality, and they never reached rural communities. The tribalists formed a strong opposition to Amanullah's reforms and despite measures to placate them, Amanullah went into exile in 1929. Many scholars view the schism between Afghan cities and rural tribal groups as the main roadblock to liberalization.⁴⁸ Unfortunately, this dynamic also blocked

future reforms and continues to create barriers to social reform today.

The second attempt at liberalization began to occur in the 1960s and lasted until 1989. The inflow of aid from the Soviet Union and the subsequent pressure on the government to become a more economically productive spurred liberalization of policies regarding women. The new constitution passed in 1964 allowed women to hold elected office, relaxed strict dress codes and raised the marriage age. Compulsory education laws applying to both men and women passed. This reform represented the most troubling change to the rural tribal populations. Despite rural resistance, the Soviet puppet state strictly enforced new regulations and made women's rights a priority citing the strong correlation between increased rights and economic growth. Heavy-handed enforcement helped fuel the fundamentalist movements that turned into the Mujahideen after the Soviet invasion in 1979. The ensuing war over the future of Afghanistan caused chaos and destruction and eventually resulted in an end to an era that had brought Afghan women improved rights.⁴⁹

From the Soviet withdrawal in 1989 until 1996, the Mujahideen controlled Afghanistan. All Afghans suffered a period of grotesque brutality, but the daily hardships that faced women lacked any historical precedent. Stories of rape, murder, mutilation and amputation pervaded the society and resulted in a movement of female self-immolation to avoid what they perceived as a worse future under Mujahideen rule. When the Taliban took power, the number of grotesque atrocities decreased, but repressive laws regarding women became institutionalized. Women had to stay within the home, only leaving to buy food, and even then only in the company of a man. Rules

regarding full-body veiling reappeared. The Mujahideen removed the right to education that girls previously enjoyed. Repression returned and though much has changed since the toppling of the Taliban in 2001, many of these repressive practices still exist especially in the more marginal rural regions.⁵⁰

Women's Rights Today

Women's rights in Afghanistan are much improved today, relative to what few rights women had under the Taliban and Mujahideen. However, with respect to other parts of the world and even other Islamic nations, rigid formal and informal restrictions still exist. Social and institutional practices constrain women and prevent them from fully contributing to Afghan society.

After the U.S. helped overthrow the Taliban government in 2001 women began working again, and girls returned to school and in 2004, a new constitution passed that set a 25% quota for female representation in parliament. However, while women's rights have improved, their longevity appears questionable. Many former warlords and persons with ties to either the Taliban or Mujahideen hold high posts in government; thus, no strong government commitment to female rights has coalesced.⁵¹ Several laws proposed in parliament would re-impose laws forbidding women from leaving their homes without male permission. Additionally, President Karzai has proven willing to sacrifice women's rights in exchange for support from the powerful conservative parties.

A wide disparity exists across the country. In the more contested or Taliban controlled regions of Afghanistan, women's rights remain poor. In regions

with little fighting and larger urban centers, women enjoy more rights. Women in Afghanistan today face violence or threats of violence. Women seen publicly without male relatives, dressed in manners deemed unacceptable or working outside the home are the subject of violent harassment despite legal protection. Phone calls and letters threatening violence against the woman or her children occur daily for those who act too liberally. These are by no means empty threats. Women are beaten and killed with little retribution for the perpetrator.

While marked improvements in women's rights have occurred, the status is so low that many improvements remain to be made. Any real, lasting change in the status and rights of women in Afghanistan will not come easily. A permanent solution must contain political, economic, institutional, legal, educational and cultural aspects and address the problem from as many angles as possible.


Microfinance in Afghanistan

Prior to 2001, the decades of war that plagued Afghanistan caused the collapse of the formal banking industry. Following the fall of the Taliban and the establishment of a democratic government, the once defunct banking industry began to reemerge. That said, even ten years after the initial invasion, the banking sector remains relatively small and limited in scope, servicing large urban centers almost exclusively.

The microfinance industry arrived shortly after US troops in 2001. However, outreach remained extremely limited through 2002. Such disappointing growth spurred the Afghan government along with the help of the World Bank to form the Microfinance

Investment Support Facility for Afghanistan (MISFA). MISFA seeks to channel donations and to organize the various NGOs, commercial banks and donors working in the microfinance sector. This organization also helps fledgling MFIs grow in a rapid but sustainable manner and collects impact and best practice data for Afghanistan.⁵²

The Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee (BRAC) is the largest MFI operating in Afghanistan. BRAC, along with the entire microfinance industry in Afghanistan, has experienced steep growth in their portfolios over the past five years. The number of microfinance clients climbed from only 25,000 in 2003 to almost 500,000 in 2008 (See Figure 1).⁵³



Successes, Challenges, and Prospects for Microfinance in Afghanistan

Although, the potential for microfinance has been thoroughly explored in theoretical studies, how efficacious it can be in an impoverished, divisive and conflict-ridden country such as Afghanistan remains

somewhat unclear. The Afghan experience with microfinance is positive, but several important challenges and questions remain.

As part of larger relief efforts, the Afghan economy has consistently grown at an annual rate of 11.4% or higher since 2002. While this impressive figure can by no means be attributed solely to microfinance (poppy cultivation for instance has played a significant role in economic growth), it has certainly played an important role.⁵⁴ Research shows that microfinance helped clients secure a permanent, steady source of income. The same study of microfinance in Afghanistan shows that female microfinance clients now enjoy increased access to clean water, safe cooking fuels and access to electricity.⁵⁵ Savings, consumption, and standards of living all increased.⁵⁶ Microfinance theory holds that economic empowerment often translates into social empowerment. The social empowerment of women appears much more modest, despite the obvious occurrence of economic empowerment. In studies on social empowerment, self-reporting is standard. When asked if they believed their social mobility had improved following receipt of a microloan, 95% of women responded it had. When asked if they felt more self-confident after receiving a loan, 99% of women responded affirmatively, and 87% said their involvement in household decision-making had increased.⁵⁷

The results of this self-report appear very encouraging. It would follow that microfinance has greatly improved women's rights. However, these statistics contradict the reports about the abysmal state of women's rights in Afghanistan. Indeed, this study limited itself to only four relatively peaceful regions where the Afghan government maintains control. In more rural, violent and traditionally conservative re-

gions, the effects of microfinance may not prove quite as impressive.⁵⁸

In order to more adequately ensure that gains made by women endure, more rural outreach must occur. This task will likely prove challenging as these communities practice much stronger restrictions on women and the rule-of-law will most likely not reach perpetrators of violence against them. Additionally, microfinance often proves more expensive in rural areas as access is restricted by poor infrastructure. Nonetheless, women in rural communities must become a priority if there is any hope of avoiding tribal backlash to urban centered progressive social, legal or economic reform.

Who spends the loan has also become an issue. Although 95% of women report increased mobility, eighty percent of women said that a male used their loans.⁵⁹ This indicates that any social gains made are fairly small, as men continue to have the final say in determining the spending of household funds.

Though the outlook for microfinance in Afghanistan is bright in some regards progress remains slow. The government must protect and enforce legal guarantees. Even if peace-talks with the Taliban result in reconciliation, women's rights must not be used as a bargaining chip. MFIs need to provide more oversight on who actually spends loans and need to make a concerted effort to reach a larger share of the rural populations. Expectations need to be tempered. Decreases in violence against women and the right to make some spending decisions autonomously would represent huge steps for women, but the small gains that have occurred must be solidified and built upon.

THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY IN SUPPORTING MICROFINANCE

The U.S. military continues to play a crucial role in the post-conflict reconstruction of Iraq and Afghanistan especially as each country continues to struggle to solidify its national security. The ongoing security threats have caused the military to adapt its strategy to utilize more tools of economic development as a means to undermine insurgent support. Microfinance represents one of many development tools available to the military. While the visibility of microfinance programs pales in comparison to larger infrastructure programs, microfinance may be effective in delivering direct long-term relief from the poverty and marginalization that many believe creates insurgent support. The capacity for microfinance to empower women will further the goal of creating secure and peaceful societies. So the military should seek to assist and support the microfinance industry in Iraq and Afghanistan in order to yield a sustainable resource that provides a route out of poverty and a source of empowerment for women.

Provincial Reconstruction Teams and Microfinance

As mentioned earlier, the precarious security situation in Iraq and Afghanistan increases the price of microfinance, in turn reducing the profitability and viability of the practice. The military must continue to work with MFIs and NGOs to help defray the extra security costs. Currently, microfinance exists mainly in the most secure provinces, reinforcing the existing security environment in stable areas, though less stable areas remain unreached.

Provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs) represent a possible means to further expanding the practice of microfinance to more volatile regions. PRTs, the joint civil-military teams comprised of military personnel and development specialists, have played an increasingly important role since their introduction in 2002. Serving as the primary civil-military partnership in both Iraq and Afghanistan, PRTs are a logical tool to use in furthering the reach and results of microfinance operations.⁶⁰ To date, PRTs have sought to support microfinance efforts in both countries to some effect. However, a more consistent, results-oriented approach by PRTs will make them more effective and ultimately benefit Iraqi and Afghan citizens as well as the U.S. military.

Commander's Emergency Response Program

The Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP) is another tool the military can utilize in supporting microfinance. This program provides military commanders a specific amount of funding to support local reconstruction and stabilization efforts in amounts less than \$500,000.⁶¹ CERP first emerged in Iraq following the collapse of the Ba'athist regime and reports show that CERP quickly and effectively delivered relief. In Iraq, for example, commanders have used these funds to create temporary employment opportunities.⁶²

CERP can be used to help institutionalize and expand the microfinance industries in both Iraq and Afghanistan, though current rules surrounding it somewhat limit its utility with respect to microfinance. According to guidelines set out by the military, com-

manders can utilize CERP for “economic, financial, and management improvements,” focusing on “economic development.”⁶³ While the legality of CERP funding for MFIs was initially unclear, more recent documents make CERP funding for microfinance permissible within certain rules.⁶⁴ Providing CERP funds to MFIs willing to educate and train local populations in the skills necessary to support and expand microfinance will not only improve education but also create more employment options. Providing education and employment opportunities will in-turn serve to expand the microfinance industry and address one of the identified barriers to microfinance expansion.

Support of Microfinance in Iraq

The microfinance industry in Iraq is not as developed as it is in Afghanistan. Insufficient resources obviously limit the efficacy of microfinance in Iraq. However, this shortfall provides the military an opportunity to more easily influence the microfinance industry.

The security situation in Iraq remains precarious, though relative to Afghanistan, the number of deaths per month is much lower. Accordingly, security represents a less significant barrier for MFIs working in Iraq. Since the military need not place as much emphasis on providing MFIs security, it should seek to influence microfinance in such a way that expands female outreach in Iraq. Through a campaign of education carried out by PRTs and targeted CERP funding, the military can harness the entrepreneurial spirit of women that has been so effective in other countries. PRTs can inform and educate local leaders and clerics about the positive financial benefits of microfinance

bringing representatives from MFIs with them to demonstrate local interest. The military could then offer CERP compensation to local governments for enrolling a certain number of individuals in a microfinance program and simultaneously extend CERP funding to MFIs that provide 30% or more of their loans to women. Upon completion of a successful microfinance regimen, more CERP funds could be allocated. This would serve to both continue to spur growth in the microfinance industry while also promoting the extension of loans to women.

Support of Microfinance in Afghanistan

One of the long-term goals of the military is to sustain the peace, prosperity and rule-of-law it has created to this point. To effectively achieve this goal in Afghanistan, the military should incentivize the practice of microfinance in rural regions. Currently microfinance is concentrated in Kabul. Though Kabul is the cultural and economic center of Afghanistan, the relatively liberal populace there is less likely to oppose female empowerment. Bringing more microfinance to rural communities will reduce opposition to government attempts to empower women by making such moves less government-centered and more organic.

By running a program to provide MFIs personal transport and security, PRTs can reduce the overhead that keeps many MFIs out of these violent regions. Simply by coordinating village visits with MFIs, PRTs may help mitigate some of the security concerns held by MFIs. Lower overhead costs will increase the profitability of microloans in the rural regions and make loaning more appealing.

PRTs can help collect data, report misuse and advocate on behalf of MFIs as well. PRTs stationed in a community for any extended period may be more capable of monitoring loan use than MFIs centered in more distant urban centers. Perhaps easiest of all, PRTs that do find themselves in rural settings could spread information about microfinance to communities, it has yet to reach. The driving force behind U.S. support for microfinance in rural Afghanistan must be to establish microfinance in these areas before significant U.S. withdrawal. The practice will become less profitable as the military presence declines and transport and security services can no longer be offered. Establishing microfinance now will help establish the MFI in these rural areas for the future.

CONCLUSIONS

Microfinance can be an effective tool for poverty alleviation and female empowerment and should play a role in post-conflict reconstruction. Microfinance industries actively lend in both Iraq and Afghanistan and can help reduce poverty and increase the economic clout of women. Nonetheless, women in these two nations continue to fight both social and institutional barriers to attaining equality. The effects of an efficient and sustained microfinance program will help to slowly tear down barriers that women face in these societies today. Such change can only be realized over a very long timeframe. Microfinance alone is not strong enough to bring widespread gender equality to either society. Properly enforced legal reform must also occur to remove institutional barriers against women. As a method of poverty alleviation, microfinance only represents one tool in what should be an expansive

toolkit. Excessive emphasis on microfinance may turn out to be detrimental to other equally beneficial programs. Some development workers have expressed concern that microfinance does not create significant poverty reduction for all clients, rather only a select few achieve significant upward mobility.

The United States military should support microfinance as part of a broad, post-conflict reconstruction effort in Iraq and Afghanistan. Microfinance has proven effective at empowering women in other regions. The military should emphasize this aspect of microfinance to the best of its ability, taking into account the strong barriers that serve to prevent complete female equality in both countries. This supporting role should consist primarily of education, advocacy and targeted funding. In addition to CERP and PRTs the military should seek to further utilize soldiers who may have some background in financing to support microfinance operations. It is important to note, however, that impact and the number of loans extended do not necessarily correlate. The desire to see immediate impact must not trump thoughtful program design.

Microfinance as a practice will grow because of military support. Careful data collection and studies will provide future microfinance practitioners insight into the most effective practices in more conservative, Muslim-majority countries where future military action may occur. Future reports will provide the military insight into the efficacy of microfinance in female empowerment and the actual effects of empowerment on the security situation on the ground.

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CHAPTER 6

EMPLOYMENT GENERATION IN POST-CONFLICT COUNTRIES

Danielle C. Humphrey

INTRODUCTION

The term *golden hour*, borrowed from the medical field, is a crucial time-period following a traumatic injury during which there is the highest likelihood that prompt treatment will prevent death. In the realm of post-conflict reconstruction, the golden hour is a window of opportunity in which the international community and the affected country can lay a foundation for growth and recovery or set a path to recurrent violence. Rebuilding after a violent conflict requires far more than bricks and mortar. Often the more cumbersome challenge is restoring dignity, opportunity and hope for the future to those deeply affected by the conflict. As a result, income generation and employment are essential building blocks of post-conflict development. Reintegration of the most vulnerable groups, such as ex-combatants, women and youth is also an important aspect, as it encourages stability and gives everyone a stake in the peace process. In order for reintegrated individuals and the community at large to benefit, they must have basic education and training. For these reasons, it is essential to understand the important roles that employment, education and training play in the golden hour of post-conflict reconstruction.

UNDERSTANDING POST-CONFLICT ECONOMIES

Violent conflict has severe impacts on an economy. Large-scale or prolonged violence destroys infrastructure and economic institutions disrupting market activity. The characteristics of post-conflict countries are fundamentally different from the characteristics of stable developing countries. For this reason, standard economic development programs are unlikely to be well-suited for countries emerging from conflict. Employment generation is a keystone to any economic recovery program. Many activities fall under the rubric of job creation such as quick-impact emergency employment, local economic recovery programs and sustainable and decent work. From a political standpoint, employment opportunities give the host-nation population a stake in the peace process by providing young men and women with an alternative to violence. Employment provides income for poor families, revives domestic demand and stimulates overall growth.

Unique to post-conflict environments, reintegration is a social and economic process in which ex-combatants return to communities and engage in alternatives to violence. Reintegrating ex-combatants gives them a stake in the peace process and reduces the likelihood that they will return to violence. Reintegration activities include providing education, vocational training and employment opportunities. Even prior to conflict, many countries suffer from inadequate education, training and opportunities. Prolonged conflict depletes the stock of skills and knowledge within a population through migration, displacement, trauma, death, disability and the destruction of schools. Restoring a country's human capital requires extensive

training programs focused predominantly on vulnerable groups such as ex-combatants, women, youth and children.

This paper explores employment generation, reintegration and education as they pertain to post-conflict environments. The paper then examines the status of those topics in post-conflict Afghanistan, and, finally, examines the role of the military in those areas.

EMPLOYMENT GENERATION

Why is it important?

In a post-conflict environment, effective employment generation programs assist in restoring economic activity and addressing humanitarian needs, particularly in areas that have inadequate security and infrastructure that impede the formation of private enterprise.¹ An increase in employment opportunities in a post-conflict setting can aid in the achievement of political objectives by encouraging internally-dislocated-persons (IDPs) to return to their communities and by giving any potential spoilers acceptable alternatives to warfare.² From an economic standpoint, employment generation improves domestic demand and stimulates overall growth by providing opportunities for income.³

Challenges and Opportunities

As a conflict draws to an end, extensive market inefficiencies make a country's labor market weak and unpredictable. Among the problems facing a post-conflict economy are the total destruction of basic infrastructure, a lack of investment and savings,

unstable financial and political structures and the disappearance of markets. In this situation, there are too few jobs for those who desire them, and the peaceful jobs that exist often pay significantly less than conflict-related jobs. In order to promote employment growth in a post-conflict setting, one must have a fundamental understanding of the underlying markets and economy of the country. As such, one of the immediate challenges to employment generation is to restore markets and access to the goods and services directly affected by the conflict.

Conflicts leave many groups vulnerable to poverty, violence and social exclusion. Vulnerable groups include ex-combatants, women, youth, displaced persons seeking reintegration, the disabled and people with obsolete skills. Vulnerable groups must be included in post-conflict employment generation programs, which presents many unique challenges. First, there must be employment opportunities that tap into the positive energy and skills of the youth population, as youth are particularly susceptible to the vicious cycle of illiteracy, violence and isolation.⁴ Second, the reintegration of ex-combatants and other target groups into communities is essential to post-conflict reconstruction, but this narrowed focus can fuel resentment in communities if not framed within an overall approach that respects community-based expectations.⁵

On the other hand, as states transition from conflict to peace, a unique opportunity for economic and social change is presented. Employment generation programs have the ability to deliver vast economic benefits and peace dividends to affected communities and to improve the rights of previously oppressed groups, through economic, political and labor market reforms. Post-conflict employment programs can also

provide young workers with their first experiences of organized work and deter them from engaging in violence. Finally, there is an opportunity to completely rebuild economic infrastructure with community-based, employment-intensive techniques.

Comprehensive Approach

Employment generates confidence, provides access to resources and creates the feeling of ownership in the recovery process. Developing long-term livelihoods is vital for long-term peace, but it may take many years.⁶ Unfortunately, post-conflict reconstruction assistance often focuses on laying the basis for economic growth in the long-run with the assumption that employment will flow naturally as the economy recovers. In the long-run, it is true that permanent job opportunities will arise as economic recovery occurs, but the unemployed cannot wait that long. For this reason, there needs to be a comprehensive approach to employment generation programs that ensures the creation of jobs in the short, medium and long term. In its policy for *Post-Conflict Employment Creation, Income Generation and Reintegration*,⁷ the United Nations sets forth a three-pronged approach for employment creation that addresses each timeframe.

Track A: Stabilizing income generation and emergency employment

This track responds to the immediate needs of conflict-affected areas. Assistance in this program track focuses on high-risk individuals and those with urgent needs. Therefore, emphasis is placed on women, youth, ex-combatants, IDPs and returnees. The main

goal of this track is to get people back to work and get money flowing, even if the work is only temporary. The point of emergency employment is to get labor and capital back to work quickly to visibly show the benefits of peace.⁸ This track is also responsible for restoring basic needs such as health services, security, sanitation and basic business services.⁹

Emergency jobs are generally short-term jobs that redirect people from destructive to constructive activities. Such jobs may include cash-for-work programs, short-cycle training and emergency employment services.¹⁰ The flow of cash into the post-conflict economy is essential for recovery, and emergency jobs provide quick incomes and may even stimulate new economic activities and skills. Emergency employment programs may be national in scope, but tend to be more effective if they are organized locally. Generally, emergency job projects should range in length from 30 to 180 days even if this means that there will have to be several individual projects.¹¹

Cash-for-work projects are normally small and rapidly implemented allowing target groups to generate income quickly. Cash-for-work opportunities may be generated by employing ex-combatants or workers who lack viable alternative employment opportunities.¹² In rural areas, target groups can be employed to re-establish or increase agricultural production, repair damaged infrastructure and strengthen market linkages.¹³ In areas with high levels of food insecurity or where markets are too disrupted, food-for-work or food-voucher programs may be considered instead.¹⁴ In one successful cash-for-work program in Iraq, day-labor programs U.S. Army company commanders implemented and ran a program to help clear trash and rubble. Though short-term, the program employed

15,000 Iraqis for three months and accounted for 70% of new employment in Ramadi.¹⁵

Short-cycle skills training targets those within vulnerable groups who possess inadequate or obsolete skills to benefit from the available employment opportunities following a conflict. The short-term jobs available immediately after a conflict can begin to create skills and services that could be useful in more sustainable industries. Teaching women to weave grass mats in refugee camps could transfer, for example, into basket-weaving to cater to handicraft markets.¹⁶ Other examples include training local blacksmiths to construct fuel-efficient stoves, supporting local carpenters to supply school desks or supporting local tailors to supply school uniforms.¹⁷

PES provides a necessary link between employment opportunities and job seekers. Establishing mechanisms, such as PESs, that assess skill levels and local business requirements can facilitate this until government agencies can assume responsibility.¹⁸ PESs direct workers to large scale public works projects when employment needs are pressing and the labor market is changing rapidly.¹⁹ PESs are especially helpful in identifying immediate job opportunities and matching job seekers with vacancies.

Although employment generation programs in Track A are short-term, they can lay the foundation for employment in the long-run. Using available labor market information to capitalize on evolving market conditions can help improve these programs in the present, their extension into the future and their overall sustainability.²⁰

Track B: Local Economic Recovery for Employment Opportunities and Reintegration

Programs in this track support reintegration, reconciliation and long-term recovery by generating employment opportunities at the local level. Target groups in this track include individuals in urban and rural areas and local governments and other authorities that are important for conflict-affected groups.²¹ Entrepreneurs may also be targeted for these programs as they can generate employment opportunities. Priority should be given to communities to which displaced persons and ex-combatants return. That being said, it is essential that the programs in this track are administered carefully, as resource allocation can exacerbate tensions if perceived as unjust. The main goal of this program track is to contribute to establishing an environment for economic growth at the local level.²²

The Track B approach seeks to reactivate the local economy through three key programs: local capacity development of governments, institutions and authorities; community driven recovery (CDR) programs emphasizing investments in local socio-economic infrastructure and local economic recovery (LER) measures consisting of consultations regarding direct employment, credit services and private sector development.²³

Capacity development programs focus on developing skills and knowledge for employment opportunities and basic service delivery at the local level.²⁴ In many cases, local governments will not have the capacity, so it may be necessary to bring in a third party to assist with local program management. Capacity development programs should focus on both

rural and urban areas as the two have different needs. Programs should not place heavy burdens on local governments and should build national ownership behind employment generation.²⁵

Traditional authorities, when they are not the source of the original conflict, can have an integral role in communities as they are often key in dispute resolutions and providing access to natural resources and property. Running government operations requires individuals with management, technical and administrative talents.²⁶ For this reason, programs that focus on the capacity development of traditional authorities can help build linkages with the government and non-traditional power structures at the local level.²⁷ Local productive associations are another area in which capacity development can be beneficial. After a conflict, local productive associations often need assistance to redevelop their capacities to deliver business services.

Community Driven Recovery (CDR) programs support the recovery and rebuilding of economic and social capital, such as local agricultural production, education, roads and health facilities.²⁸ In order to more effectively allocate external resources, a participatory needs assessment is conducted through a decentralized community decisionmaking process. It is important in this approach that a wide variety of stakeholders be included in the process in order to ensure sustainability and program effectiveness. As long as it does not create parallel institutions, this approach complements the capacity development discussed earlier. CDR programs are particularly effective in peacebuilding environments as the open and inclusive dialogue can help ease tensions. Ultimately, this approach capitalizes on the notion that project planning via social dialogue builds trust among local residents and delivers rapid and visible results.²⁹

A good example of a community driven recovery program is The Development Program for Displaced Persons, Refugees and Returnees in Central America (PRODERE), implemented in El Salvador between 1990 and 1995.³⁰ Funded by the Italian government, PRODERE's objectives included building a consensus around development issues and restoring basic services. A component of the program was the Local Economic Development (LED) strategy, implemented by the International Labor Organization for employment and income generation. The program was administered locally by community-based LED agencies composed of representatives from the targeted area.³¹

Local economic recovery (LER) measures provide communities with instruments to quickly jumpstart local economic activities following a conflict and have the potential to make employment growth more inclusive.³² Because of limited resources following a conflict, LER programs should begin with small-scale livelihood activities that may expand as capacities and resources increase.³³ Small-scale projects allow for a more equal distribution of resources across a large group. Focusing on projects in sectors that do not require highly specialized skills will maximize the number of jobs generated.³⁴ This helps to alleviate feelings of unfairness or favoritism that can undermine the peace process.

The choice of sectors in which LER programs are focused is pertinent to their ability to produce visible and sustainable results. The sectors targeted for LER programs should: 1) be essential to post-conflict recovery; 2) have multiplier effects for the larger economy and 3) be likely to attract donor and government funds.³⁵ Generally, the agriculture, fishing, construction, support industries and local trade

networks are the most effective targets for LER programs. LER also provides a window of opportunity to introduce creative income-generating activities such as agro-business, high-value crops, tourism, exports and renewable energy.³⁶ Women, who often become micro-entrepreneurs in the informal economy during conflict, can be a source for local economic recovery by generating new employment opportunities as they are reintegrated into the formal economy.³⁷

LER is the most vulnerable program track and one of the most critical for reintegration. The challenge of LER is to produce visible results as rapidly as possible while also creating sustainable local systems that support local employment and reintegration, which, by definition, takes time.³⁸ Additionally, following conflicts trust will have to be rebuilt within communities before they can function well enough for development and reintegration. As new activities for income generation are discovered and exploited, it is important that programs capitalize on what already exists.

Track C: Sustainable Employment and Decent Work

Poverty and inequality are often drivers of conflict so employment programs should pay particular attention to poverty reduction and social inclusion. A national enabling environment for employment is essential to sustain employment and reintegration progress achieved by the previous tracks.³⁹ Reintegration and job creation programs need to be supported by national systems and policies that create an environment conducive to employment growth. The policy development phase is a long process so it is essential that programs and policies in this track be initiated early and in parallel with the stabilization programs and

local reintegration track.⁴⁰ This will ensure that early employment gains may be realized and sustained.

Promoting an enabling environment for long-term employment creation and decent work requires: 1) developing national employment policies; 2) supporting private sector development and 3) consolidating employment through promoting a process of social dialogue to define the rules of the game.⁴¹ The target groups for this track are all the formal and informal labor market participants, including private sector employers and employees. Focusing on key political constituencies, such as the poor, women, children and demobilized veterans gives everyone a stake in the peace process.⁴² Ultimately, the main goal of Track C is the sustained growth of high quality employment by enabling macroeconomic, legal and institutional programs.⁴³

External actors should assist local and national governments in setting policy priorities and developing new policies.⁴⁴ An inclusive national social dialogue that engages all stakeholders will enhance ownership and program effectiveness, thereby contributing to peacebuilding. Open dialogue can help to create a policy environment that balances growth with respect for fundamental rights and social security.

Private sector development is particularly important in post-conflict environments because private jobs often provide an alternative to illegal activities.⁴⁵ The private sector is diverse and includes everyone from farmers and micro-entrepreneurs, to domestic manufacturing companies, to multinational corporations.⁴⁶ The growth and efficiency of the private sector can be facilitated by programs supporting access to new markets; supporting the development of local suppliers; promoting exports and promoting access to

finance, information, technology and training.⁴⁷ Small grassroots projects engaging the host-nation's private sector are an essential part of reviving the economy, creating employment opportunities and promoting local trade.⁴⁸

In a post-conflict environment, market access will likely be limited and essential inputs may be unavailable. At this stage in post-conflict reconstruction, it is important not to depend on foreign direct investment, as international investors will be weary of the risks.⁴⁹ For this reason, market development and value chain analysis can go a long way in expanding sales opportunities and improving access to key inputs.⁵⁰ Value chain analysis alone can help private sector recovery by helping businesses to identify market opportunities and essential inputs.

Similarly, business development services (BDS) can make micro, small and medium enterprises (MSMEs) more profitable by improving market access and productivity. Services offered may include marketing training, information technology, service development and business network promotion.⁵¹ Training in marketing is important so that the products of MSMEs have a better chance of competing with better known products. Emphasizing how local products are bringing post-conflict communities together can make local products more appealing to international consumers. For example, Rwandan Coffee is advertised as bringing "hope for the future" and providing an avenue for "rebuilding and reconciliation."⁵² This type of marketing helped the brand profit even with the constriction of coffee markets worldwide.

Financial services are also important aspects of business recovery after a conflict. Recovery grants and loan-guarantee schemes can contribute to the

recovery of businesses in the most conflict-damaged regions. Providing people with access to credit for their MSMEs is essential to jumpstarting the economy. In the post-conflict environment, credit can leverage aid-financed reconstruction. In the immediate post-conflict phase, private banking services may be too risk-averse to support private credit markets. Early business recovery builds confidence in the economy and may encourage further private sector investment. International actors may consider intervening by providing reconstruction grants to communities, providing secure financial support to remittances sent to rural areas and using guarantee fees to promise loans to entrepreneurs in conflict-affected areas.

There are two major hindrances to doing business in post-conflict settings: uncertainty about the rules of the game and the government's inability to enforce rules and regulations fairly.⁵³ The rules of the game include labor and productivity standards and a framework for social dialogue. Labor, business and government representatives must engage in social dialogue with other civil society groups. Dialogue regarding development plans, legal and institutional reforms, and property and inheritance rights encourages local ownership and commitment to new policies.⁵⁴ In order for this dialogue to be successful, however, all of the constituents must possess the necessary capacities. As such, capacity development at every level of the government is essential.

REINTEGRATION

Why is it important?

With little education or training, few employment opportunities, war trauma and a highly militarized mindset, the demobilized and their dependents will turn to criminal activities or join insurgent groups if they cannot find gainful employment.⁵⁵ Employment, education and job training for reintegration reduce dependency on factional networks that link ex-combatants and the potential for spoiler activity by providing material incentives to buy into the peace process. Effective reintegration programs can enable ex-combatants to contribute to post-conflict stabilization, enhance productive capacity, restore livelihoods and contribute to development through the provision of labor and training.⁵⁶

The goals of reintegration campaigns are: to provide information, counseling and referral on reintegration opportunities available to the demobilized; support the demobilized and their dependents to earn their livelihoods by peaceful means and participate in their communities; offer targeted support to groups in need of special support; and increase the capacities of receiving communities to integrate the demobilized and other returnees.⁵⁷

Approaches to reintegration

According to the Operational Guide to the *Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration Standards* (IDDRS), there are three main approaches to reintegration. The most useful approach for a situation depends on the nature of the conflict, how

it was resolved and the post-conflict security and development priorities.

Approach: Short-term stabilization.

The purpose of short-term stabilization is to draw ex-combatants away from violence until political and security sector reform is completed. This approach affords rapid transitional support to ex-combatants by providing income-generating, short-term employment opportunities. A short-term stabilization approach to reintegration is most applicable when ex-combatants are able to reintegrate through their own networks and possess the means of their reintegration, such as access to land. Generally, this approach is only viable when ex-combatants do not represent a long-term security threat to the general population.

Approach: Ex-combatant focused reintegration.

The purpose of ex-combatant focused reintegration is to provide ex-combatants with specially designed, individually-focused sustainable solutions for long-term reintegration. In this approach, ex-combatants are engaged in sustainable micro-projects or technical training that ultimately reduces the long-term security risk they present. Ex-combatant focused reintegration costs more than short-term stabilization and can create feelings of unfairness within their new communities. This approach is most useful when ex-combatants pose a long-term threat to the peace process.

Approach: Community-based reintegration.

The purpose of community-based reintegration is to provide communities with the capacities to support the reintegrated ex-combatants, internally-displaced persons and other vulnerable groups. The aim of this approach is to support the reintegration of ex-combatants as a component of a broader community-focused recovery program. Of the three approaches, this is the most expensive. Because this approach focuses on the needs of the community as a whole and not the specific needs of the ex-combatants, it is most appropriate for post-conflict environments in which ex-combatants are not a security threat to their communities, as in a war of liberation or national defense. While each approach is useful in its own right, the specific country contexts and characteristics of armed groups may require a mix of approaches.

Economic Reintegration

Protracted conflicts have a devastating impact on economies and livelihoods. As a conflict ends, one might expect an immediate improvement of economic conditions, but this is simply not the case. Following a conflict, the labor market is flooded with thousands of ex-combatants, IDPs and refugees, which means there will be a serious shortage of job opportunities.

Ex-combatants are deprived of education and employment for so long during a conflict that they are often considered to be a lost generation and are likely to experience difficulties in reintegrating into economic life. One of the key factors in determining whether ex-combatants return to civilian life is the availability of

economic and livelihood alternatives open to them.⁵⁸ When employment opportunities do not materialize, ex-combatants rapidly become frustrated and can engage in protests and destructive behavior. Additionally, in the absence of potential job opportunities, ex-combatants may be tempted to resort to illegal activities and violence.

Employment creation and income and livelihood generation are vital components of reintegration projects. Income generation programs may be administered through a multitude of different organizations, such as NGOs, commercial banks or government offices, but control and management should ultimately be transferred to the host country.

EDUCATION

Due to conflict, many ex-combatants miss out on opportunities for basic education and vocational training, and, as a result, are disadvantaged in the competition for jobs. In order to reorient ex-combatants into civilian life, literacy classes, education and technical and vocational training should be provided. Education should be focused on young ex-combatants and women, who represent the most vulnerable groups post-conflict, and are the most likely to become victims of lifelong poverty. If young ex-combatants are the heads of their households, education should be offered in conjunction with income generating opportunities. Vocational training should focus on providing ex-combatants with marketable skills. Activities such as these must be in response to local labor market demands and business opportunities so ex-combatants have the potential for more success as they enter the labor market following their training.⁵⁹

Why is it important?

Education is critical to post-conflict reconstruction. It not only provides a sense of normalcy to children in conflict-affected areas, it also offers adults an opportunity to see a functioning system that is working toward rebuilding a sense of community and hope for the future.⁶⁰ Education gives young people a prospect for future jobs and of reaching a higher standard of welfare. If instituted correctly, education can enhance understanding between cultures, and social tensions can be reduced. Education takes prominence in any discussion about development for two reasons. First, universal access to basic education helps to ensure that all social groups receive benefits from macroeconomic growth. Second, the quality and quantity of education strongly influence the labor force, governance and the workings of most institutions.⁶¹

Education is well known to have a direct effect on economic development and productivity.⁶² Studies from around the world have confirmed that one additional year of education can increase productivity by 10% or more, as better-educated people are more flexible and absorb new information and processes it more quickly.⁶³ In a rapidly changing environment, additional education and skills afford people greater work mobility and better opportunities as the economy progresses. Those who are better-educated benefit from opportunities afforded them through additional capital while those who are poorly educated do not. Despite the many opportunities for growth that education can provide, there are several challenges that must be met in order to ensure success.

The vast majority of those living in post-conflict and fragile states reside in rural communities that of-

ten lack educational infrastructure. One of the major challenges in establishing education in post-conflict settings is meeting the needs of rural communities and incentivizing families to send their children to school. In post-conflict and fragile states, schooling is extremely expensive, and children, at a very young age, can contribute to a family's budget by tending animals, harvesting crops or weaving rugs.

Choosing a location to build a school is also a significant challenge. Children in post-conflict settings are often widely dispersed across the countryside and travelling to school can be dangerous for students and teachers. It is essential that the local community and the host nation's ministry of education be consulted about the location of any new school buildings to ensure safety and sustainability.

In many post-conflict and fragile states, the education of women takes very low priority and is sometimes forbidden, and yet it is essential for a country's growth and advancement. Studies show that a mother's illiteracy directly disadvantages her children. For example, children under the age of 5 are more likely to survive if their mothers have primary schooling.⁶⁴ That probability increases with each extra year of education a mother receives. Education also increases participation in the electoral process and may lead to a decrease in government corruption.⁶⁵

A final challenge is ensuring the curriculum being taught is high quality. It is often easy for external actors to provide curriculum they believe is best suited for the students, but this is likely not the best approach. The curriculum must be developed with the host-nation and must be relevant to its context to enable students to take advantage of and contribute to the creation of sustainable livelihood opportunities.

Literacy

An educated workforce is one of the foundations on which a sustainable knowledge-based economy is built. Education is one of the most powerful tools for eradicating poverty and inequality and for generating sustained economic growth. Literacy can have significant impacts on the development of a post-conflict state.⁶⁶ Literacy is linked to economic prosperity because literacy levels help determine the kinds of jobs people find.

In less-developed countries, illiteracy tends to be concentrated among the poor—specifically women—and in rural areas. For example, not only is illiteracy significantly higher in rural areas in the Middle East/North Africa region (MENA), but female illiteracy in that region remains a glaring deficiency, as there are only 7 MENA states in which the majority of the female population can read.⁶⁷ Although a country that focuses on promoting strong literacy throughout its population will be more successful in fostering growth, most countries have largely ignored the issue of illiterate adults and instead focused their efforts on children. While children are important, it is essential that adults be able to find work, which may become infinitely more difficult if they are illiterate. Although adult literacy campaigns may be the most effective way to remedy this issue, few governments in the MENA or South Asia regions have employed such programs because they fear the political impact the programs may have.⁶⁸

TECHNICAL AND VOCATIONAL EDUCATION AND TRAINING

What is Technical and vocational education and training?

Technical and vocational education and training (TVET) refers to a wide range of educational opportunities that are relevant to the work world and which may occur in various learning contexts.⁶⁹ The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) officially defines TVET as “education which is mainly designed to lead participants to acquire the practical skills, know-how, and understanding necessary for employment in a particular occupation, trade or group of occupations or trades.”⁷⁰ TVET includes everything from skills-based learning for entry or re-entry into the work world to specific skills designed for particular occupations. In any case, TVET is intended to lead to direct labor market entry or to act as a foundation for further education. TVET is focuses on both initial skills training and continuing vocational training.

Accredited public or private institutions provide the majority of TVET programs. However, TVET also encompasses education that does not lead to a degree. A large part of the vocational training that occurs in most societies is of that type.⁷¹ The participants in TVET programs are predominately adults because integration into the labor market and the need for marketable skills increases from adolescence to adulthood. Many TVET programs are specifically tailored to potential adult participants offering part-time programs and short programs focusing on skills needed for particular occupations.

Why is it important?

Prolonged conflict often undermines access to education for much of a country's population. In the worst cases, where there was an apparent lack of educational infrastructure prior to conflict, the education system often partially or entirely collapses during conflict. As a result, nations are often left with a lost generation who have not had access to education and have, therefore, not developed basic numeracy and literacy skills nor benefited from the less tangible skills formal education offers.⁷² This lack of marketable skills is both economically and socially stunting for people recovering from conflict. TVET programs can help a population acquire skills and develop the capacities to support themselves through income-generating activities. Successful TVET programs also develop the skills and knowledge that will help a workforce respond to the changing needs of local labor markets.

The economies of less-developed countries are not equipped to handle the stress that conflict causes. As conflicts continue, economic productivity dwindles, markets become unstable and investments decrease due to insecurity. Eventually, markets will essentially shut down and prices dramatically increase as consumables become scarce. In a post-conflict economy, the *need* for skilled labor is substantial as the reconstruction process is labor intensive and required a skilled labor force. The *demand* for labor in terms of paid employment opportunities, however, is generally small because of the fragile state of the economy.⁷³ TVET programs are specifically designed to improve the employability of their participants by providing them with vocational education and skills that are deemed useful in post-conflict areas. Given this fact,

the need to link TVET programs to local economic opportunities cannot be overstressed. TVET programs can only be successful if they prepare their participants with skills that meet local demand.

Participation in armed conflict, whether active or passive, presents a unique set of challenges to (re)integration into post-conflict life and likewise to rebuilding communities and economies. Without the basic skills required to generate an alternative livelihood, there are few incentives for ex-combatants to demobilize. TVET programs can address the immediate need for income to ensure that ex-combatants survive outside of the military structure. By providing vocational education that leads to new livelihood opportunities, TVET provides incentives for continued peace through the provision of opportunities for ex-combatants.⁷⁴ Additionally, a psychosocial element in TVET programs aids in the reintegration of ex-combatants. TVET gives people purpose and hope for the future. Such programs also reduce the impact of trauma and allow people to re-establish security and a routine.

Finally, increased educational opportunities are a signal to the affected communities that the conflict is over or nearing an end. In most cases, TVET programming will be new to post-conflict communities, and will likely offer advantages over formal education. Though formal education holds a more prestigious position, in the immediate post-conflict period TVET will likely be more advantageous to young men and women who do not have the time to complete a primary or secondary schooling cycle. Skills training programs are generally shorter and, if implemented properly, provide an immediate return in terms of income.

Implementation

For any program to be deemed a success, it must be implemented properly. The successful implementation of TVET programs in post-conflict countries can be both challenging and rewarding. Important considerations that must be taken into account during the implementation phase including deciding who will be in charge of the program, who will pay for it, how it will be designed and how to measure its success.

The host-nation government should carry the primary responsibility for implementing technical and vocation education, but in a modern economy, the design and delivery of program policy should be achieved through a partnership between the government, NGOs, employers and employees.⁷⁵ In addition to implementation of policy, the government can also provide leadership and ensure that technical and vocational education benefits everyone.

As the responsible party, the host-nation government should set up a governing body to oversee all technical and vocational education and training.⁷⁶ The governing body's primary responsibility is coordinating TVET. Other responsibilities of a governing body may include establishing criteria and standards that apply to all aspects of TVET.⁷⁷ Having one overarching organization that oversees all TVET programs within a country will allow for better coordination. For example, Rwanda's Human Resources Development Agency is responsible for overseeing all skills development programs in Rwanda.⁷⁸ Training in all of these centers and programs are coordinated and linked directly to the work-world and include courses that are related to infrastructure development.

Vocational education should be introduced early as an integral part of basic education to provide all learners with an introduction to basic technologies, the work world and standards of responsible citizenship. Implemented programs should allow the freedom for students to freely choose their vocational interests, transfer from one field to another and access other areas of education at all levels. Programs should also be available to all and for all appropriate types of specialization.

Within formal education systems, secondary education may be adapted to better meet the needs of the post-conflict environment. Given the disparities that likely exist between employment opportunities for those with a secondary education, the highest priority should be given to technical and vocational education. Diversifying secondary education so that it may be pursued in conjunction with vocational training or employment offers students with educational options that correspond better to their post-conflict needs and abilities.

The best TVET programs are implemented to provide opportunities for technical and vocational education to those who wish to reap the benefits of it within the education system, in the work world and in the community at large. With this in mind, TVET programs should be designed as comprehensive and inclusive systems that accommodate the needs of all learners. Learning and working environments must be made suitable to ensure the participation of girls and women by removing any bias or discrimination and seeking strategies to motivate women and girls to engage in vocational training. It is also important that special provisions are made for people with disabilities, unemployed youth, refugees and ex-combat-

ants. These groups pose the highest risk to sustainable peace in the post-conflict environment so providing them with peaceful alternatives to combat such as acquiring skills and education is essential.

Typically, an unsuccessful TVET program is characterized by a lack of local involvement in the implementation process and a dependence on materials and personnel from developed countries. On the other hand, successful TVET programs are more likely to involve local personnel in the implementation and management process and have a greater dependency on materials developed locally.⁷⁹

THE WAY FORWARD: AFGHANISTAN

State of the Economy

Afghanistan's economy is on the slow road to recovery after decades of conflict. The economy recovered significantly after the fall of the Taliban in 2001 mainly because of the infusion of international aid, the recovery of the agricultural sector and service sector growth. However, Afghanistan remains extremely poor, landlocked and highly dependent on foreign aid. Afghanistan's per capita GDP is a meager \$900.⁸⁰ Although the international community is committed to aiding Afghanistan, the country's living standards are amongst the lowest in the world. Afghanistan's labor force is comprised of approximately 15 million people, yet unemployment rates are estimated to be around 40 percent.⁸¹ The employed portion of the labor force is mostly employed in the agricultural sector (78.6%), followed by services with 15.7% of the workforce and, finally, industry with 5.7% of the workforce.⁸²

Jobs

Employment opportunities will become increasingly important as Afghanistan transitions from conflict to stabilization and reconstruction. The integration of women into the workforce and the reintegration of ex-insurgents are essential to the growth and development of Afghanistan well into the future. As it stands, Afghanistan is making an effort to reintegrate ex-insurgents into daily life through the Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Program (APRP), which began accepting insurgents in August 2010. As of June 2011, 1,700 insurgents had joined the program with 40 to 50 more groups showing interest.⁸³ The goal of APRP is to attract low- to mid-level fighters with promises of jobs, literacy, vocational training and development aid for their villages.⁸⁴ Because there are not enough jobs in Afghanistan's private sector, APRP also calls for setting up an Engineering and Construction Corps and an Agriculture Conservation Corps to support the national road system, public infrastructure, reforestation, water and irrigation projects. The program is now operating in 16 provinces and emerging in five to eight more.⁸⁵

As Afghanistan's authorities continue reintegration efforts, they must keep in mind that there will be many opposed to the APRP initially. The people of Afghanistan have experienced 30 years of repression at the hands of the Taliban and will be apprehensive of any program that brings insurgents into their communities. An understanding must be developed in these villages that the APRP is not merely about buying insurgents off the battlefield but instead about providing development aid to their villages. The whole community will benefit from a reintegration program such as

the APRP as it turns people away from the insurgency and violence and provides jobs and opportunities for economic development and growth. Ex-insurgents will likely expect long-term employment, so it is also essential that it be communicated that many of the jobs ex-insurgents receive in the post-conflict period will be short-term reconstruction projects. In addition, vocational education should be offered as an alternative or in conjunction with immediate employment as vocational education will provide training that is useful in the long-term.

Education

Despite an economy in shambles, Afghanistan continues to make strides in improving education although it remains far below international standards for education. Between 2001 and 2008, primary school enrollment rose from 0.9 million to over 6 million, and the proportion of girls increased from virtually zero to approximately 35 percent.⁸⁶ The number of teachers in Afghanistan has increased nearly seven-fold in the same timeframe, but their qualifications are low, and only a quarter of them are female.⁸⁷ Increasing the participation of girls in the education system, increasing the number and qualifications of female teachers and providing a secure location for schools are essential to the improvement of education in Afghanistan, and to sustainable economic development.

The education of girls is an area that has been overlooked in Afghanistan for many years. At the secondary level of education, the numbers of girls attending school drops by half from 200,523 to 97,310 in grade seven.⁸⁸ Yet, the Ministry of Education and district-level authorities do very little in the way of investi-

gating the reasons for girls' discontinuation of school or investing in gender-specific retention strategies. The education of girls in any post-conflict country facilitates their participation in the workforce as skilled personnel who can contribute to the economy and governance. Not educating girls through secondary school will not allow women to advance in Afghanistan, and a lack of female education will hold back economic growth. Afghanistan's Ministry of Education needs to focus on gender-specific strategies that address the reasons girls are not attending school such as security threats, location and cultural barriers.

The lack of qualified teachers in Afghanistan further exacerbates the inadequacies of the educational system in the country. In a 2005 survey in northern Afghanistan, 200 teachers were asked to sit for the same exam their students take: only 10 of these teachers passed the test (5 percent).⁸⁹ Afghanistan's national education plan admits that approximately 22% of teachers meet the minimum qualifications of having passed Grade 14, which is the highest secondary grade in Afghanistan's educational system.⁹⁰ To make matters worse, there are estimated to be between 16,000 and 20,000 ghost teachers, who do not come to work or who are doubly registered.⁹¹ This results in cancelled classes, large classroom sizes, and a lack of faith in the educational system's capacity. As Afghanistan continues to improve its educational system, it must strive to educate their teachers with proper pedagogical techniques. External actors, such as education-focused NGOs, may be able to help Afghanistan's Ministry of Education by educating teachers in areas where the Ministry does not have the resources.

The location and security of schools in Afghanistan is also a significant issue that continues to ham-

per the progress and growth of the country's educational system and economy as a whole. Insecurity and long distances to schools are leading factors affecting attendance, especially at secondary schools, where the attendance rates drop significantly. In 6 of the 8 provinces where the Human Rights Watch conducted surveys, students who wanted to go to secondary school had to walk at least one hour and as many as six hours a day to attend the nearest school.⁹² Continued targeted attacks against schools, teachers and students in southern and southeastern Afghanistan have further arrested educational progress. Between April and August of 2009, 102 schools were attacked using explosives or arson, and 105 teachers and students were killed by separate insurgent attacks. While these attacks appeared to be random, several poison attacks were clearly directed at girls—of 200 reported poison attacks, 196 were girls.⁹³ For this reason as well as general fear of kidnapping or rape, many families will not allow their children to travel long distances for education.

In order to ensure that children are receiving basic education, many communities have taken it upon themselves to provide education in the form of home-based schools.⁹⁴ Home-based schooling is essentially a one-class school operating in the room of a home, in a mosque, or in the shade of a tree. Though programs such as these have significant shortcomings, they have proven to be long-established ways of getting around the security restraints that hamper children from receiving education.⁹⁵ Many home-based schools have been supported by NGOs and in many cases have proven so effective that the Ministry of Education has entered into stable partnerships with NGOs who work in partnership with local community-based organizations, district leaders, and village elders.⁹⁶

THE U.S. MILITARY'S ROLE IN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

Overview

As part of stability operations, U.S. Army and other military personnel have become increasingly involved in providing support for economic development. The military is often on the ground before civilian organizations, such as USAID, that are better equipped to carry out stability and reconstruction operations, and, therefore, may have the responsibility of initiating the economic development components of stability operations. The most critical task that the U.S. military has to provide in a post-conflict area is local area security so that stabilization, development and normal economic activity can be conducted without interference from hostile actors. Commanders may also be called upon to provide security for civilians engaged in economic development programs within their area of responsibility. The U.S. military will also be an important source of information for both civilian and military decision makers on the needs of the local population and the condition of the local economy. The U.S. military also has vast financial resources that commanders can utilize to fund development projects and stimulate economic growth.⁹⁷

Resources

The Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP) enables local commanders in Afghanistan and Iraq to provide humanitarian assistance and reconstruction projects and services that immediately assist the local population and that the local government

and population can sustain.⁹⁸ Created in 2003 using seized funds and now Congressionally-appropriated monies, CERP funds are generally the only source of development assistance completely under the control of the U.S. Army.⁹⁹ Fragmentary Order (FRAGO) 89, issued by Combined Joint Task Force 7, outlines permissible reconstruction projects and expenditure limits. Under FRAGO 89, reconstruction assistance may include buying goods and services from the local population, as well as the building or repair of infrastructure.¹⁰⁰

The primary purpose of CERP funds is not economic development, *per se*, but rather to provide immediate assistance to the local population and to preclude support for U.S. opponents. All CERP projects should be closely monitored and developed in close consultation with local officials and with civilian agencies to ensure that local needs are met and that there is no overlap with existing projects. Despite the often tactical focus of CERP projects, the U.S. Military must be careful to balance the military's short-term tactical needs with longer-term economic development and capacity building.¹⁰¹ Ideally, all coordination in field will take place through a Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT), if one is present.

A Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) is an interim civil-military organization designed to operate in post-conflict areas. PRTs are intended to improve stability in an area by helping build the host nation's capacity, reinforcing the host nation's legitimacy, supporting the host nation's delivery of essential services and providing basic security to its citizens.¹⁰² Because of the interagency aspect of the organization, PRTs will often have access to more sources of funding than the military does and be aware of non-military and

non-U.S. Government projects. One of the main tasks of PRTs is to conduct assessments to identify the needs of the province and the projects that will prove most rewarding. Therefore, all U.S. military efforts at economic development should be coordinated through a PRT, if possible.

Agribusiness Development Teams (ADTs) are specially trained units of soldiers deployed to assist the indigenous population rebuild their agricultural sector following a conflict. The aim of ADTs is to improve farming techniques and make farming a profitable venture. ADT members are trained to understand the specific types of seeds, soils and insecticides they are likely to encounter in a given region. This allows ADTs to operate demonstration farms in which they can educate local farmers about more advanced farming techniques. As farmers engage these new techniques, profits will materialize or increase ultimately stimulating economic growth and employment opportunities.

Private Sector Development and Employment Generation

Unless the local population has some prospects for restoring livelihoods and improving their living standards, they are unlikely to support U.S. forces or the host government. Commanders must focus on activities that accelerate the development of the private sector and thereby generate employment and contribute to stabilizing the local area. Potential tasks for military personnel in private sector development and employment generation may include conducting thorough assessments of private sector activities, supporting projects that improve the business environment, supporting targeted programs to increase private sector

economic activity, scheduling and supporting public works programs to ensure maximum effect and helping to implement DDR programs.¹⁰³ Within the realm of these tasks, it is essential that military personnel assess key security threats and provide protection to the local population as they begin participating in economic development activities.

Education

Schools are one of the most popular infrastructure projects undertaken by both the military and civilian agencies. While the local community is appreciative, and the resulting public image is positive, the unit building the school must be careful to consult with the local government and the national Ministry for Education to ensure that the school will be supplied with textbooks and a teacher and that the location reflects the real needs of the population. The engineers will be able to help design plans for the school, and the civilian agents will likely be able to assist in the training of new teachers. Not only does the construction and repair of schools help improve the capacity of the local population, but it also provides short-term jobs to local construction workers and longer-term jobs to teachers—both of which help to stimulate the local economy.

More than Security

There is a much larger role for the U.S. Army and other military personnel in the post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction period than just providing security. While security is the primary role of the military in post-conflict areas, military units are often

on the ground before civilian agencies or PRTs giving them a vital role in the success of any economic development activities undertaken by any U.S. Government agencies. CERP resources, PRTs, ADTs, engineers and other informal resources are all components of the U.S. military that are essential to post-conflict economic development. With these resources, the military has the capabilities to fund, teach and assist the local population and government to achieve economic success.

CONCLUSION

The *golden hour* is upon us in Afghanistan. As focus shifts from fighting to reconstruction and development, the policies that the Afghan government, with support from the international community, implement will be crucial in determining the path Afghanistan embarks upon. Emphasis must be placed on policies that encourage employment generation, private sector growth, reintegration, and inclusive education and training, and the international community must work with the host government to develop such policies. Providing the population with employment opportunities, training and income-generating activities is vital to the peace process, as it provides a peaceful alternative to violence, decreases the likelihood that the conflict will resume in the future and builds trust of the host-nation government. The U.S. military has vast resources that can help a country emerge from conflict and embark on the road to recovery. Because of such vast resources, it is not difficult to fall into a pattern of completing projects for the host-nation instead of with the host-nation. However, it is essential during the golden hour that U.S. civilian and military

projects engage the local populace in all aspects, from planning to implementation.

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CHAPTER 7

THE IMPACT OF CULTURE ON SUSTAINABLE ECONOMIC GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT IN FAILING AND POST-CONFLICT COUNTRIES

Charles Williams Glaser

INTRODUCTION

Since the end of the Cold War, the international community has intensified its focus on the role it plays in the Security, Reconstruction and Transition (SRT) of post-conflict states through assistance in state-building.¹ Traditionally, SRT efforts in post-conflict and fragile state environments face significant challenges that impede long-term domestic growth of the host-nation. Some of the challenges include: 1) economic failure or limited growth 2) corruption 3) politicization 4) lack of professionalism 5) lack of civilian control and security and 6) religious and fundamental extremism.

Despite the international communities' extensive commitment to SRT efforts in post-conflict and fragile states, the results have been unsatisfactory.² History shows that 40% of post-conflict countries revert to violence within a decade.³ Often the relapse stems from: 1) the SRT support organizations' lack of understanding of the conflict or 2) their rush to gain control while failing to lay an appropriate groundwork to promote sustainable reconciliation. Evidence has shown that early attention to the fundamentals of economic growth decreases the likelihood of the post-conflict state relapsing to its prior condition.⁴ The bottom line is that establishing appropriate economic intervention plays an integral role in the process of obtaining

sustainable stabilization. To this end, economic stabilization must form the foundation for policy prescriptions and the regulatory framework in post-conflict environments. Economic policies must be designed to support economic growth. They must help create a self-sustainable economic system that can finance a nation's interests.⁵

Although economic growth and stability are not the sole mechanisms for creating stability in regions of conflict, they play a significant role primarily because they fund other foundational elements that are needed to support a legitimate government (see Figure 1). As a result, nation-building factors and economic challenges present SO practitioners with a daunting task.

Economic stability, in its simplest form, is simply a predictable system bound by law in which people can pursue livelihood opportunities. This stable economic governance is characterized by 1) macroeconomic stability 2) control over the illicit economy and economic-based threats to peace 3) development of a market economy and 4) employment generation.

- *Macroeconomic Stabilization* is when monetary and fiscal policies are established to encourage economic growth through the management of the currency, market levels, and inflation, while functioning in a transparent legal regulatory framework that holds public finance management accountable through property rights, commerce, fiscal operations and foreign direct investment.

- *Control Over the Illicit Economy and Economic-Based Threats to Peace* is when economic threats are mitigated by sufficiently managing state and natural resources through accountable systems to reduce the role illicit wealth plays in determining political dominance and by the integration of ex-combatants into the society through the preservation of jobs and benefits.
- *Market Economy Sustainability* is a condition that enables and encourages a legitimate market-based economy to thrive thanks to the establishment of infrastructure and enhancement of the private sector, especially the financial part.
- *Employment Generation* is an economic stability condition in which job opportunities are created to provide labor support for the economic sectors while providing sustainable employment and education to military-age youths and ex-combatants to facilitate a foundation of a sustainable quality of life.

FIGURE 1: ECONOMIC STABILITY

Throughout the process SO practitioners must coordinate closely⁶ and be mindful to create scenarios that account for the host nation's cultural background. While this may seem to be only a thoughtful gesture, it is actually the key to success. Adapting processes to work within the existing cultural framework increases the potential for success, which is important as the international coalition continues to move toward a peaceful transition of power in Afghanistan.

ECONOMIC STABILITY AND CULTURE

The current post-conflict operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have emphasized the necessity a deep understanding of the underlying issues that threaten to create instability in areas that are of strategic interest. Forty percent of post-conflict countries digress back into violence within a decade primarily because SO practitioners fail to account for cultural nuances and their impact on sustainable stabilization and reconciliation.⁷ Multiple case studies, lessons-learned reports, and after-action reviews assert that understanding the language and culture of the host-nation is vital to developing and maintaining a stable, legitimate national system.⁸

Defining culture in a concrete manner has proven difficult for anthropologists because the word describes the holistic essence of human life.⁹ The concept of culture has been described in multiple ways including: 1) the collective memory and perceptions of ourselves and 2) an agreed upon set of common values that bind individuals together in harmony to give purpose to human existence.¹⁰ In its broadest terms, culture is the collective pattern of beliefs, customs, social norms, and material traits that unite an individual to a larger group identity (e.g. religious, social, racial or political),¹¹ that are passed through thoughts, speech, actions and artifacts.¹² By understanding how cultural identities, actions and beliefs are formulated, we can better understand how these factors contribute to conflict and can inform stabilization strategies.

THE FRAMEWORK OF CULTURE AND ITS EFFECT ON NATIONAL STABILITY

Culture is essentially a process that passes historical information from one generation to the next through human interaction and mental models formulated from group experiences. Culture is important because passing social understandings, morals and values down to subsequent generations helps groups of people survive in their environments. In many ways, culture is simply another word for a social mental model that enables communities of people to understand the world around them. Mental models are formulated out of the way a group operates within the world to which they are exposed.

To better understand this scenario, it is useful to have an understanding of the concept of mental models. One way to think of it is to picture in your mind's eye an image of the shape of the earth. When asked to do this, most people will imagine a globe. This is the mental model of most people living on this planet; yet, as most American's were taught in elementary school, most Western Europeans living in the fifteenth century thought the world was flat. We can use this example to understand how an individual mental model can affect their decisionmaking. In the eyes of many of his peers, Columbus was viewed as a crazy Italian sailor who believed that the earth was round. In this manner, we illustrate the fact that an individual's beliefs and understanding of a situation affects the decisions that they make and the way they process information regardless of the "facts" surrounding a given scenario.

In the early 1990s, Chris Argyris, a business professor at Harvard University, developed a system to help

individuals better understand the way they processed information. He explored the impact of formal organizational structures, systems and management on individuals working within them.

The primary goal of Argyris' research was to help people achieve better outcomes by refining their thinking through a series of processes that led them to become more aware of their own misconceptions and to seek out accurate information to use make decisions. Argyris recognized that when individuals were given a situation to address, they automatically went through an unconscious series of steps to arrive at a conclusion that would inform their actions. The process, better known as the *Argyris' Ladder of Inference*, has become a powerful processing tool to help individuals and groups dissect their personal and collective mental models and help them understand the perceptions, beliefs and assumptions on which they are based.

Argyris' Ladder of Inference was primarily applied to business and educational settings; however, much of the foundational basis for his work can also be adapted to the concepts of culture and the impact that culture has on a group's decisionmaking. One of the key components of Argyris' work is that it asserts that even when individuals have been trained to address problems in a specific manner, they rely more on their own mental models when faced with a problem situation, even when they contradict the theories they actively espouse. Additionally, Argyris states that few people are aware of their own theories and do not even recognize when they have reverted to those models over proven factual information. In this way, there is a significant separation between theory and action that negatively impacts outcomes.¹³

In order to address this issue, Argyris and his colleague, Donald Schon, created a model in which reflection is the key component in helping individuals detect and correct errors in their thinking. They referred to the methods in which people typically attempted to solve problems as Single-Loop Learning (SLL). SLL focuses on the repeated attempt to solve problems without deviating from previously determined methods, regardless of the end-goal. When individuals utilize SLL to address a problem, they simply substitute one of their past answers for another if the first attempt fails to achieve the desired results. This type of problem solving does not require the individual to question his own thinking; rather, it simply just requires them to come up with alternative plan that is consistent with their existing practices.

On the other hand, Double-Loop Learning (DLL) theory integrates the ability to reevaluate the existing problem from a systematic standpoint. DLL enables participants to question the underlying assumptions behind the tools they use to achieve a desired result. DLL helps groups recognize the flaws in their thinking and uses the reevaluation process to make changes before problems occur.¹⁴ DLL also enables people to become aware of the differences between the theories that they espouse and the ones that they actually use while attempting to determine the best option for addressing the problem from a system standpoint (see Figure 2). This is done by subjecting their thoughts to a reflective process in which the individual scrutinizes their own thinking and underlying assumptions to evaluate the processes that they use.¹⁵ Interestingly, with a few modifications, the processes that Argyris utilizes to help organizations become more reflective are transferable to larger systems, including those

within cultural contexts. Argyris’ Ladder of Inference framework demonstrates that in a business context, meanings and understanding of problem scenarios are derived from the universal experiences that a community of people acquires though their holistic existence.¹⁶ Argyris notes that when a group’s knowledge is limited to a narrow field, then their understanding of a given situation will also be limited. As a result, groups have a “pool” of data that is divided between universally known and unknown experiences and includes data processed from an individual’s or community’s observable data.




FIGURE 2: EXAMPLE OF SINGLE-LOOP LEARNING SYSTEMS AND DOUBLE-LOOP LEARNING SYSTEMS.

Culture is also derived from the universal experiences its members have acquired though their holistic existence. This includes the interactions that they have

had with others as well as the instruction that they gained over time. Consequently, if the understanding (i.e. the data pool) of the individuals who make up a cultural group is limited, their ability to make informed decisions is also limited. Simply stated, Argryis' research clearly demonstrates that individuals' or groups' background knowledge has a tremendous impact on their decisionmaking processes. Even though an actor may believe they are making a data-driven decision, all too often involved they are engaged in an unconscious process of filtering data into "true" and "untrue" categories based on their own experiences and belief systems rather than documented, factual knowledge. As such, when an individual or group bases their decisions on a previously agreed upon data pool, they are essentially asserting a "credulous allegiance" to some interpretation of past events/data.¹⁷ For example, in the United States, the "earth is flat" concept is a national historical reference that is part of most American's collective memory. It is so much a part of our own understanding of history that we use the concept as a metaphor to describe ignorance that keeps people from seeking the truth.¹⁸ In contrast, historians today argue that during Columbus's lifetime educated people believed that the earth was round. Historians note that rather than fearing that Columbus would fall off the face of the earth, the primary objection to the voyage was the concern that Columbus had "underestimated the size of the earth and would never be able to sail so far in open water (a quite reasonable concern had there not been an unanticipated land mass upon which Columbus could stumble)."¹⁹ Interestingly, this fact is not part of the American context; therefore, the traditional view of "the earth is flat" as a metaphor for ignorant masses persists as

part of our culture despite the historical evidence that our belief system is incorrect.

“The earth is flat” scenario exemplifies the fact that once a community has determined which “facts” can be derived from a pool of “data,” they begin to attach meaning to the “facts” even if they are incorrect. The misunderstanding or incorrect data can affect a cultural group even if there is data to prove that their way of thinking is inaccurate.

In situations where perceptions, beliefs and assumptions (i.e. their personal and collective reality) lead a group to an incorrect conclusion about themselves or others, problems occur. When this happens, the group is typically engaged in a reflective SLL cycle which often reinforces incorrect beliefs about the way they view themselves or others.

By applying the concepts of SLL and DLL to any given culture/community, it is possible to see how the “truths” that make up the culture’s “genetic makeup” predetermine the degree to which ideas will be accepted when they are presented with facts that challenge their existing belief system. When there are no culturally relevant mechanisms in place to help the cultural group evaluate their beliefs, understanding and systemic processes for addressing problems, there is no reason to expect change to occur. Research demonstrates that cultural groups often reject a proposed idea on the grounds that: 1) they don’t understand the concept 2) they deem it culturally irrelevant or 3) they believe it is counter to their cultural identity.²⁰ When these occur, the community in question typically rejects the concept in its entirety – even if the proposed solution has been proven to provide stability in other regions. This outcome transpires because culture is a dynamic guidance system that orients a group toward

their chosen path while eliminating opportunities for the group to form contradicting values.

While the international community has repeatedly introduced new resolutions to usher in peace in the Middle East, the politicians brokering the deal often fail to realize that conflicts are not simply based on disputes over borders, resources or sovereignty. Instead, the disputes reside in locked cultural-mental models held by each of the parties. In short, both groups come to the table with predetermined beliefs about the other parties.

When new ideas are presented to a community and are contradictory to the group's current cultural identity, they are likely to reject it regardless of the validity of the data behind it. History has demonstrated many times that very few positive outcomes result from negotiation in such scenarios. As Argyris noted, few individuals recognize that their actions are inconsistent with the policies and practices that they espouse. Instead, the various cultural groups state one thing but continue to act and think the way they have historically. In this manner, the SLL process enables the group to maintain the status quo. By acting in ways that are consistent with their past behaviors and by refusing to actively examine their actions to determine if there is a flaw in their thinking, the group is able to mentally filter out ideas that may appear to challenge their historical identity. In this manner, the SLL process eliminates any challenges to the cultural belief system while reinforcing their preexisting position. When nothing changes within the mindset of the negotiating parties, the scenario resembles a man choosing to hit himself in the head with a hammer multiple times in hope that subsequent blows will not hurt.

In the light of this concept, SO practitioners need to keep in mind that doctrine and processes for achieving stability in post-conflict states are only valid if they address the cultures' existing needs and beliefs and the historical background on which they are based. Additionally, peacemakers must ensure the processes that they propose take into account the group's preexisting mental models about the cultural groups with whom they are in conflict. When the model is flawed, the negotiators must create a DLL opportunity to act as a mechanism to help the differing cultural groups reflect on the way they are approaching the negotiations. This requires time and effort on the part of the negotiators and the participants. It requires peacekeepers to help each cultural group focus on the way their culture systematically approaches the task of negotiations, recognize the flaws in their thinking and self-correct at a systems level. This must occur prior to the time that the varying cultural groups sit down at the negotiations table.

It is important to note that it is impossible to force meaningful change in post-conflict states. The best shot at successful negotiations lies in leveraging what we know about human learning to help leaders from post-conflict regions gain a better understanding of how their beliefs and approach to negotiations affect their cause. For this to occur, changes first have to take place in the way our nation's peacekeepers think. Every group involved in peacekeeping must learn to reevaluate the processes they use to achieve their goals before attempting to push the concept of DDL off on others who they believe need to change. Historically, military organizations, like other large hierarchical bodies, are prone to engage in single-loop learning systems. Even though military actions might adapt to

the situation, the underlying assumptions supporting these actions tend to go unchallenged.²¹

The process of changing how one thinks is neither simple nor fast. Consequently, it will take time to help our nation's leaders, our military, our SRT organizations and our SO practitioners to learn to use a reflective process to reevaluate their own attitudes, beliefs, actions, and processes they use in their attempt to achieve their goals.

Similarly, SOs must have an understanding of group dynamics and change management theories in order to take the time required to help the parties become more reflective. Traditionally, this has not been part of the process of brokering change with post-conflict states. As previously mentioned, even when post-conflict countries have come into agreement in the hopes of creating an opportunity for sustainable change, the treaty typically falls apart within a two-year period because there was no authentic change in attitudes or beliefs of the participants prior to the signing of the pact.

ESTABLISHING ECONOMIC STABILITY IN POST-CONFLICT REGIONS

The process of learning and being able to move from a linear to a non-linear operational environment is one of the central components needed for developing organizational knowledge. The adaptation process relies on the ability of groups to rapidly learn from their environment and their past. With that said, the rate of change is also highly dependent on the ability of the groups to set aside past assumptions that may lead to incorrect conclusions.²² Max Boisot stated, "... knowledge may be progressive in the sense that suc-

cessive approximations may give us a better grasp of the underlying structures of reality, but... it is not necessarily cumulative. Subsequent hypotheses cannot always reliably build on preceding ones to create a single monolithic edifice."²³

However, culture is not locked in a crystalline, static structure. Cultures often make changes in their traditions to survive and adapt in a changing world. Any culture can adapt when new information is introduced into the existing "data pool" via a process that enables individuals to incorporate the data without threatening their identity as a people. If the change is to be sustainable, it must be driven by the self-determination of the culture in question.

Following World War II, when the United States economy was the dominant participant in the international arena, American economic management theories were routinely imposed on other nations. It was believed that American economic theories could be universally applied. This belief was incorrect. With the passing of time, economists came to realize that the so-called universal theories and processes that they had developed were based solely on American cultural norms and were at odds with many other cultures.²⁴ In this situation, the changes that had to be made first were ones in the mindset of American economists.

Today, most economist experts recognize that the globalization and interconnectivity of international economic markets is a game changer. It is now generally recognized that "universal" economic "ideals" do not address the diversity of international cultural identities; thus, changing the optimal potential of the economic market. We now know that we cannot go into a post-conflict country and establish sustainable

economic stability without adapting economic policies and processes to fit the culture in which they will reside. Therefore, it is important to take into account sensitive cultural differences between the SOs and the host countries. The classic post-World War II economic model must be reenvisioned for a modern sustainable approach.

In 2009, the Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU), a Kabul-based institute, found that many Afghan citizens had come to believe that the democratization process being promoted by the joint forces had become highly associated with the destruction of traditional Afghan religious and cultural norms. Many Afghan people believed that the increasing focus on individual freedoms of the West was inconsistent with the traditional Afghan religious and cultural legal system. The AREU's study warned, "if liberal values continue to be considered 'imposed', the result will be a reaction against a perceived Western cultural 'invasion.'"²⁵

The U.S. Agency of International Development's guide to creating economic growth in post-conflict countries states that the purpose of economic growth is to reduce the incidence of post-conflict countries returning to violence by accelerating the growth in the wellbeing of the population. This acceleration can only be accomplished by first focusing on humanitarian assistance and democracy building, with economic issues sidelined until stability is achieved.²⁶

HOFSTEDE'S CULTURAL FRAMEWORK

For the past 40 years, Geert Hofstede's *Value Survey Model* (VSM) and its five dimensions of culture framework set the standard for evaluating the extent

to which values in the workplace are influenced by culture.²⁷ Hofstede, a systems researcher from IBM, developed a series of measures to analyze the extent to which cultural dimensions impact environments in a variety of settings.

Hofstede's approach was based on the assumption that the effects of culture are preserved and observed in the behaviors of the individuals. Hofstede analyzed 116,000 surveys that depicted more than 80,000 IBM employees during two time-periods in the late 1960s and 1970s. The IBM employees, similar in controlled traits (i.e. they were middle aged, well educated and had similar occupational backgrounds), represented over 40 countries. This allowed Hofstede to create a control base with the major variable factor being cultural heritage. By taking this approach, Hofstede was able to create a vertical snapshot of opposing cultural values based on individual countries.

As part of the research process, Hofstede assigned scores to specific cultural attributes. Research findings led him to deduce that it was possible to compare and measure national cultures based on five dimensions of culture.²⁸ Hofstede's data demonstrated that there were five dimensions of culture that dramatically impacted behavior of individuals in each setting: Power Distance, Uncertainty Avoidance, Individualism-Collectivism, Masculinity-Femininity, and Long-Term Orientation.²⁹

Furthermore, Hofstede reasoned that when the five dimensions of culture were applied to the international arena, it was possible to use the information to reduce the friction that was present at the negotiations table when differences arose among countries. Even though Hofstede's VSM has a great number of critics, his work has maintained its position as being a comprehensive model for cross-cultural research.³⁰

In a world where governments practice genocide as a method of dealing with cultural groups that they find undesirable or threatening, it is impossible to deny the seemingly dramatic differences between subgroups that form a single nation. It is also evident that many of these subgroups are essentially powerless to deal with the persecution and the issues associated with a lack of equality. Hofstede's initial model described this phenomenon, the lack of an equal division of power among the various subgroups, as the *Power Distance Index* (PDI).

The PDI is a measurement system that examines the extent to which inequality exists and is accepted by the people in power in a given organization or society.³¹ In human relationships, power can best be described as the ability to oppose one's will over another. The concept of power is based in the perception of social hierarchies and respect for authority. Hierarchies can be seen in a variety of relationships including: 1) parent-child 2) educator-student 3) commander-subordinate and 4) civil authority-citizen. Power can also be related to one's social status, religious status, political status, ethnic status or other inter-group dynamics. According to Hofstede's PDI, the distance between each social division has a direct correlation on the way individuals view the distribution of special rights and privileges. This concept has been extended to include the way governments and their citizens interact, specifically, the extent to which ordinary citizens submit to authority (see Figure 3).

<p><i>High PDI:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Hierarchies and superiority class divisions within society are accepted. • Power is usually centralized and unevenly distributed to the ruling class • Those in authority openly demonstrate their rank • Subordinates are expected to take the blame for things going wrong. 	<p><i>Low PDI:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Equality • Power is usually democratic and equally shared • Superiors treat subordinates with respect and do not pull rank. • Blame is either shared or often accepted by the superior due to it being their responsibility.
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FIGURE 3: POWER DISTANCE INDEX (PDI)

In countries where the PDI level is low, government's power is decentralized and its officials and its citizen's are typically considered equals. Additionally, citizen's can question their leaders without fear of negative consequences. Such countries tend to be more democratic. In contrast, in countries with a high PDI, the government takes a more authoritative role, and its citizen's are expected to comply or suffer significant consequences. Similarly, the difference between the haves and have-nots is generally much greater in countries with high PDI scores.

For example, Germany's scores fall somewhere in the middle of the PDI spectrum. Unlike societies where the power distance is very high (e.g. many countries in the Middle East), and societies where the power distance is very low, (e.g. Switzerland and Australia),

the gap between the haves and have nots is very low in Germany. The United States also lies in the middle of the spectrum. The USA has been very consistent in remaining closely tied to her ideology and staying true to the belief that the American Dream is attainable for all citizens, even though the United States has a wider wealth distribution than many other democratic countries³²

Hofstede’s *Uncertainty Avoidance Index* (UAI) is a trait that examines the degree of anxiety that members of a community feel when they are in unfamiliar situations. The UAI also takes into account the degree that society accepts this innovation and change.³³ The concept of UAI depends on how comfort is obtained within an environment as it pertains to ambiguity (see Figure 4).

<i>High UAI</i> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Extensive regulations exist to relieve or protect the population from the fear of uncertainty and the unknown, placing more emphasis on conformity• Tend to view the world as threatening, and hostile and differences are dangerous• The population of the country tends to be more homogeneous	<i>Low UAI</i> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Minimal regulations to relieve or protect the population from the fear of uncertainty and the unknown, placing little emphasis on conformity• Tend to view the world as benevolent, and differences are accepted and encouraged for growth• The populations the country tends to be multicultural and diverse
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FIGURE 4: UNCERTAINTY AVOIDANCE INDEX (UAI)

In comparison to European countries, Middle Eastern countries do not like uncertainty and tend to rank fairly high on the UAI spectrum. Middle Eastern countries tend to minimize their feeling of uncertainty by utilizing rules, laws, regulations, shame and honor to reduce unfavorable outcomes.³⁴ Furthermore, there is a tendency for more adverse societies to be more religious in nature in order to address the ambiguity of the unavoidable, such as death. A country's UAI has a direct correlation with economic security because the UAI is a strong indicator of the way the citizens of a particular culture tend to view loans, investments and entrepreneurship.

Hofstede's *Individualism-Collectivism* (IDV) is a cultural spectrum trait that examines the degree to which individuals weigh their personal needs and self-interest against the needs and social-interests of the group, while taking into account the degree to which that society accepts diversity.³⁵ In part, the concept of being perceived as part of, or independent from, the larger social group is a fundamental element. This cultural groups' identity is relative to the spectrum of the hierarchy and size of the group. This can be seen in Figure 5.

<p><i>Individualistic Cultures</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • One's identity is not essentially based in the identity of the group • Survival and success is focused on being independent and being self-sufficient • Tend to distance themselves emotionally and psychologically from others, where the interests of the individual prevail over the interests of the group 	<p><i>Collectivist Cultures</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • One's identity is essentially based in the identity of the cohesive group • Survival and success is based on social harmony and interdependence within the group • Tend to associate psychologically closely with group members, while distant towards non-members, where the interests of the group prevail over the interests of the individual
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FIGURE 5: INDIVIDUALISM-COLLECTIVISM (IDV)

Individualism reflects a societal preference to act as individuals rather than as members of groups, and the opposite of this is collectivism, in which individuals of a society work towards a common goal of society, sacrificing their individual wants and needs for the advancement of the group.³⁶

Within collective societies, such as China,³⁷ children learn from an early age to respect the group in which they belong and to differentiate between group members and non-group members. In return for sacrificing personal individualism and remaining loyal to the collective group, members can expect society to protect them when they are in trouble. In contrast, in

individualist societies children learn very early on to think of themselves as “I” instead of as part of “we.” This is because, unlike collective societies, the individual is not under the protection of the group, therefore he owes the group no form of loyalty.

On the individualist side of the spectrum, we find societies in which the ties between individuals are loose—everyone is only expected to look after themselves and their immediate family. On the collectivist side, we find societies in which people from birth onwards are integrated into strong, cohesive in-groups that continue protecting them in exchange for unquestioning loyalty.³⁸ In areas where loyalty is highly valued, individuals are more likely to have a higher level of personal trust in their peers. This trust plays out in multiple aspects of their lives, including that of economic stability.

Masculinity-Femininity (MAS) is a cultural spectrum trait that Hofstede used to describe the degree to which a society accepts the fundamental binary natural differences between the sexes, while taking into account the degree in which these differences apply to a society’s social roles³⁹ (see Figure 6).

<p><i>Masculine Societies</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Social roles are defined by gender • Tough, decisive, forceful, aggressive and more focused on material success, recognition and advancement • More willing to sacrifice everything instead of negotiate from a bad position 	<p><i>Feminine Societies:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Social roles are not defined by gender but overlap • Modest, tender and more focused on quality of life, cooperation, cohesion and good relations • More willing to negotiate from a bad position then sacrifice everything
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FIGURE 6: MASCULINITY-FEMININITY (MAS)

While the MAS cultural spectrum takes in the physical social gender divide of a culture, Hofstede never meant for people to use “Masculinity-Femininity” to describe how gender empowerment differs from culture to culture. Hofstede intended that the term be used to refer to the “Masculinity-Femininity” tendencies of a culture, even though a correlation tends to exist with cultures. For example, from an economic viewpoint, a society that is high in MAS traits may deem it socially acceptable to use aggressive business tactics to acquire or destroy a rival business. In comparison, a society that is low in MAS traits may believe that cooperation and mutual benefits are the driving forces and prefer a merger that gives members of both equal control in order to form a stronger business.

Most Middle Eastern business ventures are viewed as having high MAS because most business acquisitions are considered cutthroat. In this region, many businesses are under the monopoly control of the state. In this scenario, the MAS result in a lack of eco-

conomic growth based on collective, societal economic diversity. This situation inhibits economic stability and undermines most attempts at growing the nation’s economy.

Long-Term Orientation (LTO) is the label that Hofstede used to describe a cultural spectrum trait describing the level that a society adheres to its traditions, historical heritage and long-term commitments, while taking into account the degree that society accepts institutional change (see Figure 7).⁴⁰ Hofstede described LTO as being “the fostering of virtues oriented towards future rewards, in particular, perseverance and thrift.” In comparison, he noted that, “Its opposite pole, Short Term Orientation, stands for the fostering of virtues related to the past and the present, in particular, respect for tradition, preservation of face and fulfilling social obligations.”⁴¹

<i>Short-term Orientation</i> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Immediate gratification of needs expected• Respect and traditions are sacrosanct• The bottom line is more important than building a strong market position• Focused on analytical thinking• Reciprocation of greetings, favors and gifts• Personal steadiness and stability• Results and achievements are set and can be only reached within timeframe	<i>Long-term Orientation</i> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Deferred gratification of needs accepted• Traditions are adaptable to change and circumstances• Building a strong market position is more important than the bottom line• Focused in synthetic thinking• Acceptance that results may take time to achieve• Thrift and persistence is important• Ordering relationships by status and observing this order
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FIGURE 7: LONG-TERM ORIENTATION

For example, STO and LTO can be viewed by comparing the Chinese measurement of economic growth to that of the United States. Where the United States measures economic growth quarterly (i.e. efforts are expected to produce quick results, and companies often focus on individual personnel's contribution to the company's bottom line), the Chinese tend to view economic growth in the long term (i.e. measuring success over a long timeframe, and market position and customer satisfaction are very important).⁴²

The *Five Dimensions of National Culture* are important to address when evaluating the impact of culture on the ability to sustain economic development. The amount of reference a culture has toward any given cultural tendency has implications both for the host nation and the SOs. The cultural implications of PDI, MAS, UAI, IDV and LTO determine which economic policies can be implemented. The SO must have an intimate knowledge of the culture it represents and look for solutions that align to the existing cultural norms. In addition, the SO must work to find solutions that will change the existing dynamics in an effort to address the problems that gave rise to the initial conflict.⁴³ The SO must find a balance between the creation of a stable economy and the degree of social reform that must take place to reach that goal.

CASE STUDY I: GREECE

In late 2009, fears of a sovereign debt crisis developed as investors grew concerned over Greece's ability to pay its national debt. Compared to other countries in the Eurozone, Greece's economic stability was falling into a debt spiral. This was a critical issue because

the situation would affect the European Union's debt, the euro and many European banks. In response, the IMF and other Eurozone countries agreed to intervene by offering Greece a €100 billion loan in May of 2010. A second offer of €130 billion bailout loan was made in October of 2011. Both loans came with attached austerity packages requiring Greece to restructure her debt to make it manageable.

Greek culture, much like its history, is quite different from the culture of other nations in the European Union (EU). Greece has spent a large percentage of its modern history under subservient rule, including Turkey at the beginning of the modern era and Germany during World War II. In the 1970s, the country formed a two-party system consisting of the Socialist Party and the Democratic Party. As a result, Greece's economic culture has fluctuated as it has attempted to meet its changing cultural needs.

In 2009, after engaging in a debt auction, Greece's true financial state was revealed. The country was nearing a default. The situation was serious because Greece's problems not only threatened her stability, but it also had implications for the euro. With the nation's economy decimated, the government was threatened by social unrest. To avoid the problems that would result from a default, France and Germany led the EU in offering two massive bailouts. These bailouts came with big contingencies, including forced austerity packages.

The austerity packages were not designed to take into account the differences in economic cultures, but were instead designed simply to facilitate economic growth in order to reduce the debt within Greece and the greater EU. The austerity packages were created through a SLL method that promoted cutting spend-

ing and increasing taxes. It was believed that these measures had the power to alleviate Greece's national debt. This was in fact, a traditional SLL system in that the individuals in charge of the process never questioned their thinking or their process. They simply had a task to accomplish and they went for a method that they believed was "tried and true" rather than evaluating their thinking. If they had understood the link between cultural identity and economic stability, they would have been more likely to reevaluate their plans to determine why the problems had occurred in the first place and what it would take to reverse their causes. The economic package would have been more likely embraced if the lenders could have implemented the DLL to help Greece's leaders better understand how their country had come to be in its position and to help them understand how Greece's economic culture could be harnessed to promote economic growth. Before the austerity packages were even presented to the Greek government, the foundations of the Greek economy should have been addressed.

The austerity packages, which attempted to restructure Greece's debt to a manageable percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), did not take into account the cultural differences between Greece and the rest of the EU. The failure to understand the local cultural context of Greece combined with the reflective loop of the IMF's economic mental model (i.e. austerity packages are universal and void of culture) has continued to add to the already serious economic crisis. Thus, the IMF's low LTO is completely at odds with Greece's high LTO.

Unlike Greece's high LTO cultural orientation, the IMF removes the human aspect associated with the crises and forces the leaders to continue to remain in

a single loop-learning context of cause and effect (i.e. austerity measures to eliminate additional debt) that focuses on the development of monetary gain within a vacuum, devoid of external factors. This way of doing business (i.e. viewing the Greek debt as a product with little thought for her people) is detrimental to any plan the IMF decides to implement because Greece's cultural business model is based on high LTO relationships and trust.

Greece's high LTO business culture is derived from its high UAI wariness of external forces. The Greeks view a good personal relationship between two parties as prerequisite for all business deals. Due to this cultural phenomenon, business dealings tend to be methodical and unhurried. They focus on long-term business gains over the short-term ones while ensuring the decisions that have been accepted are indeed in the best interests of the parties involved.⁴⁴ A sense of distrust has formed between the Greeks and the IMF concerning the austerity packages. The Greeks believe that the austerity packages were primarily designed to benefit the IMF and other European entities rather than to promote the overall interest of the Greek people. The resulting sense of uncertainty leaves citizens with a wary skepticism toward politicians and authority figures.

Greece's collective economic system pays for public education, public health care, offers universal pension plans and enables citizens to have relatively short work weeks while offering them the opportunity to begin receiving social security benefits around the age of 55. The system for early retirement has contributed to amorphous state spending, which has resulted in an unsustainable burden on the Greek retirement system by adding over 700,000 individuals yearly (i.e.

14 percent of the Greek workforce) to the state pension and social security plan. All of this occurs before Greek citizens reach what we would consider a typical retirement age.⁴⁵

Greece's previous economic framework resulted from decades of negotiations between strong unions and a weak socialist government, providing every citizen with a sense of entitlement. Even with the exponential growth of the retired demographic and the mounting problems that it presents, the citizens believe in their right to early retirement.⁴⁶ In addition, these same individuals still expect the Greek government to continue its generous socialist retirement policies without the economic stimulus that is necessary to support the socialist agenda.⁴⁷

The issue of the Greek debt crisis, as it pertains to this paper, is not how or why Greeks political and cultural economic policies led them to this conundrum, but realizing that these political and cultural misgivings are still in effect and have to be altered if economic reform and stability are to be reached. The current IMF SLL policy of austerity and lending has only postponed the potential for a complete economic debt default by implementing the austerity packages to lower the percentage of debt to GDP by reducing governmental spending and raising taxes.⁴⁸ The Greek people have no idea how they should respond to this scenario. In essence, the IMF austerity packages have been a culture-shock to the Greek populace because the citizens of Greece have no mental model to use to understand how and why the austerity packages can be used to help them regain a solid economic foothold.

The IMF's austerity requirements reflect their own economic and cultural practices. It is clear that the IMF's long-term survival and interests are at the heart

of the austerity packages. Any interest in the Greek people and the way that they will respond to the requirements set forth by the IMF are purely coincidental. Because the IMF is in itself a sovereign entity, it cannot afford to lend money to the Greeks without attempting to create some product that will help to guarantee the protection of their investment.

Even though the IMF has attached stringent requirements associated with their loans, they cannot guarantee that their investment will be fruitful; however, if the loan is structured on their terms, their comfort level is increased. In essence, the IMF cannot assist the Greek economic crisis without ensuring that its own UAI and LTO cultural components have been addressed. The resulting conflict of economic cultural ideals are a reason why the implementation of the austerity packages has not taken root in Greece and have done little to address the crisis in the EU.

The gap between the IMF austerity measures and the way the Greeks approach their debt can be viewed as opposite ends of the cultural spectrums. As a result, the Greek people have rejected the austerity measures by refusing to pay the taxes that support them,⁴⁹ rioting against them⁵⁰ and trying to remove the government officials who are attempting to enforce the measures.⁵¹ In essence, the reforms have been a total failure.⁵² The failure is attributed to multiple factors: 1) the new cultural components abruptly introduced by the austerity measures did not allow an appropriate amount of time for the measures to be integrated 2) the EU and the IMF expected the Greek public to accept and carryout economic processes that conflicted with their culture and 3) the IMF and the EU attempted to forcibly impose a paradigm shift on the Greeks. This in turn was in direct contradiction to one

of the critical issues associated with SRT theory – self-determination.


UTILIZING CULTURAL DIMENSIONS FOR IMPLEMENTING SRT FOR ECONOMIC STABILITY

By utilizing Hofstede's cultural framework and placing it against the dimension of time, it is possible to compare the cultural components of the host country against the proposed SO cultural markers to determine how well they will align to help the host country achieve an appropriate rate of sustainable economic growth. The framework consists of two axes that depict one of the five Hofstede's cultural traits. One axis depicts the host country's cultural tendencies while the other axis depicts the SO's proposed cultural criterion for helping the host nation achieve national and economic stability. These cultural axes are qualitative values because the cultural dimensions are not measurable. With that said, when the cultural markers are set against the framework of time, their growth can be measured against their relationship to the past, present and future.

The x-axis (time) is divided into four sections: 1) historical values 2) current value 3) transitional values and 4) future stability value. These sections depict how cultural values alter throughout time, and how culture is relative to the timeframe that it is attributed to. Like the y-axis, the x-axis is not quantitative because, as we learned in Iraq, transitional timetables are hard to adhere to.

The future stability values need to be within the cultural grasp of the post-conflict state. This means that the end-goal of supporting the growth of a stable

economy is not simply a matter of overlaying a universal format on an existing culture.



This figure compares historic (i.e. existing) cultural dimensions to the proposed process designed to help a country achieve sustainable economic growth. A gradual cultural shift enables a culture to accept and adapt over time, offering a better change for success.

FIGURE 8: THE GRADUAL CULTURAL TRANSFORMATION SHIFT

Instead, the methods and models that are used to achieve the goals must be adaptable in order to meet the cultural group where they are and then steadily move them forward with successive approximations toward a goal. The stability goals of economic growth are designed to help post-conflict countries come to resolution and achieve economic stability. The stability values, while reflective and sensitive to the host-country's cultural needs, must also be based on sound


economic principles. It is the process of creating a legitimate, sustainable post-conflict nation that is represented in the transitional gap.

When a culture is predisposed to reject change including, but not limited to, economic reforms, SO organizations need to understand that change takes time and needs to be implemented in stages. When benchmarks of change are flexible, the host-society can absorb and integrate the proposed stability designation so success is more likely. Failure to take this into account may force the host-country to reject the proposed stability concepts and return to a pre-conflict societal system.

In order to combat resistance and to facilitate a stable transition to a new (or adapted) economic model, the SO must help the host country understand how the changes can have a positive impact. This process is slow and cumbersome because in order to introduce new, sometimes opposing, information and processes into an existing economic system, the opposing knowledge existing in the SLL of the culture has to be altered. By skillfully guiding the host country to engage in a DLL process, the SOs can help facilitate the host country's attempt to reevaluate their previous methods and models to determine if they have had a negative impact on any aspect of the country's economic policies or on the country's relationship with other nations. Once problems have been uncovered, the SO must help the host country's leaders find a way to integrate new thinking and policies into the existing culture in ways that do not threaten the national cultural identity.

This alteration cannot be accomplished simply by changing the process and hoping the host country recognizes the benefits of the adapted economic culture,

but it must come though teaching cultural supporting ideas and teaching economic ideals in order to bridge the transitional zone between a host country's current economic process and their future economic stability (see figure 9).



This figure demonstrates an abrupt shift against culture's historic dimensions toward the ideal cultural end-point for the host-country. This abrupt shift does not allow a culture to adapt because of the brief transition period, limiting sustainable results.

FIGURE 9: AN ABRUPT CULTURAL TRANSFORMATION SHIFT

Currently, the primary focus of the joint coalition has been on the Middle Eastern region, most notably Iraq and Afghanistan. While the citizens and leaders of both of these countries could prosper by implementing changes that would support a stable economy through proposed economic policies, the changes would not be sustainable without extensive cultural adaptation.

CASE STUDY II: AFGHANISTAN

With the 2001 invasion of Afghanistan and the overthrow of the Taliban and their oppressive regime, Afghanistan has been able to revert to the cultural demographics that existed before the Taliban gained absolute control. With the integration of Western-influenced democracy, lawfully-derived rules, and the institution of an Afghan constitution, the quality of life in Afghanistan appears to be improving. Afghanistan, like much of the Arab world, trends to rank higher in PDI, MAS, UAI, LTO, and lower in IND on Hofstede’s cultural spectrum then its international supporting cast (See Figure 10).

Hofstede's Dimensions of Culture	Afghanistan's Cultural Dimensions	USA/ISAF's Cultural Dimensions
PDI	High	Med-Low
UAI	High	Med-Low
IDV	Low	High
MAS	High	Low
LTO	High	Low

FIGURE 10: COMPARISON OF THE USA/ISAF CULTURAL DIMENSIONS TO THOSE OF THE AFGHAN POPULACE

One of the outcomes that resulted from 9/11 was the determination of the United States to rid Afghanistan of the oppressive Taliban. The leaders of United States believed helping Afghanistan implement a form of constitutional democracy would help stabilize the

country. This was to be accomplished through a series of changes in traditional Afghanistan society.

One of the cultural shifts was focused on neutralizing Afghanistan's relatively high MAS, as it referred to gender equality. This in turn would push the country toward a more stable economy.

In a 2004, a World Bank report concluded that integrating women in the workforce in Middle Eastern and North African countries would increase the average household earnings in the countries by 25%.⁵³ The report is consistent with many other studies over the last forty years that show that the empowerment and the integration of women in the national workforce is a fundamental step in establishing a developed nation and in stabilizing the economies of post-conflict nations.⁵⁴

This research led the U.S. to believe that empowering Afghan women would in turn empower the Afghan state. As a result, the Afghan government, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and other SOs implemented an Afghan constitution that called for equal rights between men and women⁵⁵ that allowed women access to education,⁵⁶ for medical care for women without caretakers,⁵⁷ and for women to be actively involved in government.⁵⁸

For the first time in 25 years, women can attend school, own property, seek treatment in hospitals, and run for office. *Theoretically*, these changes made Afghanistan's constitutional government the most progressive of all constitutions in the region;⁵⁹ however, even though the laws gave women these legal rights, the cultural norms did not prove to be as easy to change.

While gender equality was guaranteed by the Afghani constitution, it was not upheld in many of the

rural provinces. The problem was that gender equality contradicted the cultural norms and values of the region.⁶⁰ Outside the capital, the concept of gender equality does not exist because rulers operate under the same traditional cultural norms that existed before the constitutional reform. They, not the constitution, are commonly used to determine property rights, marriage and divorce contracts, inheritance, gender roles and status of women. The enforcement of traditional cultural beliefs has effectively nullified the constitutional law in many areas of Afghanistan. Recently, Guhramaana Kakar, a gender adviser to Afghanistan's President, Hamid Karzai, stated that violence against women and its relative disregard by many courts has led to horrific stories of children being raped and then imprisoned for adultery and schoolteachers being attacked for teaching girls. Women in the workplace are regularly harassed, exploited, stripped of credit for their achievements by their male counterparts and targeted by insurgents for being a part of the economic process.⁶¹

Even though many social and ethnic groups divide Afghanistan, traditionally men dominate the public realm while the private domestic responsibilities fall to the woman. This means that the roles and status of gender remains strongly regulated and divided. In this regard, when Hofstede's scores of cultural dimension are applied to the current Afghan culture, the nation still has an extremely high score on the MAS cultural spectrum, in spite of constitutional reform.

Cultural resistance to new social economic reforms led the Afghan government, with assistance from SRT forces, to implement legal statutes to reinforce social and economic reforms. This was done through a constitutional reform (i.e. from the top down) because social

reform ideas like gender equality “failed” to be implemented from the bottom up.⁶² The implementation of economic policies associated with gender equality is essentially nonexistent because citizens in rural Afghanistan territories do not consider the laws culturally legitimate.

In order to quickly establish sustainable economic SRT processes in a post-conflict country, the economic process must be considered valid and be accepted by the culture for the policy to be implemented in a way that changes the reality of the people. Failure to create reforms that are culturally relevant will cause the culture to reject the economic stability reform on principle. Furthermore, ignoring the issue of cultural relevance will serve only “to unite insular tribal, ethnic and regional-based communities against the imposition of centralized control.”⁶³ Typically, this will result in a return to traditional practices.⁶⁴ For example, in the Panjshir Valley rebellions against imposed cultural reform were triggered when Kabul-based modernists tried to control the social environment of the more conservative rural population.⁶⁵ As stated in the 2009 AREU report, “if liberal values continue to be considered ‘imposed,’” the result will be “a reaction against a perceived Western cultural ‘invasion.’”⁶⁶

The incidence of brutalities committed against women does not mean that the current operation to incorporate women in the workforce needs to be discontinued; however, the way women are incorporated needs to be more consistent with cultural norms. For example, women are more likely to be accepted as teachers in an all-girl school than in a mixed one. In order for social economic practices to take root, they first have to be accepted by the current culture.⁶⁷ In order for this to happen, the international community

and SOs need to guide leaders to help them see the positive side of change.

The issue is not the promotion of the ideals, morals and values of the assisting countries, but the forced implementation of values in the desire to accelerate economic change and stability. As mentioned before, culture is not a static source. It is constantly changing and adapting; the mental models of the populace are influenced through new information.

Various atrocities continue to happen despite the international community becoming involved and insisting on changes in laws that support fundamental human rights. These atrocities occur because the cultural norms are inconsistent with those of the international community. The international community has stated fundamental human rights associated with gender equality should extend into all facets of any given society. They view these rights as being a fundamental foundation to the changes that they wish to see. The international community believes that it is possible to force change on another country; yet, they seem to forget that it is much easier to change a law than it is to change a mindset. Similarly, if change is to be sustained over time, it must be driven by the self-determination of the culture. To this end, imposing change via international pressure is unrealistic and unsustainable.

The question we have to ask is: do we want a host country to enact laws that require the constant intervention of foreign aid to support change or do we want to help support a natural evolution of change that enables a country to evolve into an economically stable country? The underlying question is: whom do certain nation-building models benefit? Is it the host nation or the supporting force? The second set of

questions that must be asked include: is there a compromise that allows the host nation to be self-determined and allows the supporting forces to help influence change? Is it possible that both the host nation's and the supporting nations' cultural identities can be changed in a positive way through collective knowledge; thus, allowing both agendas to be reached, through education?

RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN THE REFLECTIVE SINGLE LOOP, HOFSTEDE'S CULTURAL FRAMEWORK AND POST-CONFLICT STABILITY ASPIRATIONS

The *Williams-Glaser Framework for Understanding Culture's Impact on a Post-Conflict Countries Sustainable Stability Process* (see Figure 11) builds off Argyris' Ladder of Inference by applying a cultural connotation to the business-learning model and connecting it to a classic conflict theory framework, the Roadmap for Achieving Integrated Solutions, which is taught in Lipscomb University's Institute of Conflict Management's (ICM).

The Roadmap for Achieving Integrated Solutions is a facilitation process designed for mediator to use to help break down the complicity of a given party's issues by analyzing the situation in light of their interests and positions within a given conflict. The progression of identifying their bottom-line position and identifying possible outcomes of a conflict helps all parties identify the underlying conditions; usually, the issues are culturally based.

By combining these two analysis structures and linking them to cultural change, it is possible to use the *Williams-Glaser* framework to understand how

specific structural components associated with cultural mental models impact decisionmaking. The *Williams-Glaser* framework provides a systematic process for negotiating and obtaining a sustainable outcome. The framework also enables SOs to look at the SRT end-goals and work backwards to analyze end-points and potential pitfalls through the identification of a culture's bottom-line-position in a conflict, which are directly affected by their collective known and unknown data (i.e. their mental models). The *Williams-Glaser* framework explains how understanding cultural mental models is necessary to help SRT organizations make and carryout plans to help post-conflict countries achieve sustainable economic goals and social stability.


In addition, the framework helps negotiators utilize the concept of culture to understand and predict cultural incentives. In this manner, the framework has the potential to reduce the level of cultural conflict between the parties involved in the SRT process. In essence, *Williams-Glaser* offers insights as to why cultural groups seldom look beyond their own cultural beliefs as they attempt to find and draw probable conclusions about the possibilities set before them when faced with a situation of cultural or national importance.

As depicted in the *Williams-Glaser* framework, understanding a given cultural structure and the human tendency to revert to SLL when presented with new ideas may enable negotiators to predict how the cultural group will approach the solution table during a conflict.

The Williams-Glaser is different from other frameworks due to the introduction of three unique features. The first unique feature of the framework is the ability to represent all of the parties involved in

the stability process. This enables SRT organizations to analyze how their own mental models affect their proposed economic and social reforms. Furthermore, the framework can grow to include as many parties as needed. By applying the framework to include everyone involved in the negotiations process, it is possible to see similarities and differences between each parties' goals and desired solutions concerning the ultimate end-point of sustainability. It is also possible to determine how individual solutions were derived from a given culture.

The second unique feature of the *Williams-Glaser* framework is the circular representation of the model. In this framework, it is easy to see how cultural mental models influence the solution while noting that the mental models can be changed when individuals and groups are presented with viable solutions through a DLL process.



**FIGURE 11:
THE WILLIAMS-GLASER
FRAMEWORK**

The third feature of the *Williams-Glaser* framework is the ability to demonstrate that, even though every culture's mental models are innately different, the differences are derived from the systematic selection of data from the culture's data pool. This means that the inherent differences between cultures are based purely on their information selection process. This is extremely important for negotiators to grasp this concept because it shows that while cultural gaps may exist, it is possible for foreign concepts to be adapted for use in a host-culture to help achieve a desired goal.

While it is possible for the SO to introduce new concepts into another culture, Hofstede cultural comparison framework shows us this process is slow and requires the dedication necessary to spend extended amounts of time on infrastructure development in order to facilitate cultural change. As demonstrated in Greece and Afghanistan, failure to integrate cultural change slowly is usually met with strong resistance and the possibility of sending fragile societies back into conflict. This factor demonstrates how critical it is for SOs to outline their overarching stability goals and analyze them to determine the amount of time it would take to achieve the goals. Additionally, the SO needs to be able to clearly define the characteristics of a stable society and compare the definition with the goals that have been set. The SO should initially focus on implementing economic policies that are culturally compliant, allowing economic practices to help stabilize the initial post-conflict SRT. At this point, the SO should look to the future by integrating infrastructure in order to support long-term cultural change that will aid in further economic stability. Without a strong understanding of the culture, a supportive infrastructure and a sufficient amount of time, economic stability

and growth cannot be achieved though SRT in a post-conflict nation.

LESSONS LEARNED/RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. *Understand what culture is and how it is formed.* By understanding how culture is formed it is possible to analyze what stability objectives are viable within any given cultural group, and how to select the appropriate process to implement stability objectives into a host country's society.

2. *Integrate cultural paradigm shifts slowly.* One must recognize that cultural change, no matter how small, may be viewed by the host nation as cultural genocide. Supporting nations need to try to build an infrastructure that enables a cultural paradigm shift to take place. SRT nations should provide advice, guidance and support through a process of DLL so the host nation is more likely to understand the reasons the SRT will benefit their society. Integrating paradigm shifts slowly helps preserve the country's legitimacy and self-determination.

3. *Legitimacy and Self-Determination.* The SRT programs should enforce the aspect of "This is your country—we will help you find a way to create a stable, sustainable economy by working with your cultural norms" rather than taking the attitude of "This is your country, but we have set an agenda for you, and we know best what to do and how to do it." It is important to understand that not all host nations are willing to exchange their cultural norms for stable economic growth based on Western ideas and values. Economic processes have to be culturally relevant, and proposed ideas for the goal of achieving sustainable economies must be adaptable to the host nation. This will better

enable the host cultural to accept change without feeling that it is being forced on them.

4. *Defining Stability.* SRT organizations need to understand the difference between the stabilization of the host nation's economic system and their own national or organizational interests. If the two interests are contradictory, the stability aspirations and goals will not be met. The primary objective should be the stabilization of the host nation's economic progress through culturally-relevant processes. The interest of the supporting nations should be a secondary objective.

5. *Plan for the long-term and execute for the near-term.* Developing a stable economic sector is the ultimate long-term proposition of any SRT organization working with a post-conflict county; however, long-term goals have to be achieved through short-term tasks. Trainers and advisors must focus on and implement the goals in concert with leaders of the host country, but the goals must be sustained through the host country's own self-determination. The organization that combines short-term tasks with long-term objectives improves the probability of success.

6. *Peace and stability cannot be sustained unless culture is taken into account* when developing economic processes for and with a post-conflict society. Economic processes that are derived from cultural components have a greater chance of being accepted by the host nation. Economic stability processes should start by taking into account the culture(s) of the host nation. They should also recognize that there are often multiple subcultures within a single country and that these subcultures may differ dramatically from each other. Consideration of cultural beliefs and values should be of primary importance unless the cultural compo-

nents are the root cause or a contributing factor for conflict. If this is the case, negotiating the legitimacy of past policies, validating the need for a cultural shift and adapting goals in ways that support the economic goals should take precedence. That being said, only minimal shifts in the cultural dynamics should be considered viable options for sustainable change. Successive steps of approximation toward the goal are more likely to achieve the desired outcome.

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CHAPTER 8

PUBLIC FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT IN POST-CONFLICT COUNTRIES

PAUL SANGREY

INTRODUCTION

Over the last several decades, interest in state-building has grown significantly. The amount of discussion concerning Afghanistan and Iraq, the two most important examples of recent American state-building, is downright staggering. However, Afghanistan and Iraq are far from the only cases of state-building over the last several decades. The international community, often with American support, has engaged in state-building of some kind in a multitude of different countries ranging from Timor-Leste to Sierra Leone to Bosnia and Herzegovina. This paper will focus on the successes and failures of Timor-Leste, Afghanistan and Uganda in reforming their public financial institutions to increase their capability in managing public finances and will analyze the reasons for their partial success. For example, Timor-Leste has achieved some level of success combating the “resource curse” by depositing a large percentage of the funds derived from its petroleum reserves in a trust fund. In the same way, Afghanistan substantially reduced the corruption in its Ministry of Finance by using a treasury single account to increase transparency.

These three countries all cooperated closely with the international community, and a term that captures the essence of that cooperation is capacity-building. This term explains successful interaction in this context

so well that it has captured the collective attention of the state-building community. It refers to a framework of cooperation between the donor community and the government of the developing country in which the donors aid the government of the developing country in creating institutions staffed by skilled professionals in order to pursue public goals more effectively.¹

Public financial management (PFM) is one of the key subfields of capacity-building. It focuses on equipping national bureaucrats in a key area of government operations—managing public funds. Public financial management can be broken down into two broad categories: public expenditure management and public revenue management. These areas are closely related, and success in the one area enables further success in the other. Public financial management studies proper ways of formulating and implementing tax law, proper budgetary procedures, proper auditing procedures and proper methods for controlling funds currently in the government's hands.

This paper will not examine what the ethical and efficient uses of government actually are, nor will it try to defend a government's power to tax and spend. Rather it will assume that a well-functioning government with relatively broad powers is the best means possible of achieving the ends that the state-building community and national actors are trying to achieve.

Any comparative analysis such as this one requires an understanding of the different environments that the different countries have faced in their attempts to rebuild themselves after the terror of war. Different countries have widely divergent levels of recurring conflict and large variation in the types of power structures still in place. Moreover, the state-building community's response often differs dramatically even

in countries that appear very similar on the surface. Partially as a result, the level of government effectiveness and human development varies greatly between different countries. For example, a survey of public perceptions of government effectiveness in post-conflict countries was taken in 2007. The results ranged from 9.2 out of 100 in Afghanistan to 38.5 out of 100 in Uganda. Likewise, the ratio of government revenue to GDP varies dramatically as well, ranging from 4.5 percent in Afghanistan to 18 percent in Timor-Leste.²

REVENUE GENERATION IN GENERAL

Revenue generation is perhaps the most obvious and probably the most important area of public financial management. Revenue generation in post-conflict countries comes from four main sources: grants from the international community, taxation, import/export duties and rents for the use of certain natural resources.³ Each of these sources has its advantages and disadvantages.

Probably the most important revenue stream is taxation, as evidenced by its dominance in the strategies of stable, well-funded middle and upper income countries. In fact, taxation is one of the key factors in state-building in general. Bräutigam even argues that taxation plays the most important role in building and sustaining government power and legitimacy. She says that taxation helps form a social contract through the bargaining it creates and that the desire to raise revenue creates an imperative to build sound financial institutions.⁴ Even if one does not accept the social contract nature of taxation or that higher taxes tend to lead to greater cooperation and bargaining over government expenditure, one cannot deny that

effective taxation is necessary for a long-term stable government.

Duties on exports and imports are a form of taxation and have many of the same characteristics. Perhaps the most important differences are that the duties tend to have more damaging effects on the nation's economy than a domestic tax that raises a similar level of revenue has, but they are easier to collect.

Another extremely important area of revenue generation is in rents obtained from the extraction of natural resources. Probably the most extreme form of this is in Timor-Leste where 95% of the government's revenue and 80% of the country's Gross National Income comes from offshore petroleum deposits.⁵

Other countries have fewer natural resources from which to extract rents and are forced to rely on other revenue streams. Because effective taxation systems take time to implement, many countries are forced to rely on external donors in the years immediately following a conflict. Afghanistan, for example, gets over 90% of funding for its budget from external donors.⁶

REVENUE GENERATION IN TIMOR-LESTE

Timor-Leste is perhaps the best example of a country in recent years whose institutions needed to be built from the ground up. When it won its independence in 1999, the island had no real history of self-governance.⁷ Since then it has developed a number of different institutions, some more successfully than others. Financially, it has had both successes and failures, although its overall record is rather positive when compared with the records of other post-conflict countries.

The international community's capacity-building approach was obvious in its approach to fiscal institutions. It initially focused on the creation of a working ministry of finance that would be capable of raising a substantial portion of the revenue necessary for the government's operations. The conceived ministry of finance would have four departments: a budget department to formulate the budget, a treasury department to execute the budget, a tax department to raise domestic revenue and a customs department to raise revenue through tariffs. It would design the overall fiscal strategy, formulate tax policy, administer revenue collection and coordinate the public expenditure program.⁸

The state-building community further focused on creating a fair tax system with the goal of raising the revenue to pay for one-half of government expenditures in the first year and almost the entire recurrent budget by the third year. The proposed tax structure included a single rate customs duty, a sales tax on imports, a service tax on hotel and restaurant receipts, on housing and on vehicle rents, various excises, a wage withholding tax and an income tax on expected coffee exports.⁹ Each of these taxes fit into the general categories of taxes that post-conflict countries have tried in their attempts to build effective governments.

A single rate customs duty, like the one Timor-Leste implemented, is perhaps the simplest and most common form of revenue generation found in post-conflict countries. From an institutional perspective, it is one of the easiest ways of extracting revenue for it does not require a particularly large or skilled bureaucracy to ensure compliance. However, as mentioned above, there is consensus in the economic literature

that tariffs harm GDP growth to a greater extent than many other taxes, such as an income tax do. The basic argument runs as follows: a tariff raises the prices of the goods within the country, and it distorts the relative prices of different goods. The country then does not produce what it has the comparative advantage in, and is less economically efficient. Furthermore, if a nation levies a tariff, then its trading partners are likely to levy a tariff on goods there importing from the host nation as well, further harming the nation's economy.




FIGURE 1: AVERAGE TAX COLLECTIONS: 1975-2000

This is probably the main reason why there is an extremely strong negative correlation between the levels of tariffs a country imposes and the country's income level (See Figure 1).¹⁰ A lower-income country does not have the effective bureaucracy of a middle or upper-income level country, and so it is tempted to use a revenue extraction system that is more harmful to GDP growth. An upper-income country, on the other hand, has the ability to hire a skilled workforce to implement a less economically damaging, but less convenient tax code.

Timor-Leste's sales tax on imports also served a similar function, in that it raised revenue from one sector of the economy and, therefore, would be relatively inefficient. In fact, in this case, the sales tax is a tariff that is administered differently—it increases the relative prices of imported goods. However, the sales tax would be more difficult for that government to administer than a tariff, and so its implementation would have to have a different rationale.

Timor-Leste's special tax on hotel and restaurant receipts and on vehicle rents was another form of tax that is particularly relevant to state-building. The international community normally does not allow the government of the country in which they are working to tax them and usually does not even allow the goods brought in for their use to be taxed.¹¹ However, their workers are usually some of the highest paid workers in the economy. This lack of taxation of the international sector deprives the government of some much-needed revenue, possibly for justifiable reasons. However, more importantly, this dual tax structure strikes a large blow to the government's legitimacy in the eyes of the citizenry because a large percentage of them view the exceptions showered on the

extremely high earners as extremely unfair.¹² Essentially, the Timorese government was trying to solve this problem by taxing hotels, restaurants and rented vehicles, which primarily serviced the international community.

Timor-Leste's wage-withholding tax was an income tax and would behave accordingly. In the long-run, income taxes are one of the least-distortionary means of extracting revenue. Furthermore, they have one of the broadest bases and so a substantially higher amount of revenue can be generated from this than can most other taxes.

The final type of tax that the Timorese government attempted to use was an income tax on coffee exports. This was a form of an export tax. In a developing country, people occasionally propose to tax an industry that generates a large percentage of the country's national income through exports. This eases revenue collection and is one of the most convenient ways of generating substantial amounts of revenue. However, the government was making its goods more expensive to external buyers, and so many of them would simply buy the good elsewhere. As a result, the tax would disproportionately harm the sector relative to the rest of the country's economy both because it was being taxed and they were not and because the tax would greatly reduce demand for the sector's product. As a result, this tax is extremely detrimental to GDP growth. In the case of Timor-Leste, the tax on expected coffee exports had an even larger effect than was expected because international coffee prices collapsed at approximately the same time. As a result the revenue generated became negligible and the tax was quickly dropped.

Recently, Timor-Leste has relied extremely heavily on revenues generated by another export sector. However instead of relying on export taxes, it has relied on revenues created by extraction of its natural resources. In recent years, Timor-Leste has taken advantage of a large oil field off of its coast, and, in fact, perhaps the strongest peculiarity about Timor-Leste is that unlike most post-conflict countries it will probably be able to fund its own development.¹³

However, relying on natural resource rents is not without its problems. Many countries with substantial natural resources become dependent on that natural resource and, in a sense, become lazy. They do not work to ensure active participation in government, thereby raising legitimacy, and they let the sector that generates most of the funds play an undue influence on government policy. On top of this, Timor-Leste has only about 500 million barrels of proven reserves and so it will run out of petroleum in the foreseeable future.¹⁴

In an attempt to prevent the resource curse, Timor-Leste created a petroleum fund with the intention of depositing excess revenue from the petroleum extraction while it is available, so that when their reserves are exhausted they will have a substantial fund that they can use to continue to fund their government and aid economic development. So far they have been relatively successful, and as of November 2011 the fund had almost US\$9 billion in it.¹⁵ Whether they will actually be able to avoid the resource curse through this means has yet to be determined, although the prospect is certainly hopeful.

REASONS FOR TIMOR-LESTE'S PARTIAL SUCCESS

In August of 2010, the International Monetary Fund released a performance report on Timor-Leste's financial management system, which lauded the success of the Ministry of Finance but said that there were substantial difficulties in other areas.¹⁶ The reasons for this partial success are numerous and varied.

Perhaps most importantly, the international community took a long-term approach focused on creating effective institutions, especially a Ministry of Finance, from the very beginning. They focused more on long-term stability than on humanitarian aid or conflict prevention as they have done in some other countries. In addition, Timor-Leste had a substantial advantage in that it was a winner-take-all conflict. The Timorese had achieved their independence from an external aggressor, and so there was not any significant indigenous agitation for regime change.¹⁷ This freed the Timorese government and the international community from having to deal with unrest or insurgency while rebuilding the government. Furthermore, as mentioned above, the government has gained access to substantial oil revenues in the years following the regime change giving it the ability to pay for social programs and long-run investment without high growth-stunting tax rates or a large reliance on donors.

Also, the government levied taxes that, according to the International Monetary Fund, were for the most part appropriate, although noncompliance was not as rigorously prosecuted as it should be.¹⁸ Moreover, Timor-Leste has been able to create a well-functioning account through which all expenditures are passed.¹⁹

This allows the elected officials to be able to decide, in an accountable fashion, what the spending priorities are, and it allows them greater oversight over the line ministries. However, even though the money passes through the this account, there is still insufficient oversight and auditing of the line ministries.²⁰ This may enable corruption to rise in the future, severely affecting the legitimacy of the government and thereby increasing the difficulty of achieving long-term stability.

REVENUE GENERATION IN AFGHANISTAN

Afghanistan is another country that has received a great deal of external support to help it to rebuild its government. For example, as mentioned above, external sources pay for over 90% of the Afghanistan's budget.²¹ However, there are substantial differences between Afghanistan and Timor-Leste. Probably the most important difference is the continued insurgency there. The government is not, by any means, the only purveyor of violence. Unlike Timor-Leste, there was no winner-take-all victory, and the Taliban continues to fight. Moreover, the government was created by external NATO action, not by an indigenous independence movement. In addition, Afghanistan is a much larger nation, both in population and landmass, further making central control more difficult and making the dollar-figure of funding the donors need to provide substantially larger. Furthermore, Afghanistan's largest export is not oil – but opium. These facts place a much larger strain on the donors and, so the donors' level of effort is less sustainable in the long-run.

This greater dependence on donor support and less dependence on natural resource extraction has placed Afghanistan in a substantially different position than

the one Timor-Leste is in when it comes to the generation of revenue. In 2010, Afghanistan's domestic revenue was split almost evenly between import duties, income and property taxes and excise taxes.²²

The import duties levied in Afghanistan are an important facet of their development because they play a central role in the national government's revenue extraction strategy. Yet the central government has not been able to control them adequately. In multiple border checkpoints, the revenue generated does not pass to the central government but rather to local strongmen. This results in a reduction of revenue for the government, in greater funding of hostile elements and in a reduction in economic growth.²³ This then decreases the strength and legitimacy of the government and reduces the overall security of the region. These all make the creation of a stable state substantially more difficult.

The income, property and excise taxes all fit into the general area of sustainable taxation. It is from these sorts of taxes that stable countries such as the United States derive most of their revenue. As Afghanistan continues to develop, it will have to turn more to these areas of funding and lessen its dependence on tariffs.

Like Timor-Leste, the Afghan Financial Ministry has substantially stronger financial management systems in place than the line ministries do.²⁴ In the last several years, the budget has become substantially more comprehensive and accessible to the public.²⁵ However, before the new system was introduced many people exploited the lack of open information for their own benefit creating a culture of corruption, which is possibly the greatest threat to long-term stability in Afghanistan.²⁶ Afghanistan has made some improvement in the areas of predictability and budget

creation, and it has moved to a longer-term approach in its budget-making process, further increasing its long-term sustainability.

REASONS FOR AFGHANISTAN'S PARTIAL SUCCESS

The Afghan government had a harder time getting off the ground than the government of Timor-Leste did, even though the international community has been even more substantially involved. The Bush administration decided to use a relatively forceful state-building approach and was willing to use American resources as necessary to ensure a long-term stable government in Afghanistan.²⁷ This enabled the Afghan government to subsist almost entirely on donor funds at the beginning of the regime; however, they have since pursued a goal of long-run financial sustainability. Even though the Afghan government exceeded their initial goal of raising US\$1.5 billion in 2011 by US\$200 million, there is still a current gap of almost US\$3 billion, clearly evidencing the long path ahead.²⁸

The Ministry of Finance in Afghanistan was initially a bastion of informal rules with an organized culture of corruption, as mentioned above. This started to change when an external firm installed a computer-based public financial management system thereby forcing a breakdown in the networks of corruption. This then resulted in a shakeup in the connection between specific people and certain line ministries thereby making systemic bribes substantially more difficult.²⁹ This reduction in corruption then resulted in increased effectiveness in Afghanistan's financial management.

Another substantial improvement was recorded by Ghani, Nehan et al. in “The Budget as the Linchpin of the State: Lessons from Afghanistan” when they discussed Nehan’s reforms as Minister of Finance. She launched a process of systematic transformation, streamlining payments and systematizing the reporting by the ministries and provinces to the Ministry of Finance. This enabled her to track the salaries of government employees and to rate the predictability of success of payments throughout the country. She also linked future dispensations of funds to the submission of timely reports creating a system of rule-bound behavior. She further was able to make the system of allotments to the provinces more predictable. This then strengthened the government and decreased corruption increasing the government’s legitimacy and thereby enhancing long-run security. She altered the structure of the Ministry of Finance making it more efficient and reducing the cost of doing their job for all actors both inside of it and outside of it. This helped to enable the Afghan government to fulfill its responsibilities while remaining inside its budget.

Some public financial management reform was instituted in the line ministries and provinces. However, they were less successful than the Ministry of Finance for a number of reasons. These ministries did not focus on managing public funds correctly to the extent that the Ministry of Finance did. Furthermore, many of the ministries did not have a head who instituted much-needed reforms. The fragmentation in the international community further complicates matters and makes the future integration of systems substantially more difficult.³⁰

On the positive side, the Afghan government has been able to create a treasury single account, which

again reduces the cost of tracking expenditures. It also limits the potential abuse of rents from natural resources.³¹ Together, these reforms reduce the total cost of the government to the populace without reducing any benefits that it provides.

REVENUE GENERATION IN UGANDA

Uganda is another one of the relatively successful countries to emerge from a conflict in the last thirty years. Yoweri Museveni took power with Zimbabwe's help after a conclusive civil war that raged from 1981 until 1986. He then began to rebuild a country that had been racked by conflict and poor governance by the previous administrations.³²

Since that time, Uganda has had a record of successful growth and mostly low inflation. However, even though Uganda has been quite successful in a number of areas it still faces a number of challenges. The most notable of these is the continued violence perpetrated by Joseph Kony's Lord Resistance Army. Uganda's economy is also still highly dependent on foreign aid and on primary commodity exports such as cotton and coffee. Furthermore, the nation has had significant budget deficits and a growing trade imbalance in recent years.³³

As for revenue generation itself, the National Resistance Movement, the movement led by Museveni, inherited a severely troubled taxation system. In addition, a large public sector dominated the economy. This necessarily resulted in a very narrow tax base, and so the government had raised tax revenues to very high levels in order to raise the requisite amount of revenue.

The World Bank prepared an assessment of Uganda's public financial management systems in 2008. In it, the World Bank described some key successes, but the general tone was slightly negative. Although the system was improving, it still had a long way to go. Some notable successes were the use of policy to guide budget formulation, and the transparency of taxpayer obligations and liabilities. Moreover, a computer based financial management system had been introduced a few years before increasing accountability and contributing to the timeliness and accuracy of disbursements of funds.³⁴

Some of the notable areas that still need improvement include the unpredictability of the dispersion of funds to local governments because of inter-year inter-sector-shifts and because of political interventions. In addition, the follow-up after audits is less than satisfactory. Furthermore, Uganda needs to introduce a process to efficiently dealing with procurements. Finally, the data on donor funds is not reliable both in its direct budget support and in its support for specific projects.³⁵

REASONS FOR THE PARTIAL SUCCESS IN UGANDA

Perhaps the biggest reason for Uganda's success in the last twenty-five or so years lies in the winner-take-all victory that National Resistance Movement had in 1986. This allowed Yoweri Museveni to build a new system without having to share power with his former adversaries. He brought new officials into the system instead of dealing with the entrenched interests and power. He then reformed the tax code reducing its distortionary nature thereby reducing the cost of the

government without reducing the benefits the government provides. This helped to jump-start economic growth, increase the legitimacy of the government and increase people's stake in the present, thereby increasing the cost of revolution. This all led to increased stability, thereby starting a self-reinforcing cycle.

As part of his overall plan, Museveni created the semi-autonomous Uganda Revenue Authority. He made it leaner and more efficient while eliminating corrupt staff, decentralizing and improving staff morale. He further focused on building good relationships with other stakeholders decreasing the cost of revenue collection, resulting in management that is more efficient and transparent and in a decrease in tax avoidance.³⁶ This resulted in a less distortionary system of taxation and regulation, and lower cost of government.

In order to address the problems created by the ineffective tax structure, the government initiated a 17% value-added tax replacing both the sales tax and the corporate tax. The finance minister also lost his ability to grant tax exemptions to certain individuals, thereby reducing the distortionary nature of the tax. They also encouraged entrepreneurial innovation through the tax code in order to create more jobs within the country. They also reduced the cost of paying the taxes by allowing them to be paid through commercial banks, increasing compliance and efficiency.³⁷

In an attempt to pull private-sector investment from its neighbors, Uganda exempted capital from its import duties, allowed for tax holidays for certain kinds of investment and allowed for generous depreciation allowances. However, Uganda did not subsidize income as it did machinery. In Uganda, the effective income tax rate was 10 percent, while the effective

machinery tax rate was -3.9 percent. Their neighbors in East Africa had substantially higher taxation rates on machinery, and much lower rates on labor. For example, Kenya had an effective marginal tax rate on machinery of 12 percent and an income tax rate of 0.1 percent³⁸.

These reforms have substantially reduced the cost of compliance to the tax code. They have also increased the cost of engaging in corruption on the expenditure side of the ledger. Altogether, they have increased both the legitimacy and stability of the Ugandan government.

COMPARISON BETWEEN TIMOR-LESTE, AFGHANISTAN, AND UGANDA

Timor-Leste, Afghanistan and Uganda all made substantial errors and had major successes. They all have been able to build relatively successful financial management systems, while both Timor-Leste and Uganda have been able to create relatively successful, legitimate regimes.

Perhaps the biggest difference between the Uganda and Timor-Leste on the one hand, and Afghanistan on the other is that Uganda and Timor-Leste were winner-take-all victories, while the conflict still rages in Afghanistan. Therefore, the costs of effective governance were higher in Afghanistan, as the government was forced to divert large amounts of resources to fight the insurgency, and the insurgency presented itself as an alternative to the central government. Uganda has had to fight the Lord's Resistance Army under Joseph Kony, in recent years, but he was not present initially and only operates in one region of the country.³⁹

The necessity of the Ugandan and Afghan governments to fight part of their population makes enemies of some of their citizens and reduces their legitimacy in the eyes of others. This reduction in legitimacy reduces the willingness of the citizenry to pay its taxes, increasing the costs of effective tax collection. This puts pressure on the government to allow certain segments of the population to avoid taxes while taxing other segments more heavily, which increases the distortionary effect of the taxation and has a negative effect on the legitimacy of the government. A decrease in legitimacy also increases the relative costs of taxes like income taxes and value-added-taxes, and so the government tends to substitute less efficient taxes such as export and import duties. This drives down economic growth, reducing long-run stability.

Furthermore, Afghanistan allowed corruption to exist early in the formation of the new government, as mentioned above, and even when a better computerized financial management system was introduced, they did not expend the effort necessary to sufficiently reduce corruption. This has severely reduced the legitimacy of the government and made efficient financial management more difficult. It also reduced the benefits that efficient financial management provides. Even if official funds are well-tracked, if there is a large transfers of unofficial funds, the transfers of unofficial funds have the same distortionary and destabilizing effect of poorly managed official funds. Overall, this has placed a substantial retardant on growth in Afghanistan, thereby reducing its stability.

Afghanistan also had another substantial weakness in that Karzai was at least somewhat ineffective, as evidenced by his inability or unwillingness to combat

corruption. The leaders in Uganda and Timor-Leste, on the other hand, were substantially more effective, as evidenced by the successes already listed. This helped enable them to build better government institutions. In fact, one of the reasons Afghanistan's public financial management system is one of the stronger points in its governance is that the finance minister, at a very critical time, was a very effective leader who initiated substantial needed reforms. Nargis Nehan was able to create an effective level of governance through intelligent effort, which sadly was not duplicated in the rest of the Afghan government and so many other parts are currently less effective.

One of the strongest commonalities between the three countries is the level of external involvement. All countries had extremely high levels of donor involvement and support when compared with the size of the country. The level of support has remained high for Uganda and Afghanistan, while Timor-Leste has been able to reduce its donor dependence as its oil deposits have been brought into production. This has enabled these countries to attain levels of consumption and investment that exceed their total production capacity, a state of affairs that would have been completely impossible otherwise.

Despite such benefits, the donor involvement has complicated matters, and may have incentivized the government to allow an inefficient taxation system to continue. Furthermore, if the donor involvement was to drop suddenly, as has happened in some other countries, the government's capacity would be compromised significantly, probably leading to an increase in instability. It also makes the integration of all funds in the public financial system substantially more difficult, as most donors want a large degree

of control over where their funds go. In many cases, there is essentially a dual public sector with all the resulting redundancy and inefficiency.

LESSONS-LEARNED FROM TIMOR-LESTE, AFGHANISTAN, AND UGANDA

Several lessons can be gleaned from the attempts in Timor-Leste, Afghanistan and Uganda to build functioning states. First, a government is much easier to build if there is a winner-take-all victory. Continued insurgency substantially hampers the ability of the state to build effective legitimate institutions. On the other hand, the existence of an insurgency does not prevent the possibility of a functioning government, at least not in the area of public financial management, as evidenced by Afghanistan and Uganda.

Second, corruption also severely affects the government's legitimacy, and it should be limited as much as possible. At least partially, it can be limited through effective financial management. Instituting a computer financial management system can help significantly, as can prioritizing proper procedures for transferring and accounting for government funds.

Third, if the host nation and the international community make effective financial management a priority early in the process, the country is more likely to achieve it. Timor-Leste had the earliest success among the three countries discussed, and the emphasis on building effective institutions was the strongest there in the initial phases of the state-building.

Fourth, placing rents from the extraction of natural resources into a trust fund that then is withdrawn in accordance with the economy's ability to absorb the funds is a promising way of dealing with the resource

curse. This is evidenced by Timor-Leste's success so far in the creation of their petroleum trust fund. They limited the funds injected into the economy from the petroleum industry to a level that the economy could absorb, and they concurrently enabled the petroleum to benefit the people of Timor-Leste long after the reserves have been depleted.

Fifth, all three states have been able to use donor resources to create more effective governance than they would have been able to otherwise. Whether some of the aid actually made the situation worse is harder to determine. It is entirely possible that the international community granted more aid to than the country was able to absorb, especially in Afghanistan.

Overall, all three countries have built effective financial management systems through intelligent, focused effort. However, they still face significant challenges both in that area and in other areas, and whether they will be able to overcome them and become stable, democratic societies is still an open question. All three countries have had substantial successes and substantial failures, and a great deal can be learned from their situations.

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SECTION III:
GLOCAL TRENDS AND REALITIES

CHAPTER 9

GANGS AND INSURGENCIES: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

Rachel Baras

INTRODUCTION

In the midst of a now decade-long Global War on Terror, the U.S. military currently finds itself engaged in conflicts throughout the world, including Afghanistan, Iraq, Yemen and Pakistan. All feature insurgent groups tied to anti-West extremism that employ mixtures of terrorism and guerrilla warfare to achieve their aims. In this context, non-state organizations have grown in prominence as threats to national security. While non-state actor involvement in war is by no means a new occurrence—the challenge of quashing groups like the Taliban and Al Qaeda has highlighted the need to develop military capacity in a new direction.

Concurrently, researchers from the military and academia have built connections between the types of conflict falling under the irregular warfare umbrella. Citing the role of the populace, the common links to illegal trafficking and associated damage to government legitimacy, researchers have developed a growing body of analysis comparing two types of non-state actors: insurgencies and criminal gangs.

This connection is not necessarily intuitive. Criminal gangs have customarily fallen under the jurisdiction of police, whereas insurgencies are strictly a military matter, and while insurgencies are defined by their ideologically-based motives, gangs claim no po-

litical motivations whatsoever. While the power of the insurgency is thought to be inherently in conflict with the power of the government, gangs are oftentimes thought of merely as nuisances that introduce crime and violence into a community, but pose little threat to national security.

Indeed, if one were to compare the Taliban insurgency of Afghanistan with the drug gangs of Rio de Janeiro, the similarities would seem few and far between. The Taliban has a clear ideology, is strongest in the most rural areas of the country and makes an effort to come into contact with and attack Coalition Forces and Afghan government officials. In contrast, the drug gangs of Rio de Janeiro have no clear political aspirations, are dependent on their urban environments and only come in violent conflict with state security forces when their territory is “invaded.”

Comparing gangs and insurgencies necessitates a familiarity with their differences and commonalities and a deep understanding of the ultimate limits to comparison. As such, this paper defines each type of group, provides an overview of their structure and motivations and at the same time shows the stark differences and commonalities between them. In all, the evaluation attempts to reconcile some of these to illustrate that similar countermeasures can be used to deal with both. In pursuit of these aims, the following questions will be addressed.

1. What is the definition of a gang? What is the definition of an insurgency? Within each, what types exist?
2. What is the structure of a gang? What is the structure of an insurgency?

3. What is the nature of the relationship between government authorities and gangs/insurgencies?

4. How is the populace impacted by these interactions and relationships?

Throughout the paper, the urban gangs of Rio de Janeiro and the Taliban insurgency will be used as the primary case studies. The Rio de Janeiro gangs were chosen because of their engagement in large-scale illicit commerce, because of their influence over their territories and because their origins illuminate the societal factors that led to their strength. Meanwhile, the Taliban insurgency is useful as a model because of the centrality of ideology to its mission, its threat to the Afghan government and its ties to the populace.

BACKGROUND: THE RIO DE JANEIRO GANGS AND TALIBAN INSURGENCY

Gangs of the Rio de Janeiro Favelas

The gangs of Rio de Janeiro operate in informal areas called favelas. While difficult to define, sociologist Janice Perlman looks to visual markers to differentiate the favelas from the formal city: the irregularly shaped, multi-story houses of red brick; the flat roofs; the curving streets; and the drug gang's armed guards at the favela entrances.¹ Favela dwellers have an average income of just $\frac{1}{4}$ of those living in other areas of the city, and as of 2006, 59% of them were in the lowest income group.²

The Rio de Janeiro favelas feature two types of gangs: the armed street gangs that exist within favelas and larger drug-trafficking gangs that extend

across favelas and compete with one another. There are three of the second type in Rio de Janeiro. They focus primarily on the maintenance and expansion of their drug markets, and while the gangs engage in politics, they do so only for business interests. Their structure is hierarchical, with a centralized alliance of leaders and semi-autonomous sub-factions that coordinate with one another and consider themselves to operate within the same gang. The Brazilian policing system makes up the other side of the picture and is comprised of three components: the civil police, the military police and the federal police. The federal police serve a similar function as the U.S. National Guard, while the civil police conduct investigations and the military police carry out law enforcement and respond to incidents.³ As of 2007, the majority of policing was carried out by the state-controlled military police, which consists of favela police posts (DPOs) and motorized patrols (PATAMOs). However, DPOs were scarce among favelas, and when they existed, they consisted of less than four officers that are often bribed by the drug factions that controlled the territories. Meanwhile, the PATAMOs were ineffective as well since few favelas had car-accessible roads. Policing usually took the form of violent invasions, occupation and the establishment of restrictive roadblocks around the favela perimeters. Invasions, typically carried out by the military police's elite special operations unit, BOPE, occurred with a specific goal in mind. Once the operation was completed, the police would either leave immediately or set up an armed occupation until civil order was restored. Roadblocks restricted entrance and exit and involved searches for drugs, weapons and stolen goods.⁴

Fed up with the spreading violence and facing the 2014 World Cup and the 2016 Olympics, a group of lawmakers decided to embark on a new approach to combating the gangs.

1. This program features four stages, as follows: Stabilization—The BOPE occupies the territory and conducts searches for drugs and weapons. At the same time, the government begins to initiate small-scale social assistance programs.

2. Definitive occupation—Police headquarters transfers units from BOPE to a specially-selected UPP force made up of police officers recently graduated from the academy. They create the UPP headquarters in traffickers' former homes, and establish a 24hour presence through patrols. Additionally, they begin to initiate long-term state investment through the creation of social programs such as technical courses and soccer schools.

3. Post-occupation—The implementation of social programs is transferred from the UPP police to other governmental institutions allowing the police to focus on policing alone. This will be conducted once there is a sufficient level of trust between community members and the police.⁵

At the latest available count, 16 UPPs have been installed covering close to 50 favelas.⁶ While the program aims to eliminate the drug trafficking presence in the favelas, its main focus is to create the economic and social conditions in which there is no longer a place for the trade in the communities.

Taliban Insurgency in Afghanistan

The Taliban insurgency can be divided into two waves: the challenge faced by the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) immediately during and after the invasion of 2001 and its resurgence whose escalation was most apparent beginning in 2006. This second wave is the focus of this paper, as it is technically only this second wave that counts as a Taliban insurgency, in the sense that they are challenging a standing government.

Post-2001, having been forced out of the Afghan capital of Kabul, the Taliban insurgency retreated across the Khyber Pass to its stronghold in Pakistan's mountainous Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). These areas are almost exclusively dominated by ethnic Pashtuns—the Taliban is 97% ethnic Pashtun—and have little government oversight. Soon, the Taliban's influence spread through south-eastern Afghanistan through Pashtun-dominated border provinces like Kunar, Zabul, Helmand and Kandahar.⁷

There is debate as to whether more fault for the Taliban's resurgence lies in the populace's grievances against the government or in renewed intimidation of the populace by the Taliban. However, it is unambiguous that the progress of Afghanistan has fallen short of the expectations held in 2002.

The Taliban as a group, meanwhile, is a mix of madrassa students driven by pure ideology, juvenile jihadists recruited from villages and motivated by xenophobia, local communities allied for opportunistic reasons, and—as the smallest group—mercenaries driven by monetary benefit. The Taliban proper is joined in its insurgency by the other non-state actors.⁸

However, in popular references almost all are included under the heading of “Taliban.”⁹

The Afghan national government and a NATO-led 44-country ISAF face the insurgency.¹⁰ The UK Ministry of Defense conceptualizes this effort in terms of three parallel strands:

1. Afghan Security Forces capable of keeping the Taliban from regaining control
2. Credible governance at national and local level to give the Afghan people confidence in their democratically elected government
3. Economic development that gives Afghans a stake in their own future

In order to tackle these elements, ISAF and the general international community conduct a multi-pronged counterinsurgency approach that includes securing communities to allow Afghan government to govern and direct infrastructural and economic development projects.

DEFINITIONS

In order to compare gangs and insurgencies, it is crucial to first establish the basic definitions of each. Please keep in mind that these definitions apply to the groups as a whole—not to the individuals who participate in each.

Definition of a Gang

Malcolm Klein, an expert in street gangs and criminology, points to two features that are necessary for a gang label. First, the group must be oriented toward some sort of criminal activity. He stresses, however, that this indicator does not imply that crime is the core

focus of the gang and writes, "Note carefully, however, that I specify orientation, not a pattern of serious criminal activity..." Second, the group must self-identify as a gang, "a group set apart from others." Self-recognition can be fostered through the designation of gang colors, symbols, etc.¹¹

Irving Spergel provides a broader perspective and defines gangs in terms of positive and negative perceptions. Positive perceptions point to the gang's role as a substitute for family and kinship and a focus on the organization and coherency the gang introduces into unstable, chaotic environments. Crime is not the unifying force, rather, brotherhood is. Other people emphasize the criminal nature of gangs. Theorists who fall into this camp emphasize the growing centrality of criminal activity. Spergel argues that while both approaches are accurate in certain ways, they do not account for the wide variation in how gangs behave both between different ones and over time.¹²

Definition of an Insurgency

Definitions of insurgencies, meanwhile, tend to emphasize their political nature over their criminal one. The Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms provides the following definition: "Insurgency – the organized use of subversion and violence by a group or movement that seeks to overthrow or force change of a governing authority. Insurgency can also refer to the group itself."¹³

Two key elements are listed here: 1) the use of subversion and violence, and 2) the aim to overthrow or force change of a governing authority. This definition—technically accurate—does not provide much in the way of specificity. Bard O'Neill, author of *In-*

surgency and Terrorism: From Revolution to Apocalypse frames the definition in a different way, recognizing the insurgency as a struggle that includes not one but two actors in the insurgency: the insurgent group itself and the opposing governing authority.

One can also define an insurgency as a type of warfare. In this definition, the insurgency/government struggle could also include the populace in between, whose loyalty may fluctuate between the government and the insurgency and whose actions affect the outcome of the conflict. Additionally this definition assigns two attributes to insurgencies that can be viewed in terms of means and motive: violence and ideology. Most importantly, the core motivation of an insurgency is not just commercial or cultural, but political.¹⁴

Analysis: The Significance of Definitions

These definitions do not claim to capture the ways in which gangs and insurgencies vary from place to place. However, it is necessary to determine some sort of neutral, concrete definition for gangs and insurgencies in order to navigate the narrow line between an organized group versus a gang or an insurgency. Spergel's distinction between the positive and negative perceptions applies to both gangs and insurgencies: for many governments, to view a group as a gang or insurgency is to see them as merely violent and criminal threats, to justify a heavy-handed violent response against them and to play victim to these organized groups' criminal actions without any sense of culpability.

CONVERGING IMPACTS (LITERATURE REVIEW)

While these strict definitions are useful, they are only starting points. As noted, the purposes and functions of gangs and insurgencies are not straightforward with the qualities traditionally attributed to one increasingly encroaching on the other and vice versa. Numerous scholars have investigated this trend, most notably Max Manwaring, John P. Sullivan, Nicholas Haussler and Steven Metz.

In *Street Gangs: the New Urban Insurgency*, Max Manwaring argues that because gangs undermine the authority of the government as the sole enforcer of law, they threaten state sovereignty. In the long term, he reasons, "these non-state actors must eventually seize political power to guarantee the freedom of action and the commercial environment they want." Because gangs control "ungoverned" places, infiltrate and corrupt the government and weaken security forces, they pose security threats that are comparable to those of typical insurgencies.¹⁵ As the author of numerous articles and papers on this subject, John P. Sullivan echoes Manwaring's argument. He cites the role of the gang as conflict mediator, tax collector and "law" enforcer as specific ways in which gangs undermine the government. In some areas, gangs go to the extent of defending their territories militarily and making it virtually impossible for state policing forces to enter and impose a state presence.¹⁶ Unlike Manwaring, however, he does consider overt political aims to be significant to gang evolution as threats. As he writes, the most sophisticated gangs are unique in that "power acquisition, rather than simple market protection, has become a prime concern."¹⁷ In his work, he focuses on the evolution from gangs from

simple to sophisticated and argues that the politicized, sophisticated gangs are the new-frontier threat that is closest to insurgency. Thus, given that, political aims are the distinguishing factor between sophisticated and less sophisticated gangs. These political aims are indeed noteworthy when assessing gang threats as insurgencies.

Finally, Steven Metz describes the convergence of gangs and insurgencies in his 1993 paper, "The Future of Insurgency." He approaches this convergence from two angles. On one hand, he writes that criminal gangs are forced to incorporate political agendas in order to gain legitimacy in their communities. On the other, he offers an approach similar to the one articulated by Manwaring and Sullivan—that the combination of minimal governmental oversight and tremendous opportunities to acquire wealth allows gangs to develop in strength until they pose security threats to legitimate governments.

GANG AND INSURGENCY TYPES

Within the broad definitions of gangs and insurgencies multiple forms exist, each operating under different priorities, extents of control and internal structures. By breaking down the definitions of gangs and insurgencies, it is easier to assess their mechanisms and ultimate motivations.

Generation Gang Model

As articulated by John P. Sullivan and Robert J. Bunker in their article "Drug Cartels, Street Gangs, and Warlords," there are three levels to one such

model, the Generation Gang Model: first generation, second generation and third generation.

The first generation gangs are the least sophisticated in structure and smallest in territory controlled. While violence is a feature of these gangs, it tends to be less sophisticated, completely apolitical and interferes in community life to a lesser degree than the higher gang generations.¹⁸

In contrast, second generation gangs control a wider territory, at times spanning multiple cities or states. At the same time, the focus of the gang expands to focus on commercial benefits in addition to the existent social ones. Leadership organization is more structured and hierarchical than first generation gangs, and second generation gangs will become involved in politics to further their agendas in the system or suppress law enforcement interference in their markets. In order to control these markets, the gangs employ more violence—leading to a community life that is increasingly dominated by the gang's violent presence.¹⁹ The favela gangs of Rio de Janeiro are good examples of these.

Third generation gangs are much rarer, but at the same time their reach is more threatening. Third generation gangs have global reach and higher political aspirations, aiming to conduct unconcealed political campaigns and take the role of the state in controlling projects and schools.²⁰ While it is difficult to classify most gangs and cartels as fitting squarely into the third generation, some come close most notably the Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13) and Eighteenth Street (M-18) gangs.²¹

The characteristics of these three generations are captured in the chart below (See Figure 1).²² Second and third generation gangs pose the greatest threat to

state power, aided by the centrality of violence and illicit commerce to their missions. Given that existent comparisons draw comparisons between insurgencies' and gangs' challenges to government, and since these two pose the greatest legitimate threats to government, the second and third generation gangs are the ones typically referred to in comparative analyses.



**FIGURE 1: CHARACTERISTICS
OF STREET GANG GENERATIONS**

Most gangs and insurgencies are similar in that they tend to only operate in a limited number of cities or states. True, it is important to recognize that gangs like MS-13 and insurgencies like Al-Qaeda²³ are now challenging this generalization; however, for the purposes of this paper, we will focus on second generation gangs and assume that insurgency implies an attack on a limited number of governments. Both the Taliban insurgency and the Rio de Janeiro gangs fall within these limitations.

Liberation and National Insurgencies

As noted, different insurgencies possess different aims: such as reform of the state's distribution of benefits (e.g. Animal Liberation Front in the U.K) or complete revolution (e.g. the Taliban in Afghanistan).

In this paper, references to insurgencies will specifically apply to those that call for the complete overthrow or elimination of the government. This decision is primarily made because in the existent literature on the gang-insurgency relationship, gangs are considered in terms of the threat of totally supplanting the government in their areas of control.

In *Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in the 21st Century*, authors Steven Metz and Raymond Millen define two types of insurgencies. A liberation insurgency targets a government that is seen to be an outside occupying force because of race, ethnicity or culture. Examples provided in that paper include the insurgency in Rhodesia and the Palestinian insurgency in Israel. Meanwhile, a national insurgency is one that functions in an environment where the government is seen as a somewhat legitimate, if flawed. Moreover, the struggle does not solely involve the insurgency and government; as mentioned, it also includes other actors who can shift the balance of the conflict.

The authors highlight the fact that the boundary between the two types of insurgencies is not always clear. The Taliban insurgency is a case in point in that it contains qualities of both liberation and national insurgencies. It is clear that the Taliban considers the current Afghan government to be completely alien to their culture. Mullah Mohammed Omar, leader of the Taliban in Afghanistan, has said, "Put all your strength and planning behind the task of driving away

the invaders and regaining independence of the country.”²⁴ However, if we were to consider the insurgency in O’Neill’s terms as struggle of multiple actors rather than in terms of solely the Taliban group, it would be clear that the type of struggle is not purely liberation. Most of the populace is moved to support the Taliban not because it is particularly inclined toward their religious ideology, but because they are either disillusioned with the government or intimidated by the Taliban themselves.

Whether or not the Taliban insurgency is considered a national or liberation insurgency is significant, as national insurgencies are much easier to counter. Given that the government fighting a national insurgency does possess a certain amount of legitimacy, the government can solve the conflict by proving that it can fix the root causes of the conflict by reform. It is no wonder, then, that the Taliban insurgency would prefer to put forth the message to the populace that it is conducting a liberation insurgency; for then no amount of government reform would sway the populace to its side.

Given that these models are in part determined by the ideological message of the insurgency, there are limits to applying it to gangs. However, the characteristics of the gang/government/community relationship allow this framework to still be useful in carrying out successful counter-gang efforts. As with insurgencies, the government’s relationship with the residents of drug trafficking areas varies, too. On one hand, the struggle may hold the characteristics of a national insurgency—the government is oftentimes viewed by the people as corrupt, predatory and negligent—and since gangs have the capacity to provide relatively better security and economic benefits, the community

may consider supporting the gangs. However as the gang uses propaganda to reinforce the police as the other and as the government presence is reduced to violent incursions that alienate the populace, the community may become increasingly loyal to the gangs. In Dowdney's *Children of the Drug Trade*, he quotes one favela resident: "...are you going to trust in a policeman that you've never seen before that may or may not be dishonest, or are you going to trust in your neighbor, that although he works in the boca, grew up together with you? I'll trust in my neighbor..."²⁵

However, by framing both insurgency and gangs in like terms, it is apparent that both situations are in need of a common approach—to establish a transparent, constant presence by those who are considered to be local to the area. In the case of the Taliban insurgency, their insistence on the alien nature of the new Afghan government must be countered by efforts to demonstrate that the Afghan government serves the needs of its people and treats their interests as paramount. Meanwhile, the UPP initiative is strong in its emphasis on foot patrols and direct community engagement. However, the implementation of development projects is still largely confined to the UPP police, and as such alienates the local organizations, residents associations and civil agencies. The government must make an effort to transition power from the UPP police to these other actors if they hope for a more sustainable and effective effort.

STRUCTURE

One way of demonstrating that the gang and insurgency are converging is to look at each group in its entirety. It can be said that gangs pose a greater po-

litical impact, and that insurgencies increasingly rely on commercial interests in order to further their goals. However, another way of approaching this argument is through identifying the differences in structure within each group.

Structure of a Second-Generation Gang

For both gangs and insurgencies, we will assess the structure in terms of roles and corresponding motivations (See Figure 2).²⁶ In *Islands in the Street: Gangs and American Urban Society*, Martín Sánchez Jankowski outlines four models of organizing gangs, ranging from a fluid, disorganized type to a structured, vertical hierarchy.²⁷ For those gangs that seek commercial benefit, the vertical structure with a clear chain of command is most appealing. Steven Levitt and Sudhir Venkatesh provide a model for this structure in their study of drug gangs, “An Economic Analysis of a Drug-Selling Gang’s Finances”²⁸




FIGURE 2: GANG ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE

The central leadership is in charge of overseeing the multistate operation and liaising with drug suppliers, and they receive the largest cut of drug profits. The lower levels play important roles in the actual operation and receiving a smaller cut of the drug profits. Finally, the rank-and-file works on the periphery and pay dues in exchange for the protection that the gang grants. In larger gangs, this structure may be multiplied so that the gang is, in reality, simply a confederation of factions led by a cooperative of leaders.²⁹

Given the role of illicit industry among gangs and the association of gangs with poorer communities, the desire for wealth is often portrayed as being a central motivation for gang members. As shown by these descriptors, however, the desire for wealth is not the only factor. While some youth are coerced to join a gang against their will, for many the decision to join a gang is completely voluntary.³⁰ Malcolm Klein provides a nuanced perspective, and in doing so argues that they “are not so much different from other young people as they are caricatures of young people.” These members exhibit one or more of the following qualities: Personal deficiencies (e.g. low self-esteem, low impulse control); tendency toward defiance and aggressiveness; exaggerated desire for status and an inactive, boring lifestyle.

In its own way, the nature of the gang accounts for all of these qualities. In holding authority over their territories, the gang provides members with *de facto* status. The gang hierarchy contributes to this effect with structured opportunities for advancement that are not typically found within the marginalized communities where the traffic takes place. Likewise, the gang provides a forum in which members can feel like they belong. When the family, school and communi-

ty do not provide sufficient stability, active support and protection, the gang fills this role. Additionally, the gang provides fun to counteract the inactive lifestyle. In Rio de Janeiro, gangs are known for holding *bailes funk*, large dance parties that bring in wealthy youth from around the city. Through this lens, then, it is apparent that the gang serves just as much a political role as an economic one in the community, regardless of whether their agenda is explicitly so. In empowering youth through status, brotherhood and entertainment, the gang allows youth to exert influence over their lives and the lives of others, despite their marginalized status within the greater city. This point reaffirms the point that combating the gang cannot solely involve the removal of the traffic; rather, the effort must also replace the positive elements of the gang through the institution of social and economic development programs.

Additionally, the approach to targeting the leadership must be different from the approach to the rank-and-file. While the drug trafficking footman indeed makes more money than the average favela resident does, it may be possible to lure the footman from the traffic for two reasons: 1) income is typically commission-based and therefore insecure, and 2) unlike the leader, the footman has links to a narrower territory. When the given territory is no longer a site for trafficking, it is more difficult for the footman to continue in the trade. In contrast providing social and economic alternatives will simply not work for the leaders for their social status and income are simply too great to compare to any other option.

Varied Structures of Insurgencies

There is measure of consistency in the structure of drug gangs as, given their commercial purposes, revenue must exceed cost and this efficient structure enables profitability. Among insurgencies, however, there is greater variation. True, as Bard O'Neill writes, a struggle is necessary in order to be considered a legitimate insurgency, but some insurgencies are more successful than others are, are more organized than others are and have varying degrees of vertical versus horizontal structure. O'Neill divides insurgencies into two camps: those that subscribe to conspiratorial and urban warfare strategies and follow a small, secretive organizational model with minimal—if any—hierarchical structure, and those that aim to engage in protracted war while prioritizing military over political strategy, requiring a more sophisticated structure in order to maintain the long-term, input-intensive mission.³¹

Even the most military-focused insurgencies, however, must not only consider their military structure but their political structure as well.³² This political structure can take the following forms:

1. If the insurgency is secessionist, it may inherit and make use of existent low-level institutional structures within their territories.
2. If the insurgency can infiltrate the formal government structure, they will do so and, as they gain more access, eventually “expand their influence by exercising de facto control over parts of the population.”³³
3. If there is no governmental structure to inherit and if the insurgency does not seek to/cannot infil-

trate the government, then it will create parallel institutions that govern the areas that the insurgents control (“liberated zones”).

As O’Neill highlights, a great difference between insurgencies lies in the level at which the political structure and overall campaign is planned and run. Some insurgencies are highly centralized with political directives issued from a cohesive—but isolated—leadership, while others spread roots throughout villages and have strong communication at the lower levels.³⁴ What is consistent, however, is the requirement that insurgencies maintain a reliable presence at the community level. The Taliban insurgency demonstrates how insurgencies may employ a mix of multiple models. At first, the structure of the Taliban insurgency may seem to be purely centralized—the political agenda of the Taliban is directed by an exclusive group led by Mullah Omar consisting of the Quetta Shura. However, politics are not totally confined to the upper levels of the structure. Within the Quetta Shura is a committee dedicated to communicating with communities, addressing their grievances against the Taliban troops and providing them with restitution.³⁵

There are many cases when individuals are coerced to join insurgencies. In other situations, however, individuals elect to join and stay in an insurgency by their own volition.

Analysis: Targeting Economic and Political Root Causes...and Raising Expectations

Both drug gangs and insurgencies can be divided into the violent and non-violent roles. In a gang, there are those who work directly with the drug traffic, and

then those who carry out violence in order to protect the traffic. In insurgencies, politics constitutes one element of the group, while the military effort constitutes another. Typically, there is a contingent that manages the political aspects of the insurgency and a separate contingent that carries out the violent aspects.³⁶ That gangs and insurgencies have this dyad is significant—efforts to combat both cannot solely focus on the violence, but must address the gang's commercial impact and the insurgency's political one lest there emerge a power vacuum. Accompanying this focus on commercial and political impacts comes responsibility, both counter-gang and counterinsurgency efforts raise the populace's expectations, only to fall short—thereby making their effort utterly counterproductive

The Post-Gang/Post-Insurgency Vacuum and Decline in Public Security

In the cases when there is no coercion involved, youth are drawn to gangs and insurgencies for similar reasons: status, excitement, brotherhood, security and the like. Unfortunately, while both the Rio de Janeiro UPP initiative and the Afghanistan counterinsurgency expend energy into clearing areas of gang/insurgent presence, they do not devote enough attention to addressing the reasons why youth join the organizations in the first place.

True, the UPP initiative is strong in that it recognizes the need for community development as a way to reduce the amount of violence and crime in the favelas. However, these aspirations have been limited in practice.

When the UPP forced out the gangs by invading and setting up a long-term occupation, the committed criminals left the area, but those who operated on the tangents of the gang remained in the areas. Without gang affiliation to provide status, youth have now resorted to using violence against community members in order to display dominance.

Thus, the UPP initiative creates a paradox: when drug trafficking and gang-perpetrated violence decreases, public security decreases as well. In order to be successful, then, the UPP policing program must be amended in two ways: 1) the program should institute a greater number of targeted programs to promote routes for advancement among the youth of the favelas; and 2) the police should focus more on curbing the rise of non-gang-related crime. Only then will the community see the police as the protective force that it aims to be.

Communities facing insurgency have a similar problem. In Iraq, the decline of the insurgencies was met with a growth in kidnapping, theft,³⁷ gunfights³⁸ and other acts of criminality. In Kabul, kidnappings,³⁹ car-jackings and robberies have increased since the removal of the Taliban. Hence, a decline in insurgent presence does not equate an increase in public security. Just as the UPP initiative must focus on promoting youth advancement and combating non-gang related crime, so too must the Afghan government.

GANGS AND INSURGENCIES AS THREATS TO GOVERNING AUTHORITIES

There are two relevant methods of assessing gangs and insurgencies: to analyze the internal structures and functions, and to examine their effects on their

surroundings. While this paper's comparisons of types, roles and motivations fall into the first method of assessment, this section on national security applies to both. It asks—how do the functions of gangs and insurgencies impact the legitimacy of the governing authorities?

Breadth of the Threat

As Steven Metz and Raymond Millen write in *Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in the 21st Century*, “Insurgency is a strategy adopted by groups which cannot attain their political objectives through conventional means or by a quick seizure of power.”⁴⁰ In targeting the government, their aim is to have greater (or total) control over it themselves.

In contrast, the primary goal of the gang is to be left alone without any type of government interference at all. As will be described in detail, their primary threat is that they hold greater control over their territories than the government itself, thus undermining government's sovereignty

There are two important aspects to this distinction:

1. With political goals, the final destination of the national insurgency is in the seat of government, and is therefore in inherent conflict with the governing authorities. In contrast, given that the gang is commercially motivated, the only area of concern is turf, and so it does not go out of its way to threaten the government. Therefore, a containment policy is more feasible for them than for the insurgency.

2. When gangs and insurgencies gain political influence, insurgencies have a wider impact on the greater population. Insurgencies aim to reform/overthrow the government to benefit themselves, which neces-

sitates taking away resources, representation and/or freedoms from others. In contrast, when gangs do infiltrate the upper levels of government, they do so to maintain a lack of government interference—a goal that, when successfully accomplished, does not draw resources from other populations.

*General Overview: Non-state Actors as Threats
to National Security*

In *Street Gangs: The New Urban Insurgency*, Max Manwaring outlines the threat of second and third generation gangs to state sovereignty.⁴¹ He writes: "The sum of the political results of gang-related instability is an explosion of weak, incompetent, corrupt, and/or insensitive governments throughout large parts of Africa, Asia, Europe, and Latin America."

In accordance with this viewpoint of gang threats to sovereignty, a vicious cycle emerges. Initially, the state does not invest enough effort into managing economic, social, political and security issues so that grievances and instability are able to develop.⁴² Then, the gang steps in to fill the void, exploiting the opportunity to control territory in which to maintain their criminal markets. The gang comes to pose a greater threat to the government, and the government is prompted to react—not by addressing the issues that contributed to the adversary's emergence, but most often by conducting violent campaigns to eliminate the gang by force. As the community becomes enveloped in a culture of violence, the government is seen as an oppressive force and is further delegitimized.

Interestingly, this cycle is almost exactly the same as David Kilcullen's *The Accidental Guerrilla Syndrome*.⁴³ Like this one, the cycle he models is four-part, consisting of: Infection, Contagion, Intervention and Rejection, each corresponding to the steps proposed in the chart above.

Gangs and Engagement with the Political Realm

There is no question that violence is indeed used by gangs to exercise power. Gangs' use of violence against the police in armed conflicts is clearly one aspect of their threat to the government. Gangs' direct engagement with politics, however, is less well-known. Gangs bribe politicians, infiltrate government positions and influence community voting in order to maintain favorable conditions for their commercial enterprises.⁴⁴ The corruption can take the form of active complicity in the traffic, but it often merely takes the form of turning a blind eye to the criminal enterprises. Regardless, as a result of the gang-government corruption, the relationship between community members and the democratic political system is undermined. Instead of serving the needs of the community, the corrupted politicians now serve the interests of the gangs. In the broader sense, the gang captures the loyalty of the community by undermining the relationship between the government and community.

Insurgencies and Engagement with the Political Realm

While insurgencies tend not to collaborate with the existent government to the same extent as gangs do, they are not completely marginal. Most notably, insurgencies may infiltrate the official government, recruit officials to their cause and use their influence to skew elections.⁴⁵ In Afghanistan, the Taliban has bribed law enforcement and judicial officials in order to avoid going to prison.⁴⁶ Engagement in politics not only provides insurgents with a measure of impunity, but it also allows them to extend their influence in the existent political realm.

Still, the insurgencies become involved in government to a much lesser degree than gangs become. This is partially due to the inherent quality of an insurgency—it is a group that found no remedy to its grievances by engaging with the government in a legitimate way, and therefore resorted to the alternative of violence in order to achieve its goals.⁴⁷ Thus, while politics indeed plays a role in insurgencies, political efforts are oriented more toward winning the loyalty of the populace. To do so, it is more valuable to target the government as an outsider than influence the government from the inside.

Insurgencies' actions in election periods provide notable examples of outside interference with legitimate governmental processes. Rather than push forward corrupted officials (as gangs often do), insurgents will employ terrorism to derail the election altogether. In 2009, Faraj al-Haidari, head of Iraq's Independent High Electoral Commission, spoke of the al-Qaeda insurgency: "The electoral process is an important target to the insurgents, because if they break it they will break all the political process in Iraq."⁴⁸

Tipping Point: Containment vs. Attack

In combating gangs and insurgencies, governments have two general options: to attack the threat head-on or to adopt a policy of containment. In *The Accidental Guerrilla*, David Kilcullen highlights the risks of choosing the first option. By attacking the insurgency rather than simply containing it, the government legitimizes the insurgency as a credible threat, and in doing so creates an even more potent threat than before. The same risk applies to gangs. By attacking them head-on, the government risk alienating the people and driving them to protect the drug

traffic even more. At the same time, containment has its risks as well. Taking no aggressive action against a movement may in effect provide them with a secure space in which to build up their power. In the case of Rio de Janeiro, the government did not make a concerted effort to quash the gangs until those with power had enough of the violence. Instead of competing with the government for control, they simply filled the vacuum that the government left behind: In Alison Coffey's paper, "The Unidades de Polícia Pacificadora of Rio de Janeiro: Authoritarian Tendencies and New Democratic Potentials," she compares the locations of the favelas already under UPP control to the areas of Olympic interest—the overlap is extensive.⁴⁹ This example demonstrates two points: 1) the tipping point from containment to aggression may lie external to those directly involved, and 2) intervention is political.

These points are echoed in Afghanistan as well. The 9/11 attacks proved to be the tipping point for eliminating the regime that had harbored the terrorists responsible. Not only was the U.S. an external actor, but the U.S. was only provoked to remove the oppressive regime when it was harmed itself. While this point on the political nature of intervention may seem obvious in relation to Afghanistan, it is useful to remember that political considerations exist for all types of conflict—including gang-related.

IMPACT OF GANGS AND INSURGENCIES ON COMMUNITIES

The most direct impact of gangs and insurgencies on communities is violence. For the purposes of comparison, between 1987 and 2001, 3,937 children in Rio

de Janeiro died from violent deaths while 467 children were killed in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in the same time-period.⁵⁰ In Afghanistan, the Taliban and other anti-government groups are estimated to have killed 2,080 civilians between 2006 and 2010.⁵¹ However, the gang members and insurgents do not perpetrate all of the harm, the government plays a major role in the violence as well.

Government-Perpetrated Violence in Gang Conditions

In the favelas of Rio de Janeiro, government presence has typically taken the form of neglect, except for the instances when the police would conduct lethal attacks on the traffickers.⁵² Inevitably, these attacks would harm innocent civilians in the process. In 2008, 6.86 people in Rio de Janeiro died at the hands of police for every 100,000. In the United States, the number killed by the police was estimated at 0.12 people per 100,000. In addition, 37,751 arrests were made for every police killing in the U.S. In contrast, only 23 arrests were made in the state of Rio de Janeiro per killing—an arrest-kill-ratio lower than any other city in the Americas.⁵³ This violence taking place alongside the corruption already described, leads the community to consider the police as an oppressive force that only exists to serve its own selfish interests.

Meanwhile, residents of the favelas suffer as a result of crimes committed by a few of their members, and as law enforcement cracks down on all, the community turns away and looks to the gang as an authority.

*Government Perpetrated Violence in Insurgency
Conditions Community Marginality*

Whereas government oppression involves solely the government and affected population, marginality involves the greater society's perception and treatment of the affected population as well, although, there still is a substantial relationship between the two.

Hence, the violence resulting from gang- and insurgency-related conflict becomes a wider issue involving those who are not directly involved in the conflict in any way. Most importantly, the reintegration of the affected community into the society is impossible unless the greater society is inclined to welcome it back.

A vicious cycle is created. In the case of drug gangs, poor and crowded urban dwellings with minimal state presence provide the ideal environment for drug traffickers, who can sell and transport drugs with slight fear of being caught. As police respond to the growing traffic, the dwellings become known for their criminality, and as social programs lag behind policing inputs, the communities gain a reputation as virtually lawless areas overcome with violence. Stigmatization follows, and so not only do youth experience barriers to employment as a result of inferior education and healthcare⁵⁴, but they experience social barriers as well—leaving them little choice but to support the gang or insurgency for income.

In their working paper, "Marginality: Concepts and their Limitations," Ghana S. Gurung and Michael Kollmai propose the following way of conceptualizing the term marginality, "The conditions [of marginality] are represented by poor livelihood options (... reduced or restricted participation in public decision-

making, less use of public space, lower sense of community and low self-esteem.)”⁵⁵.

In *Favela*, Janice Perlman argues that the introduction of gang trafficking is largely responsible for the marginalization of Rio de Janeiro’s favelas. In 1976, a time when drug gangs had not yet infiltrated the favelas, she asserted that the favelas were not marginalized, but rather were well-integrated—if in an imbalanced way—into the formal city. The same does not hold true today. In one survey, she asked favela residents how they felt they had been discriminated against. Race, gender and wealth⁵⁶ all fell below one criterion: residence in a favela.⁵⁷

In “The Militarization of Urban Marginality: Lessons from the Brazilian Metropolis,” sociologist Loic Wacquant argues that the stigmatization is used to justify the treatment of these communities as “enemies of the nation” that are to be managed through penalizing all dwellers, rather than focusing on rule-of-law and targeting the actual criminals.⁵⁸ It is in this aspect that the UPP initiative marks a shift from the Rio de Janeiro’s historical way of dealing with the drug traffic in the favelas. Just as stigmatization affects favela residents with no drug affiliation, stigmatization affects ethnic Pashtuns in northern Afghanistan as well. As noted, the Taliban is almost entirely Pashtun, and so while estimates show that only 30% of Pashtuns support the Taliban, residents of the northern regions (dominated by Uzbeks and Tajiks) commit discrimination against those Pashtuns who live there.⁵⁹ Lest there emerge a new civil war, the Afghan national government should make an effort to promote leaders who encourage tolerance of ethnic groups and work to overcome discrimination.

CONCLUSION

This paper is just a starting point—in multiple senses. 1) It aims to provide a broad overview of gangs and insurgencies so that readers can go on to compare and contrast each group even further. 2) It is a starting point in another sense as well—with the growing threat of non-state actors to sovereign states, new research will explore this comparison and others, and practitioners reference these comparative analyses to a greater extent. Given that the purpose of this paper is to analyze gangs and insurgencies together, the main points of comparison are summarized as follows:

1. Gangs and insurgencies are unique in that they straddle a fine line between mere social organization and real security threat. Unlike conventional warfare, the concept of a gang and an insurgency can be misapplied easily. Without knowing the crucial criteria for each, a government miscategorizes a group of individuals and then uses this determination as justification for unwarranted police or military action.

2. The Generation-Gang model is used to conceptualize the varying levels of gangs but can be applied to insurgencies as well. While the focus of this paper is on the comparison of gangs to insurgencies, this framework could prove useful for classifying insurgencies and determining which insurgencies are useful as references for others.

3. Likewise, the qualities that distinguish national insurgencies from liberation ones can illuminate the relationship between gangs, the police and the community. Insurgencies like the Taliban would prefer to consider themselves as liberation insurgencies, as this

identity is more compelling to a community member who might ordinarily be a fence-sitter or would call for government reform instead of an outright overthrow. While gangs do not have political ideologies and would therefore not claim to protect a community from foreign actors, the community's perception of the government as alien is to the gang's benefit. It turns the community away from the government and toward the gang as a familiar presence. As a result, governments need to establish connections to the community. In the case of the Afghan counterinsurgency, this would take the form of the international community transferring all power to the Afghan government. While in the case of the Rio de Janeiro gangs, this would take the form of transferring control from the UPP police to local organizations.

4. The qualities that distinguish roles within gangs and insurgencies illuminate the need to adopt different approaches to each level. It is more difficult to reintegrate drug trafficking gang leaders into licit economies than it is to reintegrate the lower-level gang members. Likewise, it is more difficult to gain the loyalty of ideologically-motivated insurgent leaders than it is to appeal to the grievance-motivated (or forcibly compelled) lower-level insurgent. In both cases, it may be more effective to focus more energy on separating leaders from the lower ranks than to tackle the groups as uniform entities.

5. Both counter-gang and counterinsurgency efforts are susceptible to raising unrealistic expectations among community members. For those tackling gangs and insurgencies, it would be worthwhile to look at the other's strategies for maintaining workable expectations while continuing to increase community welfare.

6. Gangs and insurgencies are only able to thrive if they are able to replenish their ranks. Some recruit by force, but many recruit through providing status, money and camaraderie to incoming members. To eliminate gangs and insurgencies is to leave behind a vacuum that can be easily filled by vigilante militias, other criminal groups and predatory warlords. The effort to remove gang and insurgent presence from communities must be complemented by an equal effort to provide alternatives for would-be gang members and insurgents, as well as an equal effort to quell newly-emergent criminal activity.

7. While it is useful to compare gangs and insurgencies, it is crucial that they remain distinct from one another. While gangs indeed pose a threat to society and the government, to treat them as an insurgency and assign them political aspirations is inaccurate and will lead to an inappropriate response.

8. It is well-known that war and crime affect not only the government and its adversaries, but the populace as well. While this link between gangs and insurgencies may seem obvious, it is intended to encourage those tackling gang-related violence and those facing insurgencies to use each other as references for reducing collateral damage.

9. Most simply, community marginality results when a whole community is stigmatized and discriminated against simply by virtue of their association with the offending gang or insurgency. The connections that gangs and insurgencies have with communities and ethnic groups contribute to these groups' marginality in the greater city and/or state. In order to prevent fissures within the population, it is necessary for the government to tackle the issue of prejudices in other segments of the population. The role of the

greater community has the potential to be overlooked, but is crucial to long-term stability.

Some of these comparisons are outright commonalities, while some are more nuanced. Overall, though, it is valuable to look at both gangs and insurgencies through the same lens. With such a view, lessons are able to be derived from both.

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CHAPTER 10

NEW MEDIA AND CONFLICT

Michael Fishman

As global internet proliferation has increased, new tools have become available that give users unprecedented access to information, as well as control over its distribution. Tools like social networking and self-publishing have changed the nature of information networks in dramatic ways. Debates rage in the academic community over the effect of these new tools on culture, civil society and politics. New tools are being introduced constantly and become popular or irrelevant quickly. The following are some of the tools, services and trends that represent developments in the media environment.

DEFINITIONS

Social Media—An umbrella term for internet platforms in which user-generated content is shared among a community. Refers broadly to change on the internet and is generally linked with terms such as Web 2.0 and user-generated-content.

Blog—Short for Weblog, a blog is a website in which users post content that is viewable by the public. These entries are displayed in reverse-chronological order. Blogs include original content, as well as links to other sources. They serve as sources of news, commentary, special interest information or personal diaries. Popular blogs may be hosted by their own websites, but there are services online that allow you to set up a blog for free. The collective community of all blogs is known as the blogosphere.

Some blogs tend to have a distinct political outlook. *The Huffington Post*, launched in 2005, combines commentary with news aggregated from traditional media sources and is seen as liberal. *The Drudge Report*, a blog that originated as an e-mail chain, functions similarly to *The Huffington Post*, but leans conservative. It is famous for being the first news outlet to break the Monica Lewinsky scandal.¹ Services like **BlogSpot**, **Livejournal** and **Wordpress** allow users to create blogs for free.

Facebook – Currently the most popular social networking site worldwide, Facebook is a website which combines social networking with blogging, gaming and video-call services. Facebook has come under scrutiny for its privacy policies, occasionally unveiling features that publicly publish information without the users' consent. Facebook also enforces a true-name policy, which requires users to use their legal name, a policy, which has been criticized for putting activists at risk. While Facebook is the most popular social networking service globally, with approximately 900 million unique users per month, other variants and copies exist throughout the world, such as Russia's V-Kontakte, the Brazilian Orkut (run by Google) or China's RenRen.²

Twitter – A micro-blogging service that allows users to post 140-character messages called tweets. Twitter is unique in that utilizes both the internet and cell phones, making it a resilient tool. A Twitter user does not even need an internet-enabled phone to send and receive Tweets as the service's 140 character limit was designed to function with a phone's texting capabilities. Tweets can be addressed to specific users, or can be organized by hashtags. A user can search for a hashtag to find tweets on a subject from any Twitter

user worldwide. Twitter users may include a location in their profiles, but this location does not necessarily reflect reality and is unverified.

YouTube—A service that allows users to post and share videos. Each video has a comments section where users can discuss the video. The administrators of YouTube, which is owned by Google, do not permit videos that contain material that is deemed defamatory, pornographic or encouraging criminal conduct. It enforces these content regulations by a way of community policing. If users believe a video is in violation of the site's regulations, they flag it, and it is then reviewed by moderators who decide whether or not the video is in violation.³

LinkedIn—A social networking website tailored to professionals. Users form connections with professional contacts, and use these networks to collaborate or assist in employment. Communication between unconnected users on LinkedIn requires either a pre-existing offline relationship or the use of an intermediary common contact. For example, someone searching for a job might see that a former colleague of theirs is working for a prospective employer and use this as a way to reach out.

Google+—A new social networking platform launched by Google. Though it is new and only in the Beta phase, it offers a few new services and features that distinguish it from other social networks. Users connect by placing each other in circles, allowing them to organize their contacts by various groupings. The service also offers the Hangout feature, allowing easy group videoconferencing.

Flickr—A popular photo- and video-sharing site that includes some community functions. A user can post images and display those images on other web-

sites. Flickr also allows users to attach tags, a form of metadata that makes the images searchable by content. For example, a picture might be tagged as “St-PatricksDay”, “Wedding” or “Protest.”

Wiki – A Wiki is a type of website that allows for multiple contributors, often allowing anyone to edit. The most famous of this is Wikipedia, which has used an open-information format to attempt to create a free encyclopedia. However, a wiki can be created for any purpose.

EXAMPLES

Moldova 2009

Moldova was one of the first cases in which new media played a role in the outcome of conflict. On April 6, 2009, rallies were organized in the Piata Marii Adunari Nationale, the largest square in Moldova’s capital city of Chişinău to protest a Communist electoral victory. On April 7th, the protest became unruly. With 10,000 people in the square, riots began. Authorities had disabled cell phone reception in the area of the protests, which is a common tactic used by governments cracking down on protests, but due to the ability of many cell phones to access satellite internet, users were able to send some text messages and use Twitter. Protesters used the #pman hashtag, which referred to the square in which the protests occurred, and it quickly became one of the most popular topics on Twitter for that day. The protesters did not primarily use Twitter to communicate amongst themselves, but rather to disseminate information about the protests. These Tweets allowed the Moldovan diaspora, a large group due to Moldova’s distressed economy, to

follow along with the events in the square and to “participate” in the protests by forwarding and re-posting the messages of the protesters to raise awareness.⁴

While Moldova was celebrated by some as a “Twitter Revolution,”⁵ an example of the way in which social media would eventually bring about the demise of authoritarian states, the reality was more complex. It is clear now that Twitter played a small role—if it played one at all—in organizing the protests on the ground. For example, it is unclear how many Twitter users were active in Moldova at the time, and there are indications that the number may have been quite small.⁶ However, the impact of these new media technologies should not be measured by the number of users during a protest, but by their power to send information quickly and distribute it to many people.

Although these movements eventually failed due to a failure of political leadership, one should not completely dismiss the value of social media in this situation. It provided international attention, recognition and support for the protesters. However, one should not overstate its value either—the presence of social networking tools was insufficient on their own to facilitate a revolution when other problematic factors worked against it.

Iran

Many commentators in the Western media considered the 2009 election protests in Iran a “Twitter Revolution,” and watched the events closely, hoping that new technology could lead to the overthrow a powerful autocratic adversary. One commentator claimed that “This is it. The big one. This is the first revolution that has been catapulted onto a global stage and

transformed by social media.”⁷ This enthusiasm was largely misdirected, and may have been actually detrimental to the interests of American foreign policy. The election itself did not focus on the center of power in Iran, which remained in the hands of the unelected Supreme Leader, but on the office of president, the highest secular position on the country. Iran in 2009 was one of the most internet-active countries in the Middle East. In the years before the revolution, internet access in Iran had grown rapidly, reaching about 35% of the population before the protests, compared to an average of 26% in the Middle East as a whole.⁸ The Iranian blogosphere was vibrant and active, and was considered within the country to be the “most open public communications platform for political discourse” (See Figure 1).⁹¹⁰




FIGURE 1: A MAP OF THE PERSIAN-LANGUAGE BLOGOSPHERE

However, Iranian government officials placed strict and wide-ranging limitations on internet usage. Internet speed was severely limited for households, making it extremely difficult to download multimedia content and thus access alternatives to state-run media. Iran's constitutionally enshrined censorship of media extended to the internet, but the diffuse nature of internet expression resulted in spotty censorship¹¹

When official election results favoring incumbent president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad were released, many Iranians claimed they were fraudulent and took to the streets. The Green Movement, the reformist wing of Iranian politics was the primary force behind the protests. The Green Movement mainly consisted of the young and educated, groups that typically enjoy higher levels of internet proficiency than the general population. As protesters started to take to the streets, the Iranian government deployed a host of conventional repressive strategies—police violence and accusations of foreign instigation—as well as strategies geared toward new media. As has been common for many years in states that wish to stop protests, text messaging was shut down for three weeks following the protests. State security services hacked websites for the Green Movement. Journalists were detained, forced to stay in their hotel rooms or houses or expelled from the country.¹² In the past, this situation would have severely limited the amount of information able to leave the country. However, the proliferation of video- and photo-sharing technologies changed the information dynamic. The west could now receive real-time images, videos and updates of protests occurring inside Iran. Despite this ability, in the face of the authorities' violent crackdown, the protests waned, and Ahmadinejad remained president.

Many commentators in the Western media saw Twitter as playing a key role. In “The Revolution Will Be Twittered” Andrew Sullivan of *The Atlantic* claimed that protests were actually organized on Twitter. Although, this is likely not true, there were examples of leaders tweeting (See Figure 2¹³).



FIGURE 2: MOUSAVI TWEET

From this information, Sullivan made bold claims. New media meant that “you cannot stop people any longer. You cannot control them any longer.”¹⁴ Others claimed that the internet had provided a space for organization outside of the government’s gaze by allowing the protesters to surprise the government. Though the security forces knew to take down mobile phone services, they were slower to block the internet and social networking sites, reflecting an inability of the old guard to grasp the way that the internet was used. The proliferation of cameras was frequently cited as a key dynamic. The ability to send pictures and video of demonstrations and police brutality to the outside world was seen as key to sustaining the protest. The video of the death of Neda Agha-Soltan, a young

woman shot by the pro-government Basj militia, was a key example of this—highlighting the brutality of the regime and galvanizing protesters. Jared Cohen, a 27 year old official at the U.S. State Department, asked Twitter management to delay scheduled site maintenance, which would have taken the service offline for a few hours while the protests occurred. Although administration officials later made clear that this was a low-level communication by an employee who already was in frequent contact with Twitter management, the implications were clear: the foreign policy establishment viewed the internet not only as a business and communications service but as a tool for advancing democracy worldwide.

However, after the protests, doubts arose about the role that new media played. Evgeny Morozov, the leading academic cyber-skeptic, has written extensively on this subject, arguing that the internet is not inherently democratic, and that dictators can use it as a tool as easily as their opponents. While much discussion of the protests occurred online—it was one of Twitter’s top trending topics in the weeks following the election—it remains unclear how much of the online discussion actually came from inside Iran.

Like in Moldova, there is no way to tell how many active Twitter users existed inside the country, but the number appeared to be low—less than 1% of the population—before the protests.¹⁵ Cyber-skeptics point to the case of Oxfordgirl, a Twitter user. Profiled in *The Guardian* under the title “Oxfordgirl vs. Ahmedinejad,” she seemed an example of the internet as a tool of the freedom fighter. “Before they started blocking mobile phones I was almost co-ordinating people’s individual movements - “Go to such and such street,” or “Don’t go there, the Basij [militia] are waiting,” the

article quoted her as saying. Of course, not only was she outside of Iran, but her claims made little sense given that cell networks were completely shut off during days of protest.¹⁶ It remains unclear whether Twitter and social media had a ground level effect on the Tehran protests, but it seems unlikely. There were discussions of the protests on Twitter, but that does not mean that these had a decisive organizational nature. There were tweets, and there were protests, but there is no clear causal link, despite the claims of many western commentators. According to Mehdi Yahyanejad, the manager of one of the foremost Farsi-language websites, Twitter had no effect on the revolution. He said that in Western media "there was a lot of buzz, but once you look...you see most of it are Americans talking among themselves."¹⁷

The internet may even have lead to harm for the protesters. It allowed harmful rumors to spread as quickly as true, useful information. Unverifiable information circulated over Twitter claiming that the police were pouring acid and boiling water on crowds, causing panic. Worst among these rumors was the case of Saeedeh Pouraghay, who was allegedly arrested for shouting "Allaho Akbar" on her rooftop, raped, disfigured and murdered. Her story spread over social networks, and she became a martyr for the Green Movement, but the story turned out to be a hoax. Evgeny Morozov points out that this story may have been a hoax propagated by the Iranian security forces itself and intended to be debunked in order to bring into question the legitimacy of further claims of police brutality.

Iranian security services made use of the internet during and after the protests as well. Officials sent out mass text messages warning Iranians in Tehran to

avoid street protests. Security personnel gathered the information of Iranians living abroad and threatened their relatives in Iran if they expressed support for the Green Revolution. After the protests, a special unit in the prosecutor's office was created to investigate and prosecute internet crimes, mostly regime critics. Regime officials have used information gathered online to find Iranian relatives of expatriate bloggers and harass them.¹⁸ Iranian officials have also used the online record of a person's contacts.

In one instance, immigration control officials questioning a woman travelling into Iran after the revolution and asked if she had a Facebook. Though she said no, the officers searched Facebook for her name, found her account, and noted the names of her friends. After the protests, security personnel searched the internet to gather publically available pictures and video of protests, publishing them online and asking the public for help in identifying the protesters. The police claimed that this type of identification helped with the arrest of at least 40 people. The Iranian experience lead Evgeny Morozov to make this claim: "if the dictator doesn't fall in the end, the benefits of social mobilization afforded by the internet are probably outweighed by its costs (i.e. the ease of tracking down dissidents – let alone organizers of the protests)."¹⁹

The example of Iran shows the internet's potential in a revolutionary context as well as its limitations and dangers. The internet's ability to spread information quickly and widely can benefit to those opposing dictators, as it makes it impossible for a government to engage in what Zeynep Tufekci calls "whack-a-protest."²⁰ In this model, a government responds to protests, which normally begin in limited geographic areas, with quarantine, expulsion of jour-

nalists, and violent repression. The government thus expends minimal resources to contain dissent. New media makes this tactic impossible. Protests will be immediately seen not only throughout the country, but around the world, turning what would once have been a short-lived, regional incident into a nationwide or transnational movement.

However, the internet's role in ground-level organization appears to be largely insignificant. The case of "Oxfordgirl" illustrates this well. Though a useful source for Westerners looking for information from Iran, she played an insignificant role in Tehran itself. Further, the internet poses risks to citizens, activists and protesters who leave extensive digital records that security forces can access as well as those who they are attempting to communicate with. Thus, new media could endanger dissidents should the regime remain in power.

LESSONS

Although the role of social media in conflict will be a critical factor in 21st century conflict, it is important to neither overstate its influence nor to assume that it will influence events the same way in every conflict. New technology offers tools that provide great power to the individual: the ability to share and publish information, the ability to organize people quickly and without great expense, and the ability to communicate instantaneously around the globe. However, the internet also provides powerful tools to governments with which to identify dissenters, track criminals and spread propaganda. The future of conflict will be shaped not only by technological improvements—such as cyber-censorship software or improved cyber

security for dissidents — but also by social patterns created by this new technology. Ultimately, one should not look to the technology but the way people use this technology. The internet will not set the world free, but people using the internet have new strategies and tactics available to further their political and societal goal.

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CHAPTER 11

THE MITIGATION OF CHILD SOLDIERING THROUGH TECHNOLOGICAL AND ALTERNATIVE MEANS

Ben Brandt

"It has long been understood that socialization into violence in youth creates a generation of violent adults, perpetuating a vicious cycle of instability within countries."¹ As of 2008, there were 300,000 reported child soldiers worldwide.² Children are the most susceptible to subjugation. They are the future and should be viewed as a priority for creating stability. The issue of ending child soldiering contains a myriad of interdependencies ranging from aspects such as government structure, economics and education. However, now more than ever with the undercurrents of a globalized world and particular advancements in military technology, this problem can be significantly reduced. This paper is not a panacea for the rampant child soldier problems. It merely seeks to highlight the current trend of child soldiering in countries experiencing civil strife, examines the reasoning behind why state and non-state actors target children, draws light on initiatives that have successfully lessened the number of child combatants and offers mitigation techniques for future peacekeeping forces. The intent is to provide peacekeepers and future military forces with a realistic view as opposed to a mainstream, ideological view.

Some scholars have made the argument that this topic is difficult to conceptualize given that the definition of childhood varies greatly between cultures. According to UNICEF, a child soldier is:

A child soldier is “any person under 18 years of age who is part of any kind of regular or irregular armed force or armed group in any capacity, including but not limited to cooks, porters, messengers, and anyone accompanying such groups, other than family members.”³

This paper limits the analysis of child soldiering to children performing combat roles in armed groups. In addition to these declarations, the use of children in conflict can be traced throughout centuries of history, potentially making a case that this is not a new trend. However, there are subtle, but key patterns emerging that will ultimately have major, inevitable effects on the future of stability within a country that has or is experiencing widespread child-soldiering.

According to a paper written by Stian Eisenträger, children who accompanied knights in medieval Europe were called *infante* and made up units called the *infanteria* (infantry).⁴ This story serves as proof that children have been a recognizable component of the battlefield for many centuries; however, their level of commitment and the ratio to which they are employed as combat soldiers have changed drastically in recent years. Vera Achvarina and Simon F. Reich, authors of “No Place to Hide: Refugees, Displaced Persons, and the Recruitment of Child Soldiers,” discovered that “child soldiers have become a principal component of military forces across Africa, Asia, and Latin America, and are playing an increasing strategically important role in the Middle East.”⁵ The study they conducted showed an increase in the ratio of child soldiers as time progressed (See Figure 1).⁶

Country and Conflict	Number of Combatants	Number of Child Soldiers	Ratio of Child Soldiers
Angola (1975-95)	194,000	8,000	4%
Burundi (1993-94)	50,000	5,000	10%
Uganda (1994-2002)	74,000	16,000	22%
Rwanda (1990-94)	70,000	17,500	25%
Sierra Leone (1991-2000)	45,000	10,000	25%
Angola (1996-2002)	72,500	20,000	28%
Democratic Republic of Congo (1996-2001)	72,000	20,000	28%
Mozambique (1976-92)	92,881	25,498	28%
Liberia (1989-96)	60,000	17,500	29%
Burundi (1995-99)	45,000	14,000	31%
Sudan (1993-2002)	40,000	15,700	39%
Liberia (2000-02)	40,000	21,000	53%

FIGURE 1: CHILD SOLDIERS: COUNTRIES,
CONFLICTS AND PERCENTAGES 1975-2002

Figure 1 clearly shows the increased ratio of child soldiers in combat units over the years. In some extreme cases, the ratio climbs over one fourth. Alarmingly, the ratio of child soldiers in Liberia increased to over 50 percent. The table illustrates that the number of child combatants used in warfare has severely increased. "Historically, child soldiers have been complementary to adult soldiers. What we have seen in several later armed conflicts is that children to a higher degree have been substitutes for adult soldiers."⁷

To address the key aspects of child soldiering, one has to understand why they are being recruited, abducted or volunteered for service. No situation is the same, thus the reasons for why children are targeted range widely. The Center for Emerging Threats and Opportunities (CETO) out of the Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory published a report in 2002 entitled *Child Soldiers: Implications for U.S. Forces*. The report states that children are vulnerable and easy targets because they are "a low cost way of generating forces."⁸ The report outlines detailed accounts of national militaries offering incentives such as early leaves and pro-

motions to soldiers who recruit children for military service. Generally, children are desired because they are seen as expendable fighters that will follow orders more willingly.⁹ Moreover, children tend to be “less inhibited, and are more vicious than their grown-up counterparts.”¹⁰ Furthermore, the report explains techniques used to recruit children. Children are typically abducted for military service from schools, internally displaced persons (IDP) camps and churches.¹¹ In many instances, they see joining a rebel group as an escape from economic hardships. Namely, these are areas where the general population does not have steady access to food, water or shelter. The recruiters then indoctrinate the children. Indoctrination is “the act of imbuing a child with a new worldview of a soldier.”¹² In some extreme cases, as seen in Sierra Leone, they are forced to kill family members, friends and teachers in their home villages.¹³ Ishmael Beah, a former child soldier in Sierra Leone, comments that when they were not fighting they were using drugs. These drugs would further facilitate the indoctrination process by “weakening their inhibitions.”¹⁴

The CETO report lays out other, wider facilitators of child soldiering such as failed states experiencing poverty, high orphan rates, proliferation of lighter weaponry and small arms transfer and trade. Overall, the aforementioned facilitators imply that failed states do not have the governmental infrastructure to enforce laws and protect civilians. Poverty seems to be the driving catalyst for children joining rebel forces.¹⁵ In addition to impoverished living conditions, orphans are at a higher risk of becoming combatants because they have no parental guidance or protection. In many countries, child soldiering is highly correlated with situations involving extreme poverty.¹⁶ Another

driving factor is the proliferation of modern lighter weapons that enable children to wield them with relative ease.¹⁷ Additionally, the influx of weaponry from neighboring countries facilitates acquisition.¹⁸ All of these contributing factors focus on the bigger picture. To address them holistically would likely require the international community to commit an unfeasible number of resources. These long-term solutions to the child soldiering problem would require initiatives that attack governmental structure and ameliorate systemic problems. So the idea is to look at smaller, more specific and more realistic goals that have the greatest potential for reducing the numbers of child combatants.

In order to advise future peacekeeping and stability operations, it is important to examine the geography and demographics of the area of operation. Afghanistan and Pakistan exemplify those challenges for countering child fighters. In their article, "The Relevance of Technology in Afghanistan" in the *Small Wars Journal*, three Colonels from both the Army and the Air Force describe Afghanistan's geography.

Afghanistan relies on decentralized government, no centralized rule of law, and predominantly tribal and religious clerical rule. Afghanistan is about the size of Texas...five times larger than Vietnam...mountainous, rugged, and arid. The high mountainous elevations greatly limit the performance of rotary wing aircraft, as well as slowing down the movement of dismounted infantrymen. Afghanistan's road system is tenuous at best...creates challenges for logistics and the movement of critical supplies.¹⁹

Similar to Afghanistan, Pakistan presents many similar geographical obstacles to monitoring their bor-

der with Afghanistan. Furthermore, both countries are politically and economically unstable, and the border region between the two countries is home to multiple languages and ethnic divisions.²⁰ "More than three million Afghans currently reside in Pakistan and, 19 percent are under the age of five. In Pakistan, 63 percent of the population is estimated to be under the age of 25."²¹ These figures hold significant implications for even greater instability in the future with a generation of indoctrinated and hurt children and young adults.

The UN General Assembly and Security Council released the report *Children and Armed Conflict* in April of 2011 highlighting areas of importance. They note that there were "reports of cross-border recruitment and use of children by armed opposition groups, including the Taliban, from both Pakistan and Afghanistan."²² The report explains that children are often used to transport explosives across the border of these two countries. In one particular instance, a thirteen-year-old boy was captured and detained for a period of two years within Pakistan for weapons training.²³ He would later participate in armed attacks against Khyber and Kharkhano before escaping to Kabul. While in Kabul, he was picked up by Afghan National Security Forces and placed in the Kabul Juvenile Rehabilitation Centre for "threatening national security."²⁴ Chris Jasparro corroborates these accounts in *Jane's Intelligence Review* reporting that U.S. intelligence officers within Afghanistan say the Taliban is recruiting a majority of children from the villages in border regions.²⁵ This region contains a large population of tribal communities with a high proportion of youth residents. According to statistics released by the Office of the Additional Inspector General of Police, North West Frontier Province (NWFP), they "are all

unemployed males between 15 and 28; 80 percent are unmarried; 70 percent are from tribal areas and few if any attended school past the age of 15.”²⁶

Addressing the issue of child soldiering requires insight into various tactics of mitigation through past examples. Instances include actions by the U.S. military, by the United Nations (UN) and by non-governmental organizations (NGOs). While the areas of operation may differ in geography and culture, the same basic principles and methods used remain the same. It is, however, important to highlight Chris Jasso's point on counterinsurgency efforts. “Winning the hearts and minds” of the locals to maintain peace and stability may prove unsuccessful in “areas where traditional systems have broken down.”²⁷ In those specific cases, alternative avenues must be offered.

In the 2006 *International Security* journal publication by Achvarina and Reich, empirical evidence points to internally displaced persons (IDP) camps as a source of major recruitment. Their journal's intent was to reject the perceptions concerning the importance of wider structural factors in influencing recruitment. According to them, these perceptions, namely poverty, orphan rates and small arms transfer only create “a surfeit of explanations, a lack of specificity, and difficulties with regard to operationalization.”²⁸ Typically, these reasons stem from anecdotal stories with no real testable evidence. Achvarina and Reich did extensive research on the subject of IDP recruitments through data samples, data testing and multiple regressions tests to give policymakers a higher level of utility in dealing with child soldier recruitment. Simply stated, there is a strong correlation between the level of access to IDP camps and the child combatant rates (See Figure 2).²⁹

Figure 1: The Relationship between Access to IDP Camps and Child Soldier Rates 1975-2003




FIGURE 2: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ACCESS TO IDP CAMPS AND CHILD SOLDIER RATES 1975-2003

Adequate protection of IDP camps including the use of blockades and security guard personnel are some of the points brought up in their journal. Primarily, it is the host nation's responsibility to provide security to IDP camps whether they are set up by various NGOs or by the host nation itself. However, there are instances when the U.S. military and UN peacekeepers can be included within that security context. These instances of negotiation might occur when there is a need for an increased security presence. For example, if there were a situation where a more powerful rebel group staged an attack on an IDP location, the U.S. military in command of that area of operation might step in to provide support to the existing security personnel.³⁰

To combat the recruitment of children as combat fighters, the military might consider conducting intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) missions over IDP camps. Realistically, the military and UN peacekeepers cannot be a ubiquitous force, especially in places like Afghanistan where the natural geography is already highly limiting. To maintain situational awareness over a wide area, forces have been relying on Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) for ISR missions. These systems are a force multiplier and aid in gaining intelligence over a tough terrain without putting lives at risk.³¹ They “provide greater visibility, surveillance, and target detection of the battlefield and would give soldiers an edge in situational awareness.”³² If the military were to focus a portion of its UAV missions around areas where there is an increased probability for child recruitment, they could better understand the tactical scenario. Monitoring IDP camp locations with UAVs would provide detailed video and picture feeds that troops could use to trace, locate and identify leadership among child terrorist groups.

The CETO report outlines the benefit of removing of adult leaders in child soldier units. “The center of gravity is the hold leaders have over the children; the key is to break that link. If the adult leaders are captured or killed, the children often disappear.”³³ If intelligence gains through UAV ISR missions are sufficient for action, troops could move in with greater precision and eliminate leadership. For this purpose, UAVs could be a highly practical tool in the enervation of child soldier recruitment.

According to an online source, the UN has recently deployed its first wave of UAVs.³⁴ Not much information has been released on this subject; however, it is

reported that the area of operation is within Haiti. Their use is limited to taking high-resolution pictures of camps and settlements surrounding earthquake recovery projects.³⁵ Future UN UAV deployments raise some concerns such as proper training, adequate funding and the loss of equipment to non-allies, but further examination of these concerns reaches beyond the extent of this paper. Since there are little to no reports or case studies on UAV missions commanded by the UN, it would be difficult to make suggestions for their future deployment.

Additionally, non-lethal weapons (NLWs) are considered an alternative means in the attenuation of child soldiering. To be clear, the intent of an NLW is “neither to kill nor to harm permanently” but to minimize casualties and damage to properties.³⁶ While the use of NLWs may be inappropriate for military units engaged in combat operations, the use of such devices should be considered when conducting stability tasks. These weapons can be highly effective in an environment where belligerents often intermingle with civilians. Special Forces General Wayne A. Downing states, “It’s kind of incongruous to be someplace on a peace-keeping mission and kill people.”³⁷ This statement aligns with the idea that NLWs may lessen both collateral damage and the effectiveness of terrorist groups to utilize public fear and propaganda campaigns.³⁸ If peacekeepers were to employ NLWs in a situation where they had to engage child soldiers, it would accomplish two major things: children would not be killed or permanently injured and the probability for negative propaganda would be significantly reduced. Attempting to “win the hearts and minds” of the host nation’s civilians is the preeminent goal of counterinsurgency operations (COIN). “COIN warfare is about

the minimum, not maximum, application of force.”³⁹ It is extremely difficult to find instances where NLWs such as bean bag projectiles, pepper spray or flash bangs have been used by peacekeepers. However, all of the above mentioned NLWs would work to immobilize a child soldier unit without killing them. If NLWs are employed in given areas of operation, proper training in the usage and the rules of engagement (ROE) is high on the priority list. Training will help to educate the peacekeepers on the effects and the extent to which they can use NLWs without causing permanent damage. It would be wise to incorporate training routines similar to how our military trains with CS gas (chloro-lenzylidene alononitrile). Subject soldiers to the NLW in a controlled environment so that they know the full effects to prevent overuse.⁴⁰ Stressing ROE in training, just like with lethal weapons, is important in developing a clear understanding on when to use NLWs. Using NLWs in a situation that does not warrant their employment could be considered tortuous and work against their overall intended goals of lessening collateral damage.⁴¹

The reintegration of child soldiers into their respective societies is a significant strategic objective. The Christian Children’s Fund, an NGO, used a “community empowerment approach” in Sierra Leone to bring children back in to the system.⁴² Community service has proven to be a primary motivator for re-integrating child soldiers back into civil society. Making them participate in projects like building schools or health posts while giving them compensation or a small stipend helped tremendously. After completing community service projects, children are often accepted back into their villages as people who could positively contribute.⁴³ For example, in Eastern Sudan

under the Eastern Sudan Peace Agreement (ESPA) ex-soldiers were screened through an Integration Committee to determine if they were fit for security work. Those who opted out of that screening or who were determined to be unfit were enrolled into the Demobilization Disarmament and Reintegration (DDR) program.⁴⁴ Successful DDR programs in Columbia could serve as a template for reintegration in places like Afghanistan and Pakistan. Under the UN's security sector reform (SSR) regulations, persons under the age of 18 are not allowed to work in the security realm.⁴⁵ Thus, ex-combatants from ages 15–17 are best suited for assisting their community in a non-security related field. An alternative to providing a stipend to children or young adults that has been gaining credence is supplying mobile phones. In 2010, the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) released a special report describe the positive implications of cellular use in Afghanistan. As of 2010, there were an estimated 13 million subscriptions for a total of 29 million citizens. The annual growth rate was estimated to be approximately 53 percent.⁴⁶ This approach has many benefits ranging from monetary transfer, land dispute resolutions and election monitoring.⁴⁷ However, cellular phones could also be used in conjunction with security goals. Locals know their villages and know where conflicts originate. Ex-combatant children could help with security gains by keeping their eyes and ears open to events and then relay those messages with a cell phone. It is essentially the same idea as community empowerment and involvement seen in the Sierra Leone example. Reintegrated former child soldiers could become an active tool for promoting peace and stability within their communities. Another benefit worth mentioning is the facilitation of positive outreach via cellu-

lar usage to ex-child soldiers, which is antonymous to the negative propaganda campaigns ran by local insurgents.⁴⁸ While young teens (ages 15–17) cannot actively participate in security tasks, they can still be a part of it by adding input, closing communication gaps and increasing community awareness.

Child soldiering is not just a problem facing academic scholars. It is an issue that has clear policy implications for the future. Peacekeepers and soldiers must also “deal with the complex dilemma of facing children on the battlefield” often without the clear intelligence warnings or training to help guide them.⁴⁹ While true in certain respects, this summarization of the child soldiering dilemma can be reformed. While the complete eradication of indoctrinated child soldiers is likely an impossible, lessons from the past coupled with specific uses in technology and alternative approaches to bolster community empowerment have the potential to successfully lessen the number of child combatants. The vicious cycle can be interrupted through realistic, actionable objectives. Ultimately, these paths to mitigation will erode facilitators and bring the potential for greater stability to regions both in the present and in the future.

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CHAPTER 12

THE DPJ AND THE “NEW ASIANISM”: THE LATEST EVOLUTION OF JAPAN’S FOREIGN POLICY Zach Ricchiuti

Scholars and policy-makers alike have struggled to define Japan’s defense strategy over the years. Some declare that Japan has no real strategy. Others state Japan’s strategy has been based on several factors including external threats and the safety and security of its economy. Most post-war strategists would agree that Japan’s ruling party during the post-war period, the Liberal Democratic Party of Japan (LDP), chose to support Prime Minister Yoshida in taking full advantage of America’s nuclear umbrella while stressing economic growth and development. In contrast, the Democratic Party of Japan’s (DPJ) policy of New Asianism represents a new direction for Japan in hopes to better align itself with its Asian neighbors while reformatting the alliance with the United States to be a more balanced alliance better tuned to the intricacies of the post-Cold War system of international politics.

This shift has been met with a variety of opinions, however, stretching from calls to end the U.S. presence of troops in Japan to continuing the status quo and even strengthening the U.S. agreement. What is clear is that the growth of this policy has stemmed from a variety of factors such as the stagnation of the Japanese economy and the rise of military threats in East Asia. The way in which Japan enacts this policy will have widespread ramifications on both sides of the Pacific. This shift in policy represents a major

change for Japan not only in the way that it sees itself as a world power, but also in how it interacts with its neighbors and its most important ally, the United States. Thus, the timing of Japan's first party shift in its short democratic history coinciding with a new grand strategy of foreign policy does leave questions to be asked. Specifically, why has the DPJ chosen this new policy and what will the effect of this vision be on Japan's foreign policy with regard to its neighbors and the U.S. alliance?

In order to understand Japan's New Asianism policy, it is necessary to mention the original "Asianism" and understand under what conditions it arose and whether that has any implications to the current policy the DPJ is undertaking. The original Asianism policy was first established by Koderia Kenkichi in 1916 in a book titled, *Treatise on Greater Asianism*, where he argued that the struggle between the white and yellow race would be the conflict of the future. Japan's successes in the first Sino-Japanese war in 1894-95 and the Russo-Japanese war in 1905 affirmed Japan's status as the strongest of the East Asian nations. Koderia argued that only through close Sino-Japanese cooperation, led of course by Japan, could Asia resist the advances of the West and continue to grow economically and culturally into a superior civilization.¹ Over time, Japan's delusion of power eventually led them to invade China and commit atrocities across the entire East and Southeast Asian regions.

The similarities between Japan's first policy of Asianism and its New Asianism policy lie in both ideas' commitment to reaffirming Japan's status as an Asian nation. During the Cold War, Japan kept largely quiet in terms of international presence, choosing to focus on economic development rather than establish-

ing itself as a regional force in a region that was still reeling from Japan's previous imperial endeavors. However, the DPJ has been careful in the implications of a policy signaling Japan's "return to Asia," due to the historical weight that such a term carries. Rather, the DPJ has been strong in signaling its commitment to apologizing for Japan's wartime crimes and in putting the historical controversies that previously marred Japan's diplomatic relations with its neighbors behind it.

The answer then to the question is that the DPJ's policy of New Asianism is their attempt at redefining Japan's role as a member of Asia and as a member of the U.S. alliance. Daniel Sneider and Richard Kartz first coined the term New Asianism in a *Foreign Policy* article titled, "The New Asianism." In it, they declare that in this policy, "the DPJ wants a paradigm shift in Japanese foreign policy, one which makes it a more equal partner to the United States and puts greater emphasis on Japan's ties to the rest of Asia, particularly China and South Korea."² In order for Japan to better address the current situation in Asia, where China is rising economically but also becoming more aggressive and belligerent and North Korea continues to be a threat, Japan must have a more flexible defense policy and a larger more balanced foreign policy framework that can deal with these problems.

The idea of a more flexible Japanese foreign policy is not a new one. In Michael Green's book, *Japan's Reluctant Realism*, he describes the evolution of Japanese foreign policy in the post-Cold War era. In this new era, he highlights four continuities of the Cold War period that Japan has continued to do and six new trends that should be watched over the next few years. The four continuities are 1) the centrality of the U.S. alliance to

foreign policy, 2) the primacy of economic tools, 3) continued constraints on the use of force, and 4) no alternate strategic vision.³ The six new trends that he introduces are 1) Japan's greater focus on the balance of power in East Asia, 2) substituting realism for idealism in foreign policy, 3) a higher sensitivity to security issues, 4) a more determined push for an independent foreign policy, 5) a focus on Asia, and 6) a more fluid foreign-policy making process. Through these new trends, Green argues that Japan is reluctantly becoming more realist in its foreign policy. On the continuities that he mentions, the DPJ has for the first time in Japan's foreign policy history given itself a clear strategic vision in terms of Japan's goals and directions. This vision is, of course, Japan's focus on establishing itself as a member of Asia while restructuring the U.S.-alliance into a more equal agreement. This links with the future trends that Green introduces, which align perfectly with the changes the DPJ have made to establish stronger ties to neighboring Asian countries, strengthening Japan's defense policy, and attempting to restructure the U.S. security treaty to a more equal one. The DPJ have crafted a so far successful policy vision of New Asianism that allows Japan to face the current global climate more proactively, expanding Japan's defense capabilities, restructuring the U.S. alliance and strengthening ties with China and other Asian neighbors to manage the balance of power in East Asia. Still, there is debate among scholars as to what instigated this change in policy and what kind of an effect Japan's shift to Asia could have on its relationship with the U.S.

As the Cold War has ended and with Japan is still reeling from the economic stagnation that began in the 1990s, other scholars believe that Japan has shaped a

new policy based on the changing international order. Kenneth Pyle states, "Repeatedly, through the course of 150 years of its modern history, each time the structure of the international system underwent fundamental change, Japan adopted its foreign policies to that changed order and restructured its internal organization to take care of it."⁴ The period after the Cold War, as Pyle states, was one where "Japanese leaders were gauging the trends, assessing the appropriateness of Japan's institutions to the new conditions, debating the consequences, and achieving a consensus on a new course for the nation."⁵ The economic recession can be viewed as yet another major event that has changed the landscape of the international arena. The decline of U.S. hegemony is a significant change, and Japan re-directed its foreign policy objectives to better deal with a world where it is not dependent on a declining power that can entangle it into its own growing problems. The restructuring of Japan's internal organization is key in this conversation. The DPJ's campaign promises of more open politics and a more trust-worthy government led to a radical change in a way that put politicians in the policy-making seat instead of bureaucrats.

This is not an uncommon view, with many other notable Asian scholars putting forth a similar idea in regards to Japanese foreign policy. According to Richard Samuels, a long-time Japanese and East Asia security scholar, "Since the seventeenth century, Japan has systematically aligned itself with what it perceived to be the world's most dominant power: the Netherlands, Great Britain, Germany, and the United States."⁶ This alignment has always been done to strategically ensure that Japan's military and economic well-being was secure and stable in the long-term. It seems then

that the U.S. can no longer be relied upon by Japan to provide both security and economic growth as a bilateral partner. Furthermore, the nature of the relationship means that Japan is constantly getting entangled into U.S. global affairs, which is why the new attempt by Japan to distance itself from its American alliance is a step to better appreciate the international system in which it is acting in. Samuels believes that Japan's shift in policy coincides with a shift in world power, from a U.S.-dominated global environment to one where China and several other countries are growing. The decline of the U.S. as a world power and its growing entanglements in the Middle East make the appearance of the DPJ's New Asianism seem right on cue with the traditional style of Japanese security policy. The dual nature of the DPJ's foreign policy declarations also explains this. Even before their victory in 2009, Yukio Hatoyama, in his now infamous New York Times op-ed article declared that, "I believe that the East Asian region, which is showing vitality, must be recognized as Japan's basic sphere of being."⁷ He also asked in that same piece, "How should Japan maintain its political and economic independence and protect its national interests when caught between the United States, which is fighting to retain its position as the world's dominant power, and China, which is seeking ways to become dominant."

Hatoyama's pre-victory proclamation perfectly sums up the intentions of the DPJ's New Asianism policy. By re-adjusting the nature of the U.S. security treaty, Japan can better deal with Asia as a growing power, both in its entirety and in individual countries such as China.

In addition to Samuels and Pyle, there are other scholars who believe that Japan's new direction stems

from a change in the international order. According to Yasuhiro Izumikawa, "For Japan, the end of the Cold War was followed by a deteriorating external security environment, marked by the rise of China and the development of nuclear weapons and missile capabilities by North Korea. This deterioration led to a heightened threat perception among the Japanese public."⁸ Furthermore, Izumikawa goes on to say that the continued evolution of these two threats has resulted in the increase in Japanese military spending and the need for a more independent defense policy to deal with these threats. Where Izumikawa differs though, is that he believes that the U.S. alliance will be more important than ever in these two conflicts. He believes that Japan should remain involved in U.S. military endeavors around the world; fulfilling their duty to the alliance should the U.S. ever have to fulfill its duty of protecting and supporting Japan against a regional threat.

Meanwhile, some scholars believe that the rise of the DPJ should herald not just a new era where Japan distances itself from U.S. entanglements, but that it should go even further and remove significant numbers of American troops from Okinawa and move to assert itself even more in the Asian community. George Packard, in his 2010 article commemorating the fifty-year-old security treaty, declared, "The U.S. government should respect Japan's desire to reduce the U.S. military presence on its territory, as it has respected the same desire on the part of Germany, South Korea, and the Philippines."⁹ Packard also interestingly brings up the point that the victory of the DPJ represents a shift in the domestic politics of Japan, where LDP politicians can no longer make decisions in secret. The new party will be far more subservient

to the public's will, and this will mean that the U.S. either has to respect Tokyo's ability to manage the Okinawan base issues or air their strategic reasoning behind maintaining such high troop levels. Packard believes that the unique composition of the DPJ, which counts an important number of its members from the old Socialist party in Japan, has led to a confrontational position between the U.S. and Japan over Okinawa and other security policies. This played an important role in getting the DPJ elected against the LDP, which means that relations between the ruling DPJ party and the U.S. will continue to stall in the future unless the U.S. changes its position on the bases. Packard presents a somewhat radical view here that the DPJ seeks to make major modifications to the nature of the U.S. alliance and to eventually move it to a position where bases are no longer a main part of the agreement. While DPJ leaders have hinted at this possibility, they have since come out and acknowledged that they have long given up on this hope.

In his work on the effects of the "American Empire," Chalmers Johnson argues a similar point of view, stating, "U.S. policy has a stranglehold on Japan that carries a huge cost to both the U.S. and its regional partners."¹⁰ Johnson decries the American policy toward the region as a whole, describing American policy towards Japan and how it has resulted in the paralysis of Japanese politics and its inability to effectively deal with its neighbors in establishing a true, post-Cold War system in East Asia. The rise of the DPJ itself and its subsequent stagnancy with regard to its dealings with the U.S. over base relocation tend to support this theory.

However, the DPJ struggles when dealing with China, as seen during the *Senkaku* islands crisis, and

requires continued U.S. support in putting together a cohesive North Korea defense policy. Chalmers fails to take this and the American assistance to countries such as Taiwan and South Korea into account when decrying the U.S. military's role in Asian politics and regional stability.

However not all scholars believe that Japan's change in policy will merit massive changes in the alliance with the U.S. Daniel Sneider, a well-known Japan expert and East Asia security analyst who has followed the rise of the DPJ in great detail, believes that the party's early disagreements with the U.S. stem from a fundamental misunderstanding on the side of the U.S. on what this change actually meant for Japanese policy and what the DPJ intended to do once it faced the realism of governing. According to Sneider, "The DPJ came to power determined to change not only the policies of the LDP but also the manner in which Japan had been governed. The party's central goal was to dismantle the collusive relationship between politicians and the government bureaucracy in all realms of public policy."¹¹ As Sneider later admits, the removal of this closed-door policymaking left Japanese policy much more sensitive to public pressures and demands. The failure on Hatoyama's part to successfully resolve the base issue on Okinawa eventually led to his public demise and resignation from the prime minister post. This explains why the DPJ has been forced to push hard against Washington's previous deals, which were struck between the Bush and LDP Koizumi administrations. With the fall of Hatoyama though, the DPJ has realized how it must manage the U.S. alliance and its intricacies. Fortunately, Obama's pivot to Asia has realigned many U.S. goals with Japanese goals. Specifically, Obama's

call for multi-lateral coordination in Asia goes in hand with the DPJ's policy, "The DPJ's focus on Asia, which clearly includes strengthening ties with countries such as India, Vietnam, and Australia, could contribute to creating a security structure in Asia that can cope with the rise of Chinese power."¹² Despite their initial disagreements, the U.S. and the DPJ will eventually learn to work around their differences, mainly by allowing Tokyo enough time to sort out its own policy direction, which is now much more subject to public demand.

As important as Asia will be in Japan's new foreign policy direction, strategic work with the United States will remain a fundamental part of Japanese defense policy, which the DPJ have specifically transformed more than any other aspect of foreign policy. Michael Green believes that there are three main reasons why Tokyo and Washington will remain essential partners. His first reason is historical precedent. His next reason for this is how regional factors will bind and define Japanese security options. The rise of China and North Korea's nuclear power make the U.S. alliance by far the best option to keeping Japan secure. The last reason for this is leadership. The new generation of leaders of the DPJ, while handicapped by a lack of political experience, is more than willing to push Japan's security capabilities forward. With every generation a step removed from the memories of Japan's war-time mentality, this latest generation is perhaps the most favorable and supportive of strengthening Japan's defense capabilities. This has been exactly what the U.S. has wanted for many years. To top off all of these three reasons, Green adds, "the painful experience of the DPJ in 2009-10 appears to have reinforced a broad consensus about where Japan's source of national power

lie and what successful political leadership entails.”¹³ The DPJ’s political mistakes are outweighed by the fact that it has learned through the experiences of the Senkaku Islands clash and the Tohoku Earthquake that despite the problems, the U.S. is still Japan’s most reliable ally.

There are, however, scholars that believe that the DPJ’s rise to power does not signal a marked change in Japanese security policy, but rather a change in the role that party politics plays in crafting security policy. In an article outlining the DPJ’s origins and its foreign policy goals, Easley, Kotani and Mori argue that while the DPJ may appear to have promoted drastic changes in security policy and in the U.S. alliance, the problems of actually governing successfully while implementing major change will prohibit the party’s main goals. On the issue of altering the alliance, they say, “If the DPJ were to take steps that strain the alliance, the LDP, Japanese bureaucracy, the Japanese media, the Obama administration, and even the Japanese public may harshly criticize the DPJ and demand that U.S.-Japan relations remain solid to deal with priorities ranging from the global economic recession to an aggressive North Korea.”¹⁴ In changing the way that Japanese policy is made and opening Japanese politics up to a second party, the DPJ actually made it more difficult for themselves to implement major policy changes. While the LDP enjoyed dominance over a political system that allowed them to enact policy unopposed and behind closed doors, the DPJ’s cries for more transparent policymaking and a more open system of party politics means that not only are they left wide open to criticism when things go wrong, but they also must still maintain control of the Diet and public support lest they lose seats to the LDP.

Easley, Kotani and Mori then argue that, "Under the cover that Obama is not Bush, the DPJ could express a greater desire to work with the Obama administration and essentially declare a more equal partnership with little substantial adjustment or cost."¹⁵ The base issues remain, but even on that stance, Tokyo has sent out extremely mixed signals.

THE U.S. ALLIANCE

In Izuru Narushima's 2007 action thriller, *Midnight Eagle*, he reveals the concern that both Japanese politicians and civilians have about the dangers that come with maintaining policies to that of Washington. In the film, a classified American stealth plane armed with nuclear weapons goes down over the Japanese Alps. In a race against North Korean agents, Japanese Special Forces must reach the bomb and secure it from falling into the hands of the North Koreans. When the fictional Prime Minister Watarase stresses that it is his job to keep Japan safe, journalist Keiko Arisawa replies with, "Is that why you stood by and let the Americans get us into this?" to which he responds, "I'm afraid there were a few things of which we were not informed."¹⁶ The message of the film is controversial and clear in its delivery that entrapment into American causes and policies around the world are putting Japan at danger for causes that do not directly involve Japan's national interest. Interestingly enough, the film ends when a joint U.S.-Japan operation calls for guided missile to be fired from an American submarine off the coast of Japan to destroy the stealth ship and the North Korean agents. While the movie's anti-American message is somewhat clear, there seems to be contradictory merit in the role that America could play in the defense of Japan.

The evolution of the DPJ's New Asianism policy is the product of a changing international system that Japan is adapting to. Japan's post-war foreign policy was based completely around its alliance with the United States and the economic benefits that it would bring. In the Cold-War system, Japan was allied to the United States against the Soviet Union and had a clear sense of purpose in the international community. Japan would act as the beacon of democracy in Asia and support a large American military presence to prevent the spread of Soviet influences in Asia. In doing so, Japan was able to build Japan's economic infrastructure from the ground up and secure access to valuable American markets, all while keeping defense spending low, relying on the American nuclear umbrella and the bilateral security treaty. According to Michael Green, the changes in the post-war system forced Japan to engage new challenges in the face of growing security threats in Asia alongside a decline in economic strength.¹⁷ Japan realized that it must take a far more strategic role in securing national interests such as resources and maritime rights from a defensive posture. The domestic victory of the Democratic Party of Japan, who ran under promises of a more autonomous role for Japan within the U.S.-Japan alliance as well as a return to Asia, was a major sign that Japan's reluctant realism was about to take a step forward.

Seiji Maehara, the former Minister for Foreign Affairs has been specific in analyzing where the U.S.-Japan alliance exists within the DPJ's new framework of foreign policy, "What we want for the U.S. is to get together — the U.S., China, Japan, and Korea — to build a system of co-governance, *Ni-chu-bei-kan*."¹⁸ If the U.S. was to engage in more multilateral conversations

within the East Asia region, that could give Japan the necessary freedom to still regard the U.S. alliance as central to its diplomacy while remaining free of burdens that come with restrictive bilateral relations, such as the burden of bases and support for U.S. military operations abroad.

The alliance with the United States has always been a contentious issue whenever international conflicts have arisen. In his book titled, *The Theories of the Security Treaty*, Toyoshita Narahiko, a law professor from Kansai Graduate University, outlines the four major problems of the security treaty. The first problem he calls the Theory of Occupation. He outlines the burden that Japan bears in supporting such a large U.S. military presence on mainland and Okinawan soil. The next theory, "One-sided obligation theory," exposes the lack of responsibility on Japan's side of the treaty to come to the aid of the U.S. if it needs military assistance. The treaty clearly states the U.S.' obligation to defend Japan, but in the current global climate, it is wrong for Japan to have no legal obligation to provide aid for the U.S. The third theory is the Theory of Self-Purpose, which explains how it is difficult for Japan to assume its own identity in policy because it is so often supportive of U.S.-favored actions. The last theory is the Illusion of Independence Theory, which means that although Japan is a sovereign nation, much like the previous theory, it is often viewed as America's junior partner, and this hurts Japan's standing in the international arena.

Looking through these four theories, it could be argued that the DPJ has at least attempted to address these four major flaws in the security treaty. Negotiations over the Futenma base relocation have paused, but Prime Minister Noda and Defense Minister Naoki

Tanaka recently reached a major breakthrough in talks over the alignment of U.S. forces in the region¹⁹. The strategic importance of Okinawa should not be understated. This move to separate the initial agreement into two parts represents not only an acknowledgement on both sides that the alliance had to make a strategic change to address the current instabilities of the region but also an acknowledgement on the U.S. side for one of the first times in the alliance's history that the U.S. must more closely heed the Japanese public's demand for a change in the troop presence on Okinawa.

After World War II, the U.S. quickly acknowledged the strategic significance of Okinawa. Okinawa's distance from a variety of trouble spots such as the Korean peninsula and the Taiwan Strait makes it an ideal location for American troops to deploy from, and the variety of military capabilities on the island make it strategically viable to respond to a number of threats throughout the region. However, the domestic demands of the Okinawans and the running platform of the DPJ have signaled a need to refocus the number of troops and the manner in which the bi-lateral relationship utilizes Okinawa.

The new agreement reached by the U.S. and Japan has five major components that all serve to strengthen the alliance and regional security. The first component is the unit composition in Guam and Okinawa.²⁰ This shifting of approximately 9,000 marines from Okinawa to Guam and a variety of other positions in the Asian region is the acknowledgement of the DPJ's need for a response to domestic pressures and also a strategic shift on the U.S.'s part to place a more balanced presence of force throughout the region. The second component is the sustained financial commitment from the Japanese

government in financing this move. With an overall cost of \$8.6 billion, a Japanese pledge of \$3.1 billion is a significant contribution. The third component of this new agreement is the possibilities now created to build the relationship between the United States military and the Japanese Self-Defense Forces. In participating in this movement of troops, Japan reached an agreement with the U.S. to look into the possibility of developing shared-use facilities on Guam and on the Commonwealth of Northern Mariana Islands. This represents advancement in operational relationship between both militaries and is a sign that the alliance is truly developing into a more equal and balanced one. The fourth component is an agreement on both sides to remain committed to relocating the Futenma base to Henoko, but on a timetable created by the Japanese government. According to a senior official in the Pentagon, "the agreement reaffirms our commitment to the Futenma replacement facility at Camp Schwab, but at the same time it gives the government of Japan the political space that it needs to advance the issue on Okinawa."²¹ The fifth component is an acknowledgment that the agreement will improve the sustainability of U.S. forces on Okinawa by reducing the actual presence of Marines on the island and also offering in the near-future land returns as a down payment to the Okinawans.

After the massive Tohoku Earthquake and subsequent tsunami and nuclear disaster, Operation Tomodachi, a U.S. mission to provide aid in disaster regions provided another example of how U.S. forces could be successfully deployed in response to emergency situations. Directly after the earthquake hit, U.S. helicopters flying out of U.S. bases on Japan's main island delivered 1,500 pounds of rice and bread to people in disas-

ter hit areas, all within two days of the earthquake.²² The variety of air and sea forces stationed around Japan made it operationally very easy to quickly respond and transport humanitarian and rescue aid to the affected areas. More importantly perhaps, though, was the cultural and personal relationships that had already been established through high-level contacts in the military. While Operation Tomodachi does not represent the typical security threat that U.S. forces are meant to deter by being stationed on Okinawa, it does offer an example as to the benefits of maintaining forces in Japan and the benefits of close military relationships in non-combat and potentially combat emergencies.

The DPJ has made more progress in advancing the U.S.-alliance than any other political party in Japan's history. The firm stance initially taken by the DPJ made many in Washington nervous, and several onlookers of the alliance believed that the DPJ would prove difficult to work with on many of these issues, choosing to instead look to Asia for Japan's partners. With this latest agreement, the DPJ have largely put that assumption to bed, and not only have they won a domestic political victory in moving troops from Okinawa, but strategically they have pushed the alliance forward for two reasons. The first being the now broader presence that the U.S. will enjoy throughout Asia, and the second being the possibilities for joint-operations on Guam. The new security realities in Asia, specifically in the Southwest China Sea, where countries such as Indonesia, Vietnam, Malaysia and Taiwan all have disputes with China over territory, mean that the U.S. can better project security and deterrents in this area by having a more flexible and rotational force in Australia, Singapore, and the Philippines. The Japanese

Self-Defense Forces will, however, still be able to increase their operational capabilities defending Japan and its interests by continuing to work closely with U.S. forces at a potentially shared facility in Guam.

THE CHINA STANCE

The DPJ's stance toward China has always been that of a strategic partner. The DPJ's first Prime Minister, Hatoyama, was viewed favorably in China and the DPJ in general ran on strong messages of trying to strengthen Japan's ties with its Asian neighbors, including China. One of the most important developments that the DPJ has brought with its rise to power is its unequivocal condemnation of any sort of war-time revisionism and failures on Japan's part to respect its history of aggression. The DPJ has even gone so far as to propose a jointly written history textbook between China, South Korea and Japan that, if agreed upon, could standardize the historical accounts from all three countries.²³ The banishing of Japan's past demons is essential if Japan ever wants to engage in consistent, healthy multilateral relations with its Asian neighbors and is one of the DPJ's major successes.

In addition to retaining a consistent apologetic stance on Japan's history, the DPJ also started their control of government on a strong pro-China stance. In December 2007, before the DPJ even took power, Ichiro Ozawa, then the DPJ party secretary lead a delegation of 45 DPJ National Diet members and 390 other general participants to China, and then in 2009 proceeded to take the largest ever delegation to China consisting of 143 Diet members and 496 general participants.²⁴ Despite the DPJ's strong overtures to China, the *Senkaku* incident in late 2010 complicated Japan's

stance towards China and forced it into rethinking just how easy a partner China would be.

In the immediate aftermath of the *Senkaku* incident, the DPJ was faced with enormous pressure from within its own ranks and from China's embargo on vital rare earths exports, which caused them to release the Chinese captain and also perceived to be "scrambling to restore dialogue with China."²⁵ The DPJ quickly received assurance from Secretary of State Clinton and Secretary of Defense Gates that the *Senkaku* islands were covered by the bilateral security treaty, which showed at the time just how nervous the DPJ had become over escalating tensions. It could be argued that this represents a failure of the DPJ to successfully create a strategic partnership with China, and that even more troublingly, the DPJ retreated back into the LDP's stance of relying on American support to balance China. Rather than a direct failure, this incident should rather be viewed as a learning experience for the DPJ and as an affirmation of how Japan should in the future utilize its strategic partners in dealing with China.

In addition to the U.S., the DPJ has made several other advances in security relationships with countries surrounding China, more specifically countries that also share Japan's security worries of a rising militant China. The DPJ signed an Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement with Australia that would add onto the initial 2007 security agreement, allowing more fluid and quick information sharing to take place between both governments.²⁶ The DPJ has also initiated bilateral naval exercises with India and expanded bilateral security relationships with both Vietnam and the Philippines.²⁷ This policy of hedging, which can be defined as "to maximize one's own security by diver-

sifying security affiliations,” can be applied to Japan’s general strategy of dealing with China.²⁸

The nature of both Japan and China’s vulnerabilities have also lead to increased tensions, with both nations heavily reliant on energy imports and the securing of natural resources, which have led to a number of regional disputes over seas and islands. In Japan’s 2010 defense policy papers, China’s increased military spending was earmarked as “a matter of concern both for the region and the international community.”²⁹ The DPJ outraged Beijing even further when in May 2011, DPJ-led governments named 10 uninhabited islands in Japanese territorial waters, and then in March 2012 named another 39 islands, including the *Senkaku* islands.³⁰ On the other hand, the DPJ have maintained an open hand towards cooperation with China, as seen by the implementation of a hotline, which could link Tokyo and Beijing if a crisis were to suddenly emerge. According to Azuma Koshiishi, the Secretary-General of the DPJ, “We are preparing to communicate with governments accurately through various channels over the issue of the disputed Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands) and possible launch of a missile by North Korea.”³¹ Although Japan’s defense policy makers still regard China’s military spending and aggressive territorial claims as a threat, politicians of the DPJ have, by putting the history controversies completely behind them, allowed for a potential relationship between Beijing and Tokyo to improve. By hedging China with security agreements with various other countries, the DPJ have put together a moderately successful framework in place for Japan to address its own security needs while also attempting to improve relations with China.

IMPROVING JAPAN'S NATIONAL SECURITY

In the National Defense Guidelines of Japan, issued in 2010, the Ministry of Defense declares that there are three basic principles to Japan's security policy. The three are 1) to prevent any threat from directly reaching Japan and to eliminate external threats that have reached it so as to minimize ensuing damage, 2) prevent threats from emerging by further stabilizing the security environment in the Asia-Pacific region and by improving the global security environment, and 3) to contribute to creating global peace and stability and secure human security.³² While admittedly it is a stretch to call Japan's defense strategy as belligerent, the shift in recent years has led Japan to undergo reform specifically in the framework in which Japan can take action to defend itself. This new framework is called dynamic defense. According to Sheila Smith, in this new military posture, "Gone is the old idea that Japan should simply maintain a basic defense posture that could be ramped up if and when a threat should appear."³³ Japan's ability to fluidly adapt to quickly changing environments is essential to Japan being able to react to escalating situations, most specifically Chinese advances in naval technology and North Korean rocket launches. Legally, these new guidelines also allow Japan to enjoy more flexibility in other aspects of their restrictions on military action. With this new "dynamic defense," "Tokyo henceforth reserves the right to increase its defense budget beyond one cent of its GDP, should the security environment and security situation call for such an increase."³⁴ This is an enormous step for Japan, and in enabling the government to flexibly adjust its defense budget depending on the escalation of a security situation, Japan is able to more

effectively control its military readiness and capabilities in the face of a national threat.

The recent controversy over North Korea's missile launch, which took place in April of 2012, sent Japanese defense experts to work, quickly putting together a plan that would involve deploying Patriot surface-to-air missile batteries in Okinawa, where the missile will supposedly pass, and in Tokyo, where it represents a risk to the large population there.³⁵ While the U.S. repeatedly denounced the launchings, it was mainly left to Japan to provide adequate defense for both Tokyo and Okinawa, the location of America's largest military presence in East Asia. Fortunately, the missile failed and dropped into the ocean minutes after take-off, but this is an example of the Japanese government acknowledging a perceived threat and adjusting its defense strategy accordingly, taking initiatives to arm itself with advanced weaponry despite the presence of American military on Japan. Moving forward, analysts are predicting that North Korea will also launch some sort of nuclear test in response to the missile's failure, much like they did in 2009 when another missile launch failed.³⁶ In a press conference with defense minister Naoki Tanaka, Tanaka claimed that in response to the missile failure, Japan would continue to work closely with the U.S. every step of the way to make sure both sides are kept up to date.³⁷ With the threat of a nuclear launch still on the table, the minister also made it clear that it was a "joint coordinated effort between Japan and the U.S."³⁸ With the continued threat, Japan's new defense capabilities are important, but more important may be the continued direction of ensuring the alliance moves forward on equal footing.

Aside from increasing Japan's own operational abilities to defend itself, the DPJ have also broadened Japan's ability to cooperate with other countries in joint military and economic endeavors. This diversification of security arrangements will also serve the purpose of increasing Japan's defense capabilities. Japan has looked to strengthen its ties with countries other than the United States. On April 10th, Prime Minister Noda met with British Prime Minister David Cameron to announce a joint weapons development project between Japan and the United Kingdom.³⁹ Along with weapons development, British architecture and nuclear industry executives also made the trip. England is currently decommissioning several of its own nuclear plants, making it an ideal partner to help Japan with the continued work going on at the Fukushima plant. They also discussed progress on a potential free trade agreement between Japan and the European Union. Without the change in defense policy that the DPJ enacted, Japan would have been unable to undertake this or the agreement with the U.S. due to Japan's former ban on exporting arms. While ideologically this may seem like a troubling shift for many Japanese who retain the strong idea of pacifism, realistically, strengthening Japan's ties with Britain and other European countries, many of whom are major trading partners, will be beneficial to Japan's industry and economy in the long run.

Establishing strong relations with Asian countries was a major policy objective of the DPJ when they were running for power and even now as they govern today. With regard to its neighbors, "Japan must redress its dependence on the U.S.-Japan bilateral relationship, not by weakening or abandoning the alliance but by moving to develop a broader set of complemen-

tary and counterbalancing international ties and by exploiting the opportunities of emerging multipolarity.”⁴⁰ One example of this is the recent Japan-Russia joint project Vladivostok, where the proposed natural gas plant could supply as much as 15% of Japan’s energy imports.⁴¹ Despite the controversial nature of Russia’s occupation of four Japanese-claimed islands off Hokkaido, Japan has gone ahead and supported a plan that would secure vital natural resources. There are still members of the DPJ who oppose relying on Russia for energy security, but leaders in the party stress that establishing energy relations such as this one are vital to Japan’s national security as well as improving relations with neighboring countries.

The DPJ is also well known for its continued support of a historically LDP-supported idea, which is an East Asia Community. Hatoyama and following DPJ leaders have stressed the importance of East Asian multilateral organizations, and the DPJ has continuously stressed support for the pan-Pacific APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation) conference and the East Asia Summit (EAS), which also includes Russia and the United States.⁴² Other leaders such as Maehara have also argued the importance of regional integration through the ASEAN+3 mechanism, which includes ASEAN countries and China, Japan and South Korea. The idea behind these institutions is that they all vary in their make-up, with the U.S. and Russia involved in some, and all have different functions. Some focus more on economic growth and coordination while others focus more on security dialogue. The DPJ acknowledges candidly the strength of China against the decline of Japan and has chosen to pursue these organizations precisely because they can help Japan avoid being in the middle of an American and

Chinese race for Asian hegemony. Through these layered institutions, Japan can engage in multiparty talks that avoid the Cold War style of national rivalries that the current situation in Asia could potentially lead to.

These multiparty talks allow Japan to engage in much needed economic and security conversations with countries such as China that it would struggle to deal with bi-laterally. Japan's uses of these multi-lateral forums have come over the years at different times, depending on what the DPJ's goals were. For example, when Japan clashed with China over the *Senkaku* Islands dispute, the DPJ did not turn to the EAS or ASEAN to resolve the dispute. Rather they turned to their bilateral alliance with the U.S., which quickly reassured Japan, much to China's annoyance that it would come to Japan's aid over any disputes regarding the *Senkaku* Islands. But these multilateral institutions do have use for Japan, notably economically and in making sure that no one country such as China exerts a major influence over regional policies. Japan's position as the strongest economy in Asia is gone with China having replaced it. Thusly, according to T.J. Pempel, "this economic slowdown has combined with external changes to drive Japan in two rather separate directions – greater economic engagement with an emerging Asian regionalism on the one hand, and greater reliance on its military ties to the United States and reluctance to embrace security multilateralism on the other."⁴³

In other words, the DPJ have used multilateral organizations to strengthen ties with Asian countries while supplementing areas where multilateral cooperation is not in Japan's interest, such as defense, with its existing bilateral arrangements. For example, the ASEAN+3, or APT, which consists of China, South

Korea, and Japan, excludes the United States, and talks have gone on so far in each of the three countries where they have attempted to resolve common issues and even “work toward a common investment treaty and a free trade agreement.” The DPJ’s initial broad calls for multilateralism have therefore come at times when it has been convenient and in Japan’s economic and security interests.

CONCLUSION

The DPJ’s foreign policy of New Asianism, which initially stressed Japan’s commitment to establishing ties with Asia and restructuring the U.S.-alliance, has been largely a success. With the rise of new challenges and external threats in the East Asian region, the DPJ was forced to craft a new vision that would allow Japan to better deal with security threats while still finding a place within that vision for the U.S.-alliance. In its short rule since 2009, the DPJ have attempted to make the U.S. alliance more equal by pushing for the relocation of troops from Okinawa and also by expanding Japan’s own defense capabilities. In doing so, Japan is better suited to defending itself against external threats from North Korea and a more militarized China. On the other hand, the DPJ have put Japan’s wartime history behind them and attempted to strengthen relationships with other Asian countries. While relations with China have been rocky at best, Japan has avoided becoming overtly confrontational with China by confronting its wartime past but still staying firm in its territorial claims on the *Senkaku* Islands and its surrounding waters. The DPJ has also expanded Japan’s ability to export arms to NATO allies and countries such as Britain, thus diversifying

Japan's security and economic relationships in developing and exporting military technology. In moving the U.S. alliance forward, advancing Japan's defense capabilities and providing a new framework for Japan to engage with Asian allies and neighbors, the DPJ has put in place a coherent policy that will allow Japan to identify and strategically deal with the more complicated variety of external threats it now faces.

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SECTION IV:
HISTORY OF THE PEACEKEEPING AND STABILITY
OPERATIONS INSTITUTE AND RECENT PROJECTS

CHAPTER 13

THE EARLY YEARS: A HISTORY OF THE U.S. ARMY PEACEKEEPING INSTITUTE

Michael Bruno and Jason Kring

With the fall of the Soviet Union, the modern world entered uncharted territory, and the United States Army, an organization that had spent the past 40 years creating strategy, policy and training to fight a two-front war against another conventional force, did so even more. With this power vacuum leaving the United States the sole superpower, the mission of its Armed Forces would have to change to prepare for the next unpredictable challenge. One of those challenges, the humanitarian aid and peacekeeping effort in Somalia, came crashing into the world headfirst in 1992. This type of operation, called Military Operations Other than War (MOOTW), was greeted with mostly apprehension from most senior military officials. The military saw these types of missions as an exception rather than a common mission of the Army for the future. Others, especially General Gordon Sullivan, the Chief of Staff of the Army, saw them as a foreshadowing the missions that the United States would, more often than not, be engaged in.

General Sullivan was a man who looked to the future; he took steps to ensure that the Army's War College was a modern college.¹ He wanted the U.S. Army War College (USAWC) to be in step with other colleges across the nation both in terms of technological advancement and college management. In 1992, Major General William Stofft and General Sullivan began discussing the subject of peacekeeping. Intrigued and driven to find out more about the subject, they

reached out to organizations such as the United Nations, the Department of State and the Office of the Secretary of Defense.² After conducting some initial research, they found the subject to be insufficiently studied and embraced, especially in upper-level Army echelons. General Sullivan called General Stofft and said, “Look, we didn’t find a perfect answer and I am not getting much interest around the *Staff* on this. Why don’t you get some folks together, write a charter for me to look at and get on with it. The place to do it is at my college.”³

Coincidentally, a few days later Ambassador Madeline Albright wrote to General Stofft and General Sullivan about Colonel Karl Farris, U.S. Army, who was doing great work with the UN mission in Cambodia.⁴ General Stofft contacted Colonel Farris and asked if he would like to help him create a peacekeeping institute within the Center for Strategic Leadership at USAWC. As Colonel (Ret) Farris recalls, General Stofft asked him to prepare a charter for the Peacekeeping Institute to be sent to General Sullivan for approval.⁵ Farris recalls preparing a charter that called for the institute to:

- 1) Instruct U.S. Army War College Students on peacekeeping

- 2) Build relationships and maintain close contact with the diverse community that deploys to complex emergencies (e.g. UN, IOs, Donor Nation Agencies and NGOs) with the intention that the U.S. military, when deployed, was one part of a multi-component response element and thus viewed as a member of the team

- 3) Use the staff at PKI as the foundation for a deployable civil-military operations center for any joint task force preparing to deploy on a peacekeeping mission⁶

Farris remembers that at the time his thoughts were that regular contact with diverse organizations would carry over when co-deployed and make “coordination-cooperation-consensus” much easier in the early days of a crisis when fog-of-relief rules. Then, after a period of time, when cooperation and coordination processes were worked out, the joint task forces normally assigned to the reserve-component civil affairs unit could assume the leadership of the civil-military operations center and of civil-military coordination. He received a note back from General Sullivan, by way of General Stofft, that this was “exactly what he wanted.”⁷

General Stofft wanted the Institute to study, write, confer and coordinate with organizations such as the Department of State, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and NGOs by studying topics such as negotiations, joint-planning and operations in peacekeeping.⁸ With that, General Stofft approached the creation of U.S. Army Peacekeeping Institute (PKI) with extreme haste. By December of 1992, a charter was written, and by July 1993 PKI was functioning with Colonel Farris as its first director.

In a memorandum designed to explain the purpose, vision and expected costs of PKI to Lieutenant General John Tilelli (at the time the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans (DCSOP) i.e. one of the people responsible for the future vision in the Army) in order to secure funds, the mission of the PKI was explained to be two-fold. One mission was internal, designed to support the USAWC curriculum, and one was external that would focus on supporting the senior leaders of the Army and combatant commanders on peacekeeping operations.⁹ The official concept of PKI was to create an institute for the study of peace

operations at the strategic and high operational levels that worked with other U.S. agencies and international organizations to become “the preeminent center for the study of the application of military force for peaceful purposes.”¹⁰ The overall mission statement of the United States Army Peacekeeping Institute at the time of its conception was as follows:

“Study and confer on the strategic and operational implications of peace operations; develop peace operations concepts and doctrine in support of the senior leadership of the U.S. Army, the Army War [C]ollege, and the combatant commanders. Refine the application of land power in peace operations at the UN, interagency, joint, and combined levels through the use of studies, conferences, simulations, courses, exercises and war-games.”¹¹

General Stofft identified a mission that had a specific set of objectives:

- 1) To teach three negotiation skills seminars a year in order to teach senior-level leaders negotiation skills for the conduct of peacekeeping operations.

- 2) Develop a negotiations sub-course for the USAWC core curriculum and provide instruction to the faculty to ensure uniformity in its presentation.

- 3) Teach a USAWC advanced course to selected students on negotiation skills for peacekeeping operations.

- 4) Teach a USAWC advanced course to selected students on peacekeeping operations.

- 5) Host an annual International Peacekeeping Conference, the purpose of which will be to collect and exchange information regarding the application of landpower in peace support operations at the United Nations, interagency, joint and combined levels.

6) Provide general officer training on an as required basis to flag officers needing upkeep training prior to an assignment requiring peacekeeping or negotiations skills.

7) Provide a mobile tactical trainer capability for colonels and general officers of units designated to perform peacekeeping operations.

8) Publish a quarterly peacekeeping operations bulletin that provides up-to-date information regarding doctrine, techniques, skills and ideas applicable to the senior-leader level of peacekeeping operations.

9) Work with other armies and the United nations on peace operations training, doctrine and leader development.¹²

In an attempt to fulfill one of its core objectives, PKI designed a course teaching strategic policy and decisionmaking in peace operations that was taught at the USAWC beginning in the spring of 1994. In the spring of 1995, PKI added a second course teaching how to negotiate strategy and process.¹³ On occasion, PKI staff would offer classes on negotiating to commanders who were preparing to deploy on peacekeeping operations around the world.¹⁴ As the reputation of PKI as an expert on peacekeeping operations grew and spread through the Army, more and more commanders requested information and guidance from the institute.

By October of 1994, commanders were frequently requesting information on peacekeeping from PKI, for example, one unit commander requested all pertinent information regarding which NGOs would be in country and requested information on the host nation's ministries and activities in Haiti before the unit was deployed.¹⁵ The charter that General Sullivan request-

ed reiterated the mission of PKI at USAWC, "Provide capability within the Army to examine strategic and operational issues supporting the Army's participation in peace operations."¹⁶ It goes further to state that the institute will conduct its own research and, "Monitor, assimilate, and adapt for Army use, peace operations research conducted by other services, academe, government agencies, and other countries."¹⁷

The final step in making PKI a reality was securing funds and developing a personnel strategy. General Stofft approached Lieutenant General Tilelli to secure funding for the institute for Fiscal Year 1994.¹⁸ At the activation of the institute, there was one civilian position with a US\$ 30,000 salary for five months that was the largest part of the Fiscal Year 1993 Institute budget, which totaled 77,000 dollars.¹⁹ The following year, a proposal was made for two additional civilian employees, and, officially, three military personnel for a total of six. The projected budget for Fiscal Year 1994 was US\$ 300,000, which included 24 trips, office materials and the first annual conference.²⁰ Within the year, the personnel were expanded to 13 operators, most importantly, to include special staff. The staff included a Foreign Service Officer on loan from the Department of State, a clear reflection of the respect and importance placed on the new institute by outside organizations; a Civil Affairs Officer; a Psychological Operations Officer and a Staff Judge Advocate Officer.²¹ These billets were added to PKI because each billet represents an integral part of peacekeeping principles; these specialties offer important insight to different arenas of the battle space. With the approval and funding for the institute secured, PKI continued to fulfill its mission as defined by its original charter and mission statement.

One of the first projects of PKI was the Somalia After-Action Report (AAR), where Lieutenant General Thomas Montgomery came to Carlisle to debrief the situation.²² From that point forward, every Army commander who conducted a peacekeeping operation was required to come to Carlisle and do an after-action report with the institute. General Montgomery had requested help from General Stofft with peacekeeping and documentation of the operation in Somalia. While the tragic events of the Battle of Mogadishu gave the United States a flashback to Vietnam, a long, drawn-out war where national treasure and blood were spent for no tangible victory, the United States was extensively involved with what Max Boot famously coined, "Savage Wars of Peace." The after-action report was one of many tools that the Army began to develop in order to become more effective in this realm of war-fighting.

The purpose of the after action report's was to examine the mission for strategic, operational and tactical implications for the Army of peace and humanitarian missions. The first after-action report for operation in Somalia, OPERATION CONTINUE HOPE, focused on a wide range of issues, from studying the impact of national policy-level decisionmaking on military operations in the field to coalition command and control to interagency coordination and cooperation.²³

The Rwanda peacekeeping mission, OPERATION SUPPORT HOPE, followed the one in Somalia and its after-action report studied the operational and strategic implications of Army involvement helping in a humanitarian assistance operation.²⁴ PKI was the civil-military operations center lead for the joint task force deployed to Rwanda in July 1994. There Colonel Farris was appointed overall head of civilian-military

coordination and established three civil-military operations centers at Entebbe, Kigali and Goma. The leadership was eventually turned over to reserve-component civil affairs units.

The United States was also involved with many peacekeeping and humanitarian aid efforts, which were vastly different from conventional Armed forces doctrine and operational activities. PKI continued its trend of producing excellent lessons learned in after-action reports in Haiti, OPERATION UPHOLD DEMOCRACY, and Bosnia-Herzegovina, OPERATION JOINT ENDEAVOR.²⁵ Common lessons learned across those peacekeeping and humanitarian aid operations included the complexities of interagency cooperation, the difficulties coordinating with NGOs and international organizations, and the intricacies of how the Army fits into peacekeeping operations.²⁶

Each year from 1994 through 2002, PKI held the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staffs (CJCS) Peace Operations Seminar.²⁷ The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff asked the Army to serve as the executive agent for the operation, as Combatant Commanders had requested more information and preparation for humanitarian aid and peacekeeping missions.²⁸ The purpose of the CJCS Seminar was to provide an open forum for flag officers to polish and develop their knowledge and understanding of peacekeeping and humanitarian aid operations at the strategic level. Each year it took on specific roles and involved international and interagency officials as participants. For example, the 1997 CJCS Seminar concentrated on sustainable security and military support to civil operations, with officials from the United Kingdom, the United Nations, the Department of State and the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance participating.²⁹

In 1995, the CJCS Seminar concentrated on “harmonizing the effort” of the humanitarian, political and military components in “complex emergencies.”³⁰ The findings of the exercise were published in the after-action review of the CJCS Seminar each year. In 1996, the CJCS Seminar focused on civil-military interagency operations and cooperation,³¹ while the next year’s CJCS Seminar was a conference on creating sustainable security in peacekeeping operations and military support to civil operations.³²

In summary, from 1994 through 1997, PKI conducted many after-action reports that were invaluable to the combatant commanders around the globe who had to conduct peacekeeping operations. During this time, PKI also published doctrine, training manuals and other documents that contributed greatly to the advancement of the Army in the peacekeeping field of operations.³³

PKI was the sponsor of the *U.N. PeaceKeeper’s Handbook* and led the rewrite for Chapter VI, Communications, and Chapter VII, Logistics.³⁴ It began a cooperative initiative with the United States Institute of Peace to “...harmonize the political, humanitarian, and military efforts that are combined to remedy complex emergencies...” called the TRIAD Integration Initiative.³⁵ The project worked with multinational organizations to identify and define the problems that impede cooperation and developed joint analysis of potential methods to improve cooperation and ways to implement agreed upon cooperation methods.³⁶

Early in its tenure, the institute began working on a long-term project, the Peace Operations Library and Information Integration Project, a high priority mission with the intent of receiving, archiving and sending information about peace operations, especially

doctrine, training, education and portfolios on potential geographic hot spots.³⁷ PKI was also a founding member of the International Forum for the Challenges of Peace Operations (Challenges Forum).³⁸ The Challenges Forum is an international group of peacekeeping organizations, much like PKI, that enables dialogue through seminars focused on issues within the sphere of peacekeeping operations. Through the Challenges Forum, PKI was able to help build connections with other groups across the globe that shared a similar goal, fulfilling one of its core objectives.

In early 1997, the United States Army War College, with the Army Staff's Force Development Directorate support, proposed to cut all the military staffing of PKI as part of the College's contribution to personnel reduction mandated by the Army's Quadrennial Defense Review.³⁹ In addition to that recommendation, the USAWC issued a statement that proposed that PKI's mission was not a force requirement of the Army and so no funds should be allotted to the institute.⁴⁰ This plan to cut the institute would only have saved the Army 270,000 dollars and given it the ability to redistribute seven military officers. The plan was not to have the entire institute cut out of the USAWC, but to simply have it transferred and absorbed by the Center for Strategic Leadership (CSL); only three civilians would make the transition, in essence destroying the institute.⁴¹

As the proposal became known, many people came forward to defend the Institute. Chief among them was the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy and Requirements, Dr. Edward L. Warner III, who wrote that PKI's "...unique and singular capabilities make it a vital actor in our efforts to construct and implement the peace operations of both our National Security and National Military strategies."⁴²

Dr. Warner further argued that PKI provides

a comprehensive information resource on peace operations to all senior leaders of the Defense Department...a center of expertise and excellence on peace operations which will provide planning support to our regional [Commanders-in-Chief]...serving as [the Defense Department's] main conduit to the academic and research world that [conducts] contemporary research on peace operations.⁴³

Dr. Schear, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Peacekeeping and Humanitarian Assistance, sent a memorandum illustrating that PKI

has an established reputation throughout the international peacekeeping arena as a leader in developing the standards necessary to effectively train military observers and troop contingents for peace operation duties...the loss of PKI will severely hinder our ability to influence and act on the many outstanding issues affecting our peacekeeping interests.⁴⁴

This memorandum eventually made its way to Dr. Warner, who upon researching and hearing out the arguments for keeping the institute open approached the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, Lieutenant General Thomas Burnette.⁴⁵ Eventually the issue came to the attention of Togo West, the Secretary of the Army, who then spoke to Army Chief of Staff General Reimer about his concern about having PKI shut down.⁴⁶ After one phone call from Reimer to the Commandant of USAWC, Major General Robert Scales, the decision to close PKI was reversed.⁴⁷

After the institute survived the 1997 attempted closure, it continued to serve as the Army's expert on peacekeeping operations. It continued to conduct an

annual CJCS Seminar and also sponsored numerous publications and after-action reports. With 9/11 and the wars of Afghanistan, OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM, and Iraq, OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM, PKI and the knowledge it had developed over the past eight years became invaluable.

At the turn of the century, PKI was still a military orphan, as Lorelei Kelly of the Washington Post described.⁴⁸ In 2002 with the Realignment Task Force about to be published, PKI discovered it was going to be dismantled and transferred into the Center for Army Lesson's Learned (CALL), where it would continue its mission with only a fraction of the money and personnel it had.⁴⁹ In response, Colonel George Oliver, the director of PKI at the time, went on the offensive. By March, Lorelei Kelly found over 40 congressional allies for PKI, who wrote to the Secretary of the Army of the importance of keeping the institute open.⁵⁰ Despite the letter, in June 2002, the Army staff decided to close down PKI as part of the Realignment Task Force that was to cut 26 spaces from the USAWC.⁵¹ The decision to use PKI's ten spaces was explained to be a consolidation, moving PKI from Carlisle to CALL in Leavenworth where the two "similar" organizations could be together.⁵² However, when Colonel Oliver called CALL to discuss turnover and facilitate the transition, CALL told him that no one at their establishment "had that kind of experience."⁵³

PKI had friends during this time who came to their rescue. Lorelei Kelly, a senior associate with the Henry L. Stimson Center and congressional liaison, spearheaded a national information campaign to shed light on PKI's closing.⁵⁴ Articles written in *The Army Times*, *the Sentinel*, *TIME* and *Newsweek* gathered the national spotlight on the military's decision to close PKI.⁵⁵

These articles had an underlying theme – the author’s opinion as to why PKI was really being closed was because of the Army’s distaste for doing peace operations.⁵⁶ The *TIME* article, “The Price of Peacekeeping? Too High,” is perhaps the most important one that was written because it reached Secretary Rumsfeld’s inbox and was the driving factor to reverse the decision to close PKI.⁵⁷ Another factor that contributed to the saving of PKI was Colonel Oliver having a letter signed and delivered to Secretary Rumsfeld by retired Lieutenant General Jay Garner when he met with the Defense Secretary.⁵⁸ Both of these factors placed pressure on the Secretary of Defense to reevaluate the closing of the U.S. Army Peacekeeping Institute.

In July of 2003 PKI received word that they would not be shut down after all, the institute had received a reprieve from Secretary Rumsfeld after he had learned of PKI’s fate.⁵⁹ Secretary Rumsfeld sent a memorandum to the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict (ASD-SOLIC) and the Vice Chief of the Army to “come talk to me” about PKI’s closure; that meeting was all it took.⁶⁰ The combination of the media attention in light of the problems that the military faced after the decision to invade Iraq in March of 2003 were the saving graces of the U.S. Army Peacekeeping Institute. As staff recalled, they had packed the organizational files, moved them to the Military History Institute and effectively turned out the lights when resurrected as the Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI).⁶¹

PKI had a brief but busy history since its creation by General Stofft and Sullivan in 1993. Within a decade, it was put on the execution block twice and survived both times. The first time it was saved by the attention of dedicated civilians who were loyal to PKI

and believed in its mission. The second time, in 2003, the institute was saved by a joint effort by members of Congress, a hard-charging director, a media campaign and most importantly the problems that emerged from the invasion of Iraq. The institute started with only three personnel and today's descendant, the U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute has over 40 with an operations budget of over 3,000,000 dollars annually.⁶² The institute has become the expert authority on peacekeeping and stability operations across the Department of Defense, and they are a focal point for interagency cooperation and communication. The institute continues to do after-action reports, annual seminars and conferences, numerous outreach programs and writes publications, such as FM 3-07, *Stability Operations*, that greatly help combatant commanders around the globe. The staff at PKSOI continues to teach electives at the expert level to students attending the USAWC keeping in alignment with the original charter and mission of the institute. With the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the presence the United States has in Libya and the Philippines and the rise of failed states across the world, peacekeeping and stability operations may become the primary mission of the United States Armed Forces for the foreseeable future. Having an organization like PKSOI and its predecessor PKI, a center for developing doctrine, training manuals and expertise on these operations and for educating the leaders of the Army on the ideas of peacekeeping and stability operations, is crucial to the future success of the Army, due to the likelihood that the military will continue to face these same dilemmas in the future.

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
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